A Post-Mortem Analysis of Former Chechen Field Commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili
A Post-Mortem Analysis of Former Chechen Field Commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili
On August 23, a former Chechen field commander and veteran of the second Chechen war, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, was shot in Berlin. He was shot twice before the perpetrator attempted to flee the scene on a scooter. Although Moscow officially denies involvement in the assassination, according to German media the suspect is a Russian citizen who was arrested before he could escape the area (DW, August 28). Khangoshvili was buried in his home village in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and his funeral ceremony was attended by almost the whole male population of the region (Ekho Kavkaza, August 29). Khangoshvili’s assassination led to protest demonstrations organized by Chechen diasporas across the whole of Europe (DW, August 31).
Background
Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a.k.a. Zelim Dishny, was born in August 1979 to an ethnic Chechen (Kist) family in the village of Duisi, located in the Akhmeta municipality of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. In 1991, Khangoshvili moved along with his relatives to Chechnya. He did not take part in the first Chechen war and moved back to Pankisi. Khangoshvili, however, joined the Chechen insurgency during the second Chechen war, fighting under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and the Arab foreign fighter Abu Walid. By 2002 he was in command of approximately 60 fighters. Between 2004-2005, Khangoshvili disengaged from militancy and moved back to Georgia, via Khasavyurt (Dagestan) and Azerbaijan. Following his return to Georgia Khangoshvili changed his name in a newly issued Georgian passport due to security considerations. He took his mother’s last name to travel as Tornike Kavtarashvili (Der Tagesspiegel, August 27; Kviris Palitra May 29, 2015; Resonancedaily August 27).
Little is known about the operations conducted by Khangoshvili’s group during the second Chechen war. On some footage released in social media, Khangoshvili appeared in a heavily forested area, as his group engaged in asymmetric warfare (YouTube, August 27). Russian authorities accused Khangoshvili of being the mastermind of an attack in the city of Nazran in Ingushetia in 2004 (Ekho Kavkaza, May 29, 2015). Furthermore, Khangoshvili was shown in an undated photo seated alongside the third president of the breakaway Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov (Reginfo August 2018). Neither Russian officials nor media outlets confirmed his direct or indirect involvement in the terrorist attacks and hostage-taking operations that infamously took place in Beslan, North Ossetia and Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater. Khangoshvili was never placed on an Interpol wanted list, which allowed him to travel to different countries. Unlike the vast majority of former Chechen militants, Khangoshvili was open to communicating with the media and he even had a Facebook profile (Facebook/zelimxan.xangoshvili, August 23).
Khangoshvili in Georgia
After his disengagement from active militancy, Khangoshvili maintained contact with the Georgian security services. Gia Lortkipanidze, who was Georgian deputy minister of interior affairs responsible for counter-terrorism under President Mikheil Saakashvili, spoke of this connection in an interview, saying:
“If somebody is in contact with you, it does not mean that he is your agent. Neither Khangoshvili, nor Ruslan Papaskiri, are my agents. I had and still have friendly relationships with them…For us information and maintaining control over the situation was important, so we were relying on their authority” (Frontnews December 1, 2014).
During the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Khangoshvili mobilized approximately 200 volunteers from Pankisi to fight against the Russian troops, though they did not take part in combat due to the ceasefire (Der Taggespiegel August 27). Although Khangoshvili was not an active member of the Caucasus Emirate—an Islamist North Caucasian separatist group—he maintained contact with the group’s mujahedeen and had credibility among them. Owing to his personal linkages, Georgian authorities used Khangoshvili as a mediator during the negotiations between the North Caucasian rebels and Georgian special forces in Lapankuri, which ended in a skirmish between the two groups in what became known as the “Lopota Incident” (Interpressnews, August 24).
Khangoshvili was comfortable in Georgia during Saakashvili’s administration, owing to his personal contacts and cooperation with high-ranking Georgian security practitioners. Saakashvili himself called Khangoshvili a “brave man and patriot of Georgia” in a Facebook post following his death (Primetime, August 27). After the 2012 transition of power in Georgia, when the Saakashvili-led United National Movement was replaced by Georgian Dream, Khangoshvili immediately became the target of frequent interrogations owing to his involvement in the Lapankuri events. “I have been interrogated 11 or 12 times. Once I spent nine hours being interrogated,” Khangoshvili said (Accentnews, August 28).
According to his brother, Khangoshvili survived several assassination attempts. The first unsuccessful attempt took place prior to 2008, when a group from Pankisi planned to kidnap Khangoshvili and transport him to Russia. The group was uncovered and the perpetrators were detained (Vayfond August 26). Later, in 2015, Khangoshvili survived another assassination attempt in Tbilisi city center, during which he was severely wounded in the arm. The perpetrator managed to evade arrest and escape the country. The assassination attempt was not investigated properly, and Georgian authorities declined Khangoshvili’s request to provide him with a state guard (Accentnews August 24). These circumstances forced Khangoshvili to flee Georgia. His first destination was Ukraine (Radioway August 24). According to Georgian media, while in Ukraine, Khangoshvili cooperated with local counter-intelligence agents against Russian influence operations (Resonancedaily August 26). In 2016, Khangoshvili moved to Germany and applied for asylum status (DW August 28). Khangoshvili neither took part in the Syrian conflict nor pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS).
Who Could be Behind the Assassination?
Although German authorities have not disclosed detailed information regarding the investigation of Khangoshvili’s assassination, several theories have been circulating in Western and regional media. The prime suspect in this case is Russian intelligence. Khangoshvili was included on a list of Russian federal fugitives, making this version credible. Khangoshvili believed he was a subject of interest to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). As he explained in an interview: “I received information about the new group hired for my assassination. According to my sources, this FSB-linked group was based in North Ossetia.” Khangoshvili added: “Besides I had information about the murder plot of three individuals—me and two Georgian generals. I will refrain to disclose their identities. I spoke with one of them and he had similar information…This was preceded by pressure on my sister and brother-in-law residing in Russia” (Accentnews August 24).
German media has suggested that the suspect in the murder was holding a passport bearing the name of Vadim Sokolov. Furthermore, a joint investigation by Spiegel, Bellingcat, and The Insider revealed that the passport number of the suspect could be linked to a particular unit in Russia’s interior ministry that issued travel documents for members of Russia’s military security service (Spiegel October 2). Khangoshvili’s assassination resembles a series of recent murders of Chechen dissidents. Since the early 2000s, prominent dissidents such as Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Umar Israilov, and many other Chechens have been killed while in exile (Ekho Kavkaza August 26). Moreover, during the past several years, the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has substantially increased his influence with the Chechen diaspora, which gives him greater leeway in using force against potential opponents (Kavkazskiy Uzel January 7, 2017).
Another theory, one which has been pushed by Georgian experts close to the country’s government, is that Khangoshvili’s murder was revenge by family members of the Chechen youth recruited by insurgent groups in the North Caucasus (Imedi News, August 24). Nevertheless, even after the skirmish in Lapankuri, over the several years Khangoshvili spent in Tbilisi and the Pankisi Gorge, no conflict with his compatriots were reported. Furthermore, Khangoshvili had no criminal record in Georgia, and his direct or indirect involvement in organized crime was highly unlikely, especially since organized crime is not widespread among the Chechens from Pankisi. The largest Russian organized crime database contains the name of only one ethnic Chechen from Georgia (Prime Crime).
And finally, the assassination potentially could have stemmed from cleavages between various Russian-speaking jihadist factions. Prior to his departure from Georgia, Khangoshvili had distanced himself from the jihadist groups operating in Syria. In an interview, Khangoshvili mentioned that the IS Chechen commander Akhmed Chataev was upset with him after he was released from prison in Georgia (Accentnews August 28). Nevertheless, Chataev and many other Russian-speaking IS-sworn militant leaders were killed before Khangoshvili’s assassination.
Additionally, while in Europe, Khangoshvili received numerous threatening messages on his cell phone from anonymous Georgian numbers in the Georgian language with the following text: “Do you think that we don’t know where you are? You’d better come back and be here” (Accentnews August 24).
Future Implications
The assassination of Khangoshvili could have an impact on several fronts. First, he was among the few surviving veterans of the Chechen war capable of bridging the gap between the state and insurgents. Such mediators are critically important in the Caucasus, where informal contacts and personal relationships matter. Today, the inability of state officials to communicate with non-state clandestine actors, especially during emergency situations such as the Lopota incident, is highly problematic.
Second, Khangoshvili was known for his moderate position. His death and that of Isa Munayev—who fought alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian-backed separatists—and other moderate Chechen field commanders will make possible the rise of young, inexperienced and more radical actors. According to Kavkazskiy Uzel, the vast majority of militants recently killed in Chechnya were in their early twenties, and therefore highly unlikely to have interacted with the veterans of the first and second Chechen wars (Kavkazskiy Uzel September 10).
Third, Khangoshvili’s assassination will increase skepticism towards Europe and the Western world among Chechens, especially in the Chechen diaspora. The famous Chechen YouTube blogger Tumso Abdurakhmanov has accused German authorities of lacking interest in protecting Chechen refugees. It is noteworthy that Khangoshvili was refused asylum status in Germany despite having been wounded in a separate assassination attempt in Tbilisi (YouTube August 30).
Khangoshvili’s assassination could further increase the grievances that people in the Pankisi Gorge have against Georgian authorities. Georgian human rights activist Tamta Mikeladze believes that Georgian officials over the last four years did nothing to investigate the earlier attempt to assassinate Khangoshvili (Radio Tavisupleba August 24). In his last interview, Khangoshvili metaphorically described his recent relationships with Georgian authorities, saying “they are telling you that we are brothers, but being stabbed in the back cannot be a brotherhood” (Accentnews August 24). Combined with recent events, such as the murder of a 17-year-old Pankisi resident Tamerlan Machalikashvili and clashes between Georgian police and locals in Pankisi over the construction of a hydropower plant, the Georgian authorities’ ambiguous position on Khangoshvili’s assassination could create the sense that the Georgian state facilitated his assassination.
