Abadi’s Ally in Ninewah: Militia Leader Abd al-Rahim al-Shammari Defends Iraq’s Territorial Integrity

Abadi’s Ally in Ninewah: Militia Leader Abd al-Rahim al-Shammari Defends Iraq’s Territorial Integrity

The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) referendum on independence that was held on September 25 has faced extensive criticism from a range of Iraqi and international actors. Among the critics are prominent Arab Sunni Iraqi politicians concerned with the territorial integrity of the strategic and restive Ninewah governorate, which Peshmerga forces loyal to the KRG have come to control over the course of the counter-Islamic State (IS) campaign (Rudaw [Erbil], September 28). One of the most prominent Arab Sunni Iraqi critics of the KRG referendum, and of the possibility that KRG independence will absorb a large area of Ninewah away from Iraq, is Abd al-Rahim Jasim Muhammad Mutlaq al-Shammari al-Jarba, a member of the Iraqi parliament from Ninewah governorate (Rudaw [Erbil], September 12; NRT TV [Baghad], September 9). Al-Shammari, who is one of the most important Arab Sunni politicians and militia leaders loyal to the government led by Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi in Baghdad, has been a vocal critic of the KRG and all its local partners, including fellow Arab Sunnis, that would work for Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence (Iraq Akhbar [Baghdad], September 10; Facebook, July 4; Kurdistan Democratic Party, January 9).

Background

Al-Shammari, 46, is a native of the town of al-Ba’aj, which is in Ninewah governorate near the Iraqi-Syrian border and is located approximately 170 kilometers west of the city of Mosul. He is a member of the Jarba section of the Shammar tribal confederation, which is powerful in northwestern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northern Saudi Arabia. Al-Shammari comes from a prominent family within the Jarba. He has steadily built a political career, and throughout his career he has been charged with important positions in the local, provincial and national levels of government. In the post-Saddam period, he served as the chief political officer of the al-Ba’aj district. From there, he assumed a position on the Ninewah governorate security council, within which he became a ranking member with responsibility for Mosul (YouTube, March 16, 2015; YouTube, April 26, 2014; Agence France Presse, August 23, 2013; The New York Times, February 12, 2012). Then in 2014, al-Shammari was elected to the Iraqi parliament, representing the Sinjar district as part of the National Alliance, a political bloc headed up by Ayad Allawi, a prominent Shia Arab Iraqi politician who has built a pan-sectarian, pan-ethnic, “nationalist” political movement (al-Watnia [Baghdad]; Facebook, September 26). Since being elected to the Iraqi parliament, al-Shammari has steadily increased his political profile, including his election to his current position as the chief of the Iraqi parliament’s Human Rights Commission in September 2016 (Iraqi News [Baghdad], October 29, 2016; The Baghdad Post, September 27, 2016)

Organizing Sunni Resistance to Islamic State

Shortly after al-Shammari was elected to the Iraqi parliament in 2014, IS began its offensive that captured Mosul and most of Ninewah governorate. In addition to his role as a prominent MP from Ninewah governorate, al-Shammari is the overall commander of Quwat al-Nawadir, an affiliate of the Hashd Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Units-PMU) organization that is primarily organized from the Jarba branch of the Shammar confederation (YouTube, February 25; YouTube, January 13). Quwat al-Nawadir is considered to be one of the most important Sunni Arab-majority PMU groups, and it has an estimated 1,500 fighters. Al-Shammari established the group as part of a mobilization of his tribesmen not long after IS seized Mosul and most of Ninewah governorate, and he was one of the first and most prominent Sunni Arab leaders from Ninewah to organize resistance to IS (al-Nahar [Beirut], November 27, 2016; YouTube, December 3, 2014; Knooz Media [Ninewah], September 5, 2014). Al-Shammari mobilized Quwat al-Nawadir mainly from his tribe: it was a preexisting network of Shammar tribal fighters that had fought IS’ predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), as part of the Sons of Iraq network of Sunni Arab resistance against al-Qaeda (Diyaruna [Ninewah], July 29, 2016). He saw the opportunity for his tribesmen to both liberate their villages from IS, particularly in and around the Sinjar, al-Ba’aj and Rabia districts on the Iraqi-Syrian border, and to demonstrate that Sunnis could also be loyal Iraqis in response to sectarian attacks against Sunnis after IS began its military campaign following the fall of Mosul (YouTube, August 3; YouTube, June 8; YouTube, August 4, 2016).

Quwat al-Nawadir has fought closely together with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party-influenced Iraqi Yazidi armed organization Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê‎ (YBS-Sinjar Resistance Units), in the Sinjar district of northwestern Iraq. Most of the Shammar fighters in Quwat al-Nawadir are from the districts neighboring the Yazidi-majority Sinjar district, including al-Shammari’s native area of al-Ba’aj, and al-Shammari, when he was the political head of the Ba’aj district, actively engaged with his Yazidi neighbors (Diyaruna [Ninewah], July 29, 2016;  ARA News [Sinjar], April 3, 2016; YouTube, March 26, 2016). Al-Shammari developed this alliance with the YBS, which although not currently active has reached a peaceful understanding between the Shammar communities under his influence and the YBS to resist the superior forces brought to bear on the areas around the Sinjar and al-Ba’aj district by IS (for more on the Iraqi Yazidi armed opposition to ISIS, see MLM Brief, September 6). He was able to activate this cooperation thanks to his connections within the Yazidi community that he built through years of political engagement while serving as the chief of the al-Ba’aj district. These connections were built through events like in 2007 when ISI conducted a mass casualty attack against Yazidis in Sinjar, killing over 200 people. Al-Shammari was the political chief of the Ba’aj municipality at the time, and in that position and later when he served as a ranking member of the Ninewah governorate security council, he was responsible for organizing the security for Sinjar and its surrounding districts (Agence France Presse, August 23, 2013; al-Hadbaa [Mosul], July 25, 2009). For his efforts to promote inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cooperation, and for his actions against ISI in Ninewah, he was targeted for assassination by the militant Salafist organization in September 2008 and continues to be a high-value target of IS (Burath News [Ninewah], September 27, 2008).

Since the start of the counter-IS campaign in July 2014, al-Shammari has emerged as a key Sunni Arab ally of the Abadi government. He has frequently appeared on Iraqi television extolling the virtues of a non-sectarian, Iraqi nationalist political platform to build inter-communal trust and to maintain security in Iraq based on Iraq’s territorial integrity (al-Ghad Press [Baghdad], September 10; YouTube, October 11, 2016; YouTube, September 12, 2016). Also, he has been a vocal defender of the Sunni Arab community, and has sought to highlight the grievances of the Sunni community with their inclusion in the governance and society in Iraq in the post-Saddam period (Iraqiyoon Press [Baghdad], October 2). However, he has gone on major Arab television channels to defend the PMUs, and to inform audiences that the PMUs draw from the local population, including from the Sunni Arab tribes. Al-Shammari supports the PMUs role in the anti-IS campaign in Ninewah, particularly if the PMUs are drawn from the local population (al-Sumaria TV [Baghdad], October 16, 2016; YouTube, April 13, 2015).

Conclusion

Abd al-Rahim al-Shammari is one of the most important Arab Sunni leaders in Ninewah governorate, and he has become more prominent in Iraqi national politics in the years since IS captured Mosul in June 2014. His influence in post-conflict Ninewah is poised to grow thanks to his command over a tight-knit Sunni Arab tribal force that works in alliance with the PMU organization, and to his public support for the Abadi government. Both attributes position al-Shammari to be a key interlocutor between the people of the newly-liberated areas of Ninewah and the central government in Baghdad, and he has sought to emphasize this role in his appearances in the Iraqi media as the counter-IS campaign has been prosecuted and reconquered many areas in Ninewah, including Mosul, from IS.

Al-Shammari’s long-standing opposition to al-Qaeda and IS, and his willingness to take a generally “Iraqi nationalist,” rather than sectarian, view on events in Ninewah governorate, are also important. He is taking firm public stances that reflect his alliance with Abadi, such as opposition to a Turkish military presence in northwestern Syria, opposition to the KRG referendum, support for Sunni Arab PMU affiliates and the reestablishment of a pro-Baghdad Ninewah governorate council. His overall command of Quwat al-Nawadir, and his militia’s association with the PMU organization, is another source of political strength for al-Shammari. His force is strategically located in the Iraqi-Syrian border region near one of the more important border crossings, Rabia, providing it with the potential for continued financial and military support from Baghdad in exchange for securing this border region.

For these reasons, from the perspective of the Abadi government in Baghdad, al-Shammari is an ideal type of Sunni Arab leader. Al-Shammari is an actively serving member of the Iraqi parliament, and while it might be expected that he would align with the Abadi government due to his current position, the pervasiveness of sectarian tension in Iraqi society makes his strong, public statements of support for Haidar al-Abadi noteworthy. His ability to raise a credible Arab Sunni tribal force against Islamic State and willingly command that force to pragmatically engage with and fight next to a range of partners, such as the Yazidi Kurdish-majority YBŞ and predominately southern Iraqi Shia PMU groups, further underscores his political flexibility. However, al-Shammari is also a high-value target for assassination, a longstanding one for militant Salafist groups, and potentially a new target for actors as diverse as the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Asayish, supporters of the Turkish-backed Moslawi Arab Sunni leader Atheel al-Nujaifi, and even PMU groups if al-Shammari were to challenge their role in post-conflict Ninewah. Yet as long as he survives, Abd al-Rahim al-Shammari will likely continue to become more influential and solidify himself as one of the more powerful Arab Sunni leaders in Iraq.