Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki: KTJ’s Trusted Ally of Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria

Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki: KTJ’s Trusted Ally of Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria

Executive Summary:

• Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki, the emir of Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ), has protected the group from fragmentation by navigating intra-jihadist rivalries. He successfully transitioned KTJ from a transnational movement into a Syria-focused militant force.
• Under his leadership, KTJ has expanded to approximately 1,200 fighters, deepened integration into the new Syrian Army, and secured leadership roles and salaries for his cadres. 
• He acts as an intermediary who defuses tensions between foreign fighters and Syrian authorities. His loyalty to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa helps position KTJ as an institutionalized component of Syria’s emerging security order.

In early May, Syrian forces carried out a security sweep targeting Uzbek foreign fighters in the Idlib countryside (see Terrorism Monitor, June 5). Syrian forces detained multiple Uzbek fighters in the sweep. In response, a contingent of other Uzbek foreign fighters surrounded police stations in protest, and in the days after, Syrian security officers detained an additional 16 Uzbek fighters (New Arab, May 18). Tensions between Uzbek fighters and the Syrian government were shortly defused, however, following mediation by Uzbek elders led by Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) emir Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki, who reportedly reaffirmed his loyalty to the Syrian state (Homeland Security Today [HST], May 20).

Al-Uzbeki (born Ilmurad Hikmatov) rose to lead the KTJ after a long trajectory through Central Asian jihadist networks. He joined Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan in the early 2000s, but intensifying repression by the regime of then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov forced him to flee to Tajikistan. Continued pressure from Uzbek security services, however, drove him into Afghanistan. It was there that he joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and embraced jihad (HST, September 10, 2023).

Pragmatism and Judgment

Abdul Aziz’s foresight and strategic judgment twice shielded him from ill-fated realignments. In November 2015, IMU emir Usmon Ghazi pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The ensuing shift ended in disaster in Zabul province, where Taliban forces defeated the IMU, and more than one hundred Uzbek fighters were executed (CACI, May 3, 2016). Abdul Aziz, however, refused to abandon the IMU’s longstanding alignment with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and broke with the group before joining the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) instead as deputy leader.

In 2019—shortly after his relocation from Afghanistan to Syria—he opposed former KTJ leader Abu Saloh’s attempt to break from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and align with Jabhat Ansar al-Din, an al-Qaeda–aligned faction (Modern Diplomacy, April 19, 2019). His stance effectively aligned him with HTS in its broader contest with al-Qaeda’s remaining Syrian branch, Hurras al-Din (HD), over control of Greater Idlib. HD was dismantled in the aftermath, while Abu Saloh and some 30 followers were detained. Following the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the group ultimately endorsed the new authorities and dissolved itself (HST, September 10, 2023).

These two episodes underscore Abdul Aziz as a highly calculating and pragmatic jihadist leader. He successfully preserved KTJ from fragmentation while navigating broader intra-jihadist rivalries. This has repositioned KTJ from a transnational jihadist formation into an institutional actor within Syria’s emerging security order. As a “second-generation” Central Asian jihadist leader, Abdul Aziz has earned respect within foreign fighter networks and HTS through his organizational skills and his ability to align KTJ’s ideology with HTS’s evolving pragmatism.

Integration into HTS and Leadership Style

Since taking over KTJ's leadership in April 2019, Abdul Aziz has deepened the group’s integration into HTS and, later, into the new Syrian army. He has therefore repositioned the group as a Syria-focused militant force rather than a transnational jihadist movement. KTJ has since expanded to roughly 1,200 fighters. This made the group one of the largest Central Asian armed formations in northwestern Syria and a significant actor in the campaign against al-Assad’s government (CTC Sentinel, September 1, 2025).

Abdul lacks a formal Islamic scholarly background. While fluent in Uzbek, Russian, Turkish, and Pashto, he does not possess the Arabic theological training and Qur’anic scholarship that earned his predecessor, Abu Saloh, the honorific ‘Sheikh.’ His authority instead rests on military expertise, battlefield experience, and a strong understanding of Central Asian security dynamics. Over time, he built a reputation as a respected military instructor among Central Asian foreign fighter networks, earning the title of ‘Ustoz’ (teacher). Whereas Abu Saloh was more closely aligned with al-Qaeda’s transnational jihadist vision, Abdul Aziz has been associated with al-Sharaa’s more pragmatic strategic line (HST, September 10, 2023).

Uzbekistan and Russia continue to regard Abdul Aziz as a dangerous international terrorist and have sought his extradition. He has denied any involvement in attacks outside Syria, including the 2016 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek and the 2017 St. Petersburg metro attack. While sanctions on HTS and al-Sharaa have eased, the United States has kept KTJ on its terrorist blacklist since designating it a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity in 2022 (U.S. Department of State, March 7, 2022). Abdul Aziz has consistently maintained that KTJ poses no threat beyond Syria and is not involved in external operations.

The Intermediary

Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki twice served as an intermediary in armed confrontations. First, between Syria’s General Security Service (GSS) and the French-speaking Firqat al-Ghuraba in October 2025, and then the recent mediation between the Syrian Army and breakaway Uzbek fighters in Idlib’s Kafriya and al-Foua in May (npasyria, October 22, 2025; HST, May 20). In both cases, he helped defuse tensions, secure the release of detained militants, and prevent escalation through negotiations with Syrian authorities. He repeatedly invoked a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad from Sahih al-Bukhari during the meditations, saying, “Whoever obeys me has obeyed Allah, and whoever obeys my emir has obeyed me” (YouTube/@UstozAbdulazizz, February 2). The reference reportedly helped secure compliance among foreign fighters with Syrian directives.

Another key role emerged in January 2025. After HTS’s defeat of the Assad regime in December 2024, Central Asian states expressed concern that Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Uyghur, and Tajik fighters in Syria could relocate to Afghanistan and destabilize the region. At al-Sharaa’s request, Abdul Aziz publicly rejected claims of any “export” of the Syrian jihad. He assured the international community that neither HTS nor affiliated foreign factions posed a threat to neighboring Central Asian or Western states, and emphasized their focus on post-Assad reconstruction and on integrating Uzbek fighters into local Arab communities (YouTube/@UstozAbdulazizz, January 12, 2025). 

Abdul Aziz also leveraged al-Sharaa’s trust and his close ties with Syrian Minister of Defense Murhaf Abu Qasra to promote KTJ-linked cadres and facilitate their integration into the Syrian Army. For instance, he secured monthly salaries of around $300 for them, a key source of support in a postwar, economically devastated environment. He also secured the appointment of his deputy and long-time IJU associate, Saifuddin Tojiboy, as commander of Qaid Amaliyat fil-Livo (Operational Headquarters) within the new Syrian Ministry of Defense in January 2025 (HST, April 8, 2025).

Conclusion

Abdul Aziz and KTJ are likely to become institutionalized components of Syria’s emerging security order, as they lack external sanctuaries and depend on al-Sharaa’s backing. This trajectory may shape not only KTJ’s future but also the broader course of Central Asian militancy in the Levant. Whether Abdul Aziz’s trajectory proves sustainable will depend on the durability of al-Sharaa’s rule and the degree of integration of foreign fighter networks into the Syrian Army.