CAPTURED: Chechen Islamic State Commander al-Bara al-Shishani Arrested in Ukraine
CAPTURED: Chechen Islamic State Commander al-Bara al-Shishani Arrested in Ukraine
On November 12, the Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) apprehended al-Bara al-Shishani, a leader of the Russian-speaking faction of Islamic State (IS). Al-Bara was arrested in a private house located in the region surrounding Kyiv. According to SBU officials, al-Bara had been residing in Ukraine since 2018, and was using a fake ID (YouTube, November 15). Reportedly, American and Georgian security services assisted their Ukrainian counterparts during the operation (Liga.net, November 15). Al-Bara remains in custody and will most likely be deported to Georgia, where the Tbilisi City Court had already sentenced him to detention in absentia (State Security Service, November 15). Al-Bara’s arrest is the first case of a high-ranking Russian-speaking IS leader being detained.
Early years and Insurgency
The biographical details of al-Bara’s life available in open sources are scarce and sporadic. Al-Bara, a.k.a. Umar, was born as Caesar Tokhosashvili and is ethnic Kist (Georgian Chechen) from the Pankisi Gorge, a place of origin for numerous jihadist leaders, including Umar al-Shishani, Muslim al-Shishani and Seyfullah al-Shishani. He was born in the Omalo village of the Akhmeta municipality of Georgia sometime in the early 1980s (Hromadske, November 19). According to reports from Pankisi, during the second Chechen war, 15-year-old al-Bara joined the Chechen insurgency and participated in reconnaissance operations close to the Chechen-Dagestani border. A former fighter claiming to have known al-Bara says that “he [al-Bara] was not religious, but he was passionate about weapons” (Hromadske, November 19). Al-Bara joined the Syrian conflict in 2012 (YouTube, November 15). Despite his mother’s alleged resistance to his decision, al-Bara left Georgia and traveled to Syria via Turkey (Kviris Palitra, September 11, 2017). Upon his arrival in Syria, al-Bara assembled an armed group called Ahadun Ahad (‘One and Only’), mainly composed of ethnic Chechens. The group operated mainly in the Latakia province alongside Jund al-Sham, led by Muslim al-Shishani. Al-Bara’s group even took part in the 2015 Idlib offensive. Georgian media also reported on al-Bara’s illegal oil smuggling activities (Kviris Palitra, September 11, 2017).
The situation changed dramatically when a personal conflict emerged between al-Bara and Muslim al-Shishani, leading to the end of their partnership. Soon after, sometime in early 2015, al-Bara was severely wounded in the arm and spent some time being treated in Turkey. Upon his return to Syria, al-Bara lacked the resources to continue supplying his autonomous jihadist group, ultimately deciding to dissolve the organization and join Islamic State (Hromadske, November 19). He was reportedly a close associate of Umar al-Shishani and the counter-intelligence service of IS, known as the Amniyat (Novaya Gazeta, November 22). Despite his allegiance to IS, some Georgian sources suggested that al-Bara was pragmatic and not indoctrinated by their ideology. For instance, al-Bara reportedly punished Tamaz Chaghalidze (a.k.a. Ahmad al-Jurji), a leader of the Adjaran (Muslim Georgian) faction of IS for releasing a communique that threatened the Georgian state and Georgian civilians (Kviris Palitra September 11, 2017).
After the collapse of IS, al-Bara’s whereabouts were unknown. In August 2017, Georgian media reported he was killed, along with his wife and four children, when airstrikes hit their position. This was disproved by al-Bara’s mother after she received a message from her son on WhatsApp (Radio Way, September 2, 2017). Al-Bara attempted to return to Georgia, but refrained from doing so due to the strict legislation against returning foreign fighters (Kviris Palitra, September 11, 2017). Eventually, al-Bara moved to Turkey, and then to Ukraine (Novaya Gazeta, November 22).
Al-Bara in Ukraine
Little is known about al-Bara’s activities in Ukraine. Kyiv officials suggest that al-Bara was coordinating the Amniyat activities (zn.ua, November 15). Al-Bara was not the only example of a former jihadist militant who settled in Ukraine. In 2017, the Ukrainian news agency Hromadske reported on the case of former Dagestani IS foreign fighters settling in Ukraine (Hromadske, May 3, 2017). The notorious jihadist Akhmed Chataev was living in the Uzhgorod region of Ukraine prior to his extradition to Georgia. He potentially oversaw an existing jihadist network in Ukraine (Zakarpattya, January 15, 2010).
Several factors make Ukraine an attractive destination for Russian-speaking jihadists. Russian is widely spoken in Ukraine. The absence of a language barrier enables easier travel throughout the country. Chechen jihadists can sometimes rely on anti-Russian solidarity when negotiating with Ukrainian authorities, as tens of Chechens have fought against Russian troops and their proxies in the Donetsk and Luhansk region (Ukrainskaya Pravda, February 3, 2015). Additionally, neither Ukrainian society nor Ukrainian authorities possess an in-depth knowledge of the political violence and instability in the North Caucasus. Furthmore, unlike central regions of Russia, Islamophobia or Caucasophobia is not as widespread in Ukraine. And finally, existing corruption allow jihadists and other illicit actors to obtain a residence permit and other documents in Ukraine (Segonya.ua, September 4, 2018). This combination of factors enables jihadist migrants to remain undetected for a period of time.
Another issue is the ease with which al-Bara was able to reside in Turkey, and from there travel to Ukraine. Owing to the geographic vicinity of the country, many Russian-speaking jihadists fled to Turkey following the collapse of the IS caliphate. Turkish media have frequently reported on the arrests of Russian-speaking members of IS (Gazete Duvar, October 12, 2018). How al-Bara received his travel documents raises several questions. They could have been obtained either in Syria or in Turkey. Either case indicates severe security problems in Turkey, as al-Bara seemingly passed Turkish passport control with fraudulent documents.
Outlook
Al-Bara is the first detained high-ranking Russian-speaking IS commander, who possesses information on the finances and transnational networks of IS. Whether or not he has yet collaborated with the investigation is unknown. Ukrainian security services have previously detained members of jihadist terrorist organizations, but the details are usually not disclosed due to security considerations (Novaya Gazeta, November 22).
This raises the question of why Ukrainian authorities decided to publicize the case. An extradition request from Georgian authorities is highly unlikely: as long as Tbilisi’s relationship with the Pankisi Gorge remains problematic, Georgian authorities will not be enthusiastic to receive a high-ranking jihadist detainee from that region, even if he is a Georgian citizen. The case of IS returnee David Borchashvili—who was refused entry to Georgia several times during his deportation from Turkey—is an illustration of Tbilisi’s refusal to accept returning IS fighters (Radio Tavisupleba, November 23, 2015). The reason for al-Bara’s arrest could be that attitudes towards North Caucasian and jihadist migrants in Ukraine are changing, as their presence in Ukraine could be used by Russian officials as a pretext to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs and label the country as a hotbed for terrorism.
Upon his extradition to Georgia, al-Bara will most likely be convicted for “joining terrorist organization abroad,” which, according to Article 328 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, calls for a prison sentence of 10 to 17 years (Criminal Code of Georgia). He will be the latest in a recent series of convicted Georgian militants, as authorities have recently arrested alleged recruiter Ayub Borchashvili, members of the Adjarian (an ethnic group of Georgians) faction of IS and David Borchashvili (Batumelebi, April 13, 2016). Nevertheless, he is unlikely to have an impact on the residents of Pankisi gorge from prison.
Conclusion
Although al-Bara was overshadowed by other Russian-speaking leaders of IS like Umar al-Shishani, Gulmurod Khalimov, Ahmed Chataev and Abu Jihad due to his limited appearances in jihadist propaganda videos, he was among the key IS operational militants. His involvement in the siege of Idlib and return to the theater after his injury suggests his commitment as a field commander. Most likely, he did not cut off communication with his fellow jihadists after he fled Syria, potentially offering intelligence agencies useful information on any terrorist network operating within Ukraine and the Caucasus. Nevertheless, al-Bara’s jihadist career has likely been terminated by his arrest and detention for the next 10 years.
