Abkakhzia Expels Russian Political Technologists

Abkakhzia Expels Russian Political Technologists

Executive Summary:

• Abkhaz officials expelled Russian political technologists, following confrontations with opposition figures who accused the specialists of election interference during Abkhazia’s November 8 local elections.
• Several issues remain between Sokhumi and Moscow, and the Abkhaz elite are not willing to meet all the Kremlin’s demands despite the breakaway region’s overwhelming economic dependence on Russia.
• Moscow tolerates such defiance because Abkhazia maintains loyalty regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine and its anti-Western geopolitical stance, which Russia prioritizes over internal administrative disputes.

On November 8, local elections were held in Abkhazia—a breakaway republic in Georgia occupied by Russia (Apsnypress, November 8). According to Abkhaz sources, candidates supported by the authorities won the local elections, receiving 76 percent of the vote. Only 30 percent of eligible voters in Abkhazia, however, participated in the polls (OC-media, November 11). Scandals marred these local elections. Neither the low turnout nor the victory of pro-government candidates in most districts turned out to be the main event. The most notable development was the discovery of the so-called Russian political technologists in Abkhazia and their subsequent expulsion (Kavkaz-uzel, November 7).

Several Russian political technologists who had previously worked in the Russia-occupied Ukrainian territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea arrived in Abkhazia at the invitation of the pro-government organization “Abkhazian Team” to assist Abkhaz President Badra Gunba and his team during the elections. According to Abkhaz sources, the arrival of the Russian political technologists had been coordinated by Abkhaz officials and Russian First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, who oversees Georgia’s occupied territories—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—within the Kremlin administration.

On November 5, just a few days before the elections, Abkhaz opposition figure Kan Kvarchia arrived at the office of the Russian political technologists—located in the center of the Abkhaz capital Sokhumi—accompanied by his supporters and journalists (Ekhokavkaza, November 19). Kvarchia asked the Russian political technologists by what right they were interfering in Abkhazia’s “internal affairs” and whether they had an official permit to work in Abkhazia. One of the Russians, Ivan Repa, replied that they had no such authorization from Abkhaz officials and could not even imagine needing any permit to operate in Abkhazia (Abkhazeti, November 5). Repa later admitted that he is originally from Crimea and previously worked in the part of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia oblast occupied by the Russian army (Instagram/@chp_abkhazia_offical, November 6).   Kvarchia and his supporters brutally beat the Russian political technologists “for interfering in Abkhazia’s internal affairs” (Sotaproject, November 5). Repa stated that he was struck in the face several times and even threatened with death. During the violence, the Russians confessed that they were not only assisting the Abkhaz ruling officials, but had also hired several individuals to remove pro-opposition election campaign materials from the streets of Sokhumi (Instagram/@novosti_abkhazia, November 6).

The Russians said that Abkhaz representatives from the ruling party would arrive on site shortly to protect them. Officers from the Abkhaz Security Service appeared at the scene. They did not detain a single perpetrator. Instead, the Russian political technologists were taken away and expelled from Abkhazia (Sovanews, November 9).

Later, Giorgi Gabunia, the founder of the “Abkhazian Team,” stated that, contrary to their claims, officials in Abkhazia never invited the Russian political technologists, and he had not heard anything about their work in Sokhumi (Geabconflict, November 28). All opposition organizations operating in Abkhazia condemned the invitation of the Russian officers and accused the ruling officials of trying, through Gunba’s administration, to divide Abkhazians into pro-Russians and anti-Russians.

Kvarchia is well known in Moscow, and the Kremlin has long considered him an “anti-Russian” figure. In February, the Russian government revoked Kvarchia’s citizenship, stating that he “was contributing to destabilization in Abkhazia, and creating tension near Russia’s borders” (Jam-News, January 23; Ekho Kavkaza, February 18). The real reason for revoking his citizenship was Kvarchia’s active involvement in Abkhazia when then-President Aslan Bzhania was forced to flee Sokhumi and a new presidential election was organized with Moscow’s active participation. Gunba, backed by Moscow, won this election (BBC, November 18, 2024).

At the same time, no one considers Kvarchia a pro-Georgian actor. He participated in the 1992–1993 war, and his rhetoric toward Georgia has consistently been hostile. The incident involving the political technologists—especially, the Abkhaz officials’ inability to protect them from violence—once again confirms that there are several unresolved issues between Sokhumi and Moscow, and that the Abkhaz elite are not willing to meet all of the Kremlin’s demands.

Both the Abkhaz opposition and the ruling party have shown a willingness to reject some of Moscow’s demands. Last year, Russia even cut off electricity supplies to Abkhazia after the so-called “apartments” project—effectively a Russian settlements construction plan—was finally canceled by Abkhazia, despite Moscow’s lobbying efforts (RBC, December 18, 2024). Furthermore, neither the previous nor the current Abkhaz government has agreed to Moscow’s demand to allow the free buying and selling of apartments in Abkhazia, which would enable Russians to purchase them, thereby raising prices and altering the demographic situation in Abkhazia in their favor (see EDM, February 12).

Moscow has had little success lobbying for large-scale privatizations in Abkhazia, as the Abkhaz elite is firmly opposed to the participation of Russian capital in privatization. Additionally, Abkhazia has not returned the New Athos Monastery, one of the Russian Orthodox Church’s holy sites, to the Russian Church (see EDM, November 26, 2024).

Abkhazia is almost entirely dependent on Russia. For example, 99 percent of the tourists visiting Abkhazia are Russians, 95 percent of Abkhaz exports are sold to Russia, and more than half of Abkhazia’s state budget is composed of financial transfers from Moscow (Vedomosti, September 6, 2024). Moscow is not going to hurry to use the leverage it has at its disposal, as it has not even reacted to the most recent incident.

Davit Avalishvili, from the independent outlet Nation.ge, believes that a few factors drive Moscow’s “tolerance” toward the Abkhazians. Many Abkhazians not only verbally support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but some are also fighting as volunteers in the Russia-occupied Donbas region, where dozens of them have been killed. “Russia has A-category interests and B-category interests in Abkhazia,” Avalishvili stated. He further stipulated, “As long as the Abkhaz authorities and the Abkhaz elite in generally support Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, do not attempt to destabilize the situation in the North Caucasus, where people ethnically related to the Abkhazians live, and are not active in the Turkish direction, Moscow will tolerate many things, because apartments, monasteries, and privatizations all fall under B-category interests. In other words, on strategic issues—including anti-Western and anti-Georgian rhetoric— “the Abkhazians remain loyal to Moscow,” Avalishvili concluded (Author’s interview, November 13).

The situation unfolding in Abkhazia confirms that many things in the post-Soviet space will depend on the outcome of the war against Ukraine. A Russian defeat in Ukraine could trigger a “domino effect” that would change other regions as well, including Georgia’s former autonomous republics.