Abdelmalek Droukdel and Boko Haram: A Post-Mortem Analysis on the AQIM Leader’s Ties to the Nigerian Terrorist Group
Abdelmalek Droukdel and Boko Haram: A Post-Mortem Analysis on the AQIM Leader’s Ties to the Nigerian Terrorist Group
Abdelmalek Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadud) was the leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) since 2006—or since 2004, if his stint leading AQIM’s predecessor, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), is included. His death was announced on June 11, and heralded the end of an era. He was killed in a raid by French special forces in Talhandak, Mali, near the Algerian border. Droukdel was the longest-serving leader of any major jihadist group, having overseen not only the GSPC’s affiliation with al-Qaeda in 2006, but also AQIM’s expansion from Algeria into the Sahel and northern Nigeria. The jihad in the Sahel and Nigeria has far exceeded the intensity of the jihad in Algeria itself.
One of the ironies of Droukdel’s career is that while AQIM was formed to wage jihad in Algeria, it did not find unprecedented success there, but in countries further south. Droukdel was also overshadowed by more charismatic AQIM-allied jihadists in the Sahel like Mokhtar Belmokhtar or AQIM’s highest-ranked Sahel-based brigade leader, Abu Zeid, whose kidnappings netted AQIM tens of millions of dollars. Nevertheless, although Droukdel may have appeared aloof toward AQIM’s expansion into the Sahel compared to other commanders—such as Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid, who were actually based in the region—his record of supporting Nigerian jihadists in Boko Haram is often overlooked. When the Nigerians sought to launch their jihad in 2009, Droukdel provided strategic leadership and acceded to all their requests.
This post-mortem analysis of Droukdel discusses his support for Boko Haram and his delegating the Nigeria portfolio to other commanders, including Abu Zeid, who were closer to the action in Nigeria from their Malian bases than Droukdel was from his Algerian base. This would be the same base from which he traveled into northern Mali before the U.S.-assisted French special operation that killed him two months ago (France24, June 5). The picture of Droukdel that emerges from this profile is not of a leader who was aloof to Nigeria or the Sahel, but one who was committed primarily to jihad in Algeria and understood his limitations in those regions. Therefore, Droukdel empowered others, including Abu Zeid, to extend the jihad as far as Nigeria.
Initial GSPC Leadership Contacts with Nigerians
Droukdel took over leadership of the GSPC in August 2004 when his predecessor, Nabil Sahrawi (a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim Mustapha), was killed in an Algerian counter-terrorism operation. Sahrawi himself had some interest in Nigeria because he passed messages to al-Qaeda member Ibrahim Harun. Harun was a Saudi citizen from the Nigerian Hausa diaspora, and was deployed by al-Qaeda to Nigeria in August 2003 (U.S. E.D.N.Y, 2017). At the same time, GSPC members were also operating in Nigeria, so it was unsurprising that Sahrawi would utilize them to convey messages to Harun (Jeune Afrique, May 10, 2004). Harun then sent a Boko Haram (then called “Nigerian Taliban”) member to Pakistan to transfer Sahrawi’s messages to al-Qaeda Central (Refworld.org, April 30, 2008).
After Sahrawi’s death, few direct contacts existed between the GSPC and Boko Haram, which itself was in disarray after a December 2003 crackdown on the group by security forces. However, there were still dozens of Nigerians, including some from Boko Haram and some independent of the group, who trained with the GSPC (Agence France-Presse, June 21, 2012). This is why Droukdel mentioned Nigerians being trained by AQIM in a 2008 interview with the New York Times (New York Times, July 1, 2008). Droukdel’s interview occurred around one year after he himself formalized the GSPC’s affiliation with al-Qaeda and AQIM’s formation by pledging loyalty to Osama bin Laden, which was accepted by Ayman al-Zawahiri in a video interview (Paldf.net, September 14, 2006; Al-Sahab, September 11, 2006).
Droukdel and Boko Haram’s Jihad
Droukdel was forced to react directly to the jihadist situation in Nigeria after Nigerian security forces killed Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf and several hundred followers in July 2009. This was the second major crackdown on the group. After this, Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau, became the new Boko Haram leader and sent three emissaries to meet Abu Zeid in AQIM camps in Mali, including Khalid al-Barnawi, who would later form the Ansaru faction that opposed Shekau’s ruthlessness in killing Muslim civilians (al-Andalus, April 2017).
In mid-August 2009, Abu Zeid wrote Droukdel to discuss the meetings he had with Shekau’s “delegation” and explained to Droukdel that they requested arms, finances and weapons in order to wage jihad in Nigeria. However, Abu Zeid also noted Khalid al-Barnawi and his co-fighters previously lived with him in the Mali-Niger border region before 2009 and that Boko Haram planned to wage guerrilla warfare once it had recovered from the July 2009 crackdown (al-Andalus, April 2017).
Droukdel was evidently informed about the situation in Nigeria as even before Abu Zeid’s letter reached him, he released a statement through AQIM’s al-Andalus media agency condemning the “evil Christian Nigerian army” that “brutally killed around 800 Muslims” in the July 2009 clashes, while also honoring Muhammed Yusuf as a “martyr” (al-Andalus, August 20, 2009). This demonstrated that Droukdel, either through his deputies or his own personal monitoring of the situation in Nigeria, was aware of Muhammed Yusuf and thought highly of him.
Nevertheless, Droukdel’s emphasis on blaming Christians for the crackdown on Boko Haram when Nigerian’s president and local leaders who authorized the move were Muslims indicated Droukdel’s lack of knowledge of Nigeria. Alternatively, Droukdel may simply have been interested in Boko Haram responding by attacking Christians and sparing Muslims, whose support the group would need to wage jihad. It is notable, therefore, that AQIM approved of Ansaru’s separation from Shekau in October 2011 and that Ansaru, as Droukdel had recommended, specifically targeted Christians and Westerners in Nigeria (al-Andalus, April 2017).
Droukdel’s Response to Abu Zeid on Boko Haram
When Droukdel finally responded to Abu Zeid in September 2009, he approved all of Boko Haram’s requests, indicating he was giving his full backing to AQIM’s support of the Nigerian militant group. Also notable was Droukdel’s advice that Abu Zeid should convey to Boko Haram that Muslims civilians should be spared and that Christian proselytizers, Westerners, and the Nigerian government be targeted with “special operations.” Droukdel further promised media support to Boko Haram (al-Andalus, April 2017).
This would explain why Abubakar Shekau’s October 2010 Eid el-Fitr written statement was released not by Boko Haram, but by AQIM’s al-Andalus media agency. AQIM released an April 2010 video showing clips from al-Jazeera documenting the killings of Boko Haram members in July 2009 (al-Andalus, October 2, 2010; al-Andalus, April 12, 2010). Finally, Droukdel also encouraged Sahel-based AQIM commanders to manage the relationship with Boko Haram, indicating that they were closer to the Nigerian group than Droukdel himself and could better “supervise” Boko Haram’s training (al-Andalus, April 2017).
Droukdel approved al-Andalus’ efforts in publicizing Boko Haram and Shekau, at least until the latter fell out with AQIM, and he issued the statement honoring Yusuf’s martyrdom. Droukdel also issued another February 2010 statement through al-Andalus condemning the “genocide” in Nigeria and promising arms, training and fighters to “defend” Nigerian Muslims from “Christian minority aggression” (al-Andalus, February 2, 2010). Furthermore, in July 2010, Droukdel instructed Abu Zeid to provide 200,000 euros to Boko Haram, which was funneled into Nigeria by Khalid al-Barnawi (al-Andalus, April 2017). Thus, by mid-2010 Droukdel had offered the full array of AQIM support to Boko Haram in terms of training, finances, weapons, and media, and he concluded by delegating the AQIM-Boko Haram relationship to his Sahel-based commanders.
AQIM and Boko Haram after Droukdel’s Departure
The history of AQIM and Boko Haram after Droukdel’s departure from management of the relationship is fairly well-known. By 2012, AQIM approved Ansaru’s formation, and although sporadic communications with Shekau persisted, Boko Haram never returned to AQIM’s fold (see TM, January 10, 2013). Rather, Boko Haram eventually became interested in Islamic State and by 2015 Shekau had pledged his loyalty to Abubakar al-Baghdadi.
Droukdel’s intervention in Nigeria, however, was also not an aberration. He became involved in advising AQIM-allied Malian jihadists when they occupied territory in 2012. However, they did not listen to Droukdel’s advice about gradually implementing sharia on a religiously inexperienced population and instead imposed severe sharia punishments that alienated local civilians (Associated Press, April 2012). Moreover, eventually some of those Sahelian jihadists formed Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), which, like Boko Haram’s successor, Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), became opposed to AQIM.
In this regard, one can view Droukdel’s record as AQIM leader as unsuccessful. Although jihadist projects burgeoned in Nigeria and the Sahel during his leadership of AQIM, only a fairly minimal al-Qaeda presence exists in Nigeria today through Ansaru, and an active presence of al-Qaeda in the Sahel. However, the latter competes with Islamic State-loyal forces. Meanwhile, the jihad in Algeria continues to wane, with AQIM and Islamic State fighters each carrying out only a handful of attacks in the country each year.
On the other end, many of Droukdel’s struggles were beyond his capacity. He was not a leader like Abu Zeid or Belmokhtar who knew the terrain and societies of the Sahel and Nigeria. Moreover, it was due to Droukdel’s predecessors in the GSPC and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) that Algerians began to sour on the idea of jihadist insurrection in Algeria. In addition, Droukdel was never intended to be the type of leader that also ventured onto the battlefield. Rather, his leadership was defined by providing guidance, issuing statements and maintaining loyalty to al-Qaeda. In this regard, he demonstrated a clear ideology, albeit with a decidedly Algerian orientation, and lived up to what al-Qaeda Central would have expected of him.
To Droukdel’s credit, al-Qaeda’s image never suffered under his watch. The group avoided the types of mass killings of Muslims that defined the GIA, Abubakar Shekau-led Boko Haram and Islamic State. Moreover, despite the upsurge in global jihadist support for Islamic State, AQIM never budged. Al-Qaeda, therefore, had a reliable partner in Droukdel. Similarly, Boko Haram and Malian jihadists would have found Droukdel reliable, especially given the support he directed AQIM to provide to Boko Haram, despite some of them abandoning AQIM for Islamic State.
The biggest issue with Droukdel’s leadership, in fact, was that his subordinates often had their own interests and competing objectives and simply did not follow Droukdel’s guidance. Droukdel, for his part, also had little means to compel their compliance. This points not so much to Droukdel’s vulnerabilities, but rather to the challenges of jihadist group alliances, internal dynamics and organizational structure, especially when AQIM expanded into the new frontiers in the Sahel and Nigeria.
