Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere

Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere

Executive Summary:

• Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington.
• The Kremlin’s relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela’s oil reserves, and cultivate an alliance aligned with an anti-Western agenda.
• Russian energy firms have gained oil stakes and repayment-in-kind options for investments in Venezuela, while joint financial ventures and Venezuela’s crypto experiments have served as testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms later adapted by Russia.
• Arms transfers, military-industrial collaboration, and media partnerships through RT, Sputnik, and TeleSur expanded Russia’s military footprint and narrative reach in the Western Hemisphere, though the financial return on Russian investments remains limited and challenged by U.S. pushback.

Russian state media and political commentators have had mixed responses to the U.S. capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. Official Kremlin sources strongly condemned U.S. actions as “military aggression” and a violation of Venezuelan sovereignty, calling for Maduro’s release and convening the UN Security Council (Interfax, January 5). The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed “concern” and solidarity with Venezuela. Pro-Kremlin media and military bloggers criticized the United States for “piracy” and “neocolonialism” (RTVI, January 3). Moscow’s relatively restrained reaction may be to avoid worsening relations with Washington amid negotiations about Ukraine, reflecting a mix of ideologically-grounded rhetoric and pragmatism in Russian information narratives (RTVI, January 3). Despite the geopolitical benefits Moscow has gained from long-term relations with Caracas, the economic rewards have not always been evident. Russia does not appear ready to face U.S. wrath if it decides to harden its position on Maduro’s ouster. 

Relations between Moscow and Caracas warmed in the early 2000s, when Hugo Chávez sought a counterweight to Washington’s influence and support from states advocating a “multipolar world.” Russia noticed this alignment and saw an opportunity to return to Latin America as a trading partner and geopolitical force (Russian International Affairs Council, March 17, 2015). Between 2008 and 2010, former presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Chávez signed cooperation documents in energy, oil and gas, finance, and the military-technical sphere (RIA Novosti, September 26, 2008;  Vesti.ru, October 15, 2010). For Russia, strengthening ties with Venezuela was important in three main ways. First, it has allowed Russia to go beyond alliance with Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, demonstrating that it could form anti-U.S. linkages in Washington’s “backyard.” Second, it has granted Russia access to the world’s largest oil reserves and the ability to diversify its own exports by gaining stakes in Venezuelan energy and mineral projects (Vedomosti, August 8, 2017).  Third, it has provided Moscow with an allied vote in international organizations in line with its increasingly anti-Western agenda (Russian International Affairs Council, March 14, 2025).

Moscow’s ties with Caracas help it to build the “rogue” oil axis. Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves at approximately 47 billion tons, which is significantly more than any other country (Financi, January 3). The Russian–Venezuelan alliance enabled Russian companies, primarily Rosneft, to acquire stakes in several joint enterprises in Venezuela. For example, at various points, Rosneft held shares in Petromonagas, Petrovictoria, Petroperija, Boqueron, and Petromiranda, including in the Orinoco Belt (Oil Exp, accessed January 10). Russian experts argue that this structure allowed Moscow to convert political support for Caracas into a long-term flow of oil—Russia received physical oil in exchange for loans that would be resold on world markets with spread margins (TRT Na Russkom, January 9). 

Russia has worked with Venezuela to build non-Western financial systems and model sanctions evasion. For example, Russia’s VTB and Gazprombank held a controlling stake in a joint Russian–Venezuelan bank featuring $4 billion in charter capital (Finam, September 10, 2009). Russia gained invaluable lessons in bypassing or mitigating Western sanctions by closely studying Venezuela’s financial workarounds and alternative oil trading routes (Russian International Affairs Council, accessed January 9). 

Collaboration with Caracas also provided Russia with lessons in navigating new non-Western payment methods. Venezuela, for instance, was among the first states to attempt a sovereign cryptocurrency, dubbed the petro, formally backed by its immense natural resources (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 20, 2018). At that time, Russian analysts and subject experts theorized that it would be beneficial for Russia to take part in petro development as a means to gain experience for future alternative payment systems (Gazeta.ru, April 27, 2018). Although the petro essentially collapsed by 2024, the Kremlin clearly took note of cryptocurrencies and other alternative payment methods as a workable sanctions-evasion mechanism (see EDM, June 5, 2024). By 2025, Russian oil companies were using digital assets to convert yuan and rupees into rubles, bypassing U.S.-controlled financial channels (SIA, March 14, 2025).

In 2006, Russia rushed to fill the military-industrial vacuum left after the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela and halted maintenance of its F-16 fleet (TASS, December 16, 2014). Since 2006, Russia has fulfilled several large military contracts with Venezuela. In 2006, Rosoboronexport signed a contract for 24 Russian Su-30MK2 fighters valued at roughly $1.5 billion; delivery was completed by 2008. Venezuela demonstrated its Su-30MK2 aircrafts—armed with Kh-31 missiles—during the September 2025 “Sovereign Caribbean 200” exercises in response to U.S. naval activity in the Caribbean (1.ru, September 21, 2025). Russia also constructed facilities for licensed AK-103 production and ammunition, along with purchases of tanks, artillery, and air-defense systems such as the S-300 and short-range complexes (Vslukh.ru, September 12, 2009). Russian defense experts believe that these exports helped sustain Russia’s defense-industrial base and demonstrated its capacity to work with “politically toxic” regimes. Russia’s military-industrial relationship with Venezuela provided Moscow with a roadmap for dealing with similar regime clients in Asia and Africa (Russian International Affairs Council, March 17, 2015).

Russia also benefited from working with Venezuela to spread anti-Western narratives. After its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia embarked on a steady expansion of its media influence in the Spanish-speaking world through RT en Español and Sputnik. RT has demonstrated steady audience growth in Venezuela, where it is carried by local cable operators and competes with Western networks (Cyberleninka, accessed January 7). Russia’s collaboration with Venezuela’s TeleSur, which produces Russian-driven English and Spanish-language narratives about Latin America, was one of the Kremlin’s most successful projects in the Western hemisphere’s information environment (Golos Ameriki, November 29, 2023). Venezuela serves as a launchpad to spread pro-Russian, anti-U.S. narratives across the region. In 2024, Venezuela’s Ministry of Communication and the Russian Sputnik agency signed an exchange agreement, and Sputnik journalists began appearing regularly on Maduro’s television programs, institutionalizing informational cooperation (Libertador, November 26, 2024).

Caracas has become one of Russia’s key partners in Latin America (Russian International Affairs Council, November 14, 2025). Venezuela also became a venue for collaboration between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in the region. Until now, Russia and the PRC have largely managed to avoid competition in the Caribbean basin, dividing roles. While Beijing mainly engaged through finance and infrastructure, Moscow focused on military and energy. Both posed a range of challenges to the United States and its interests in the region. The PRC and Russia’s influence, however, have reportedly been damaged by Maduro’s ouster, at least in the short term (Eurasia Today, January 8). Despite limited financial return on investments for Russia’s state, and Russian elite profits difficult to measure, cooperation with Venezuela delivered geopolitical benefits for Russia and, perhaps even more so, to the PRC (RBC, October 18, 2018). Russia’s engagement with Venezuela demonstrates that even with very limited resources, a powerful outsider can build strategic footholds near U.S. borders.