Amir of the Southern Sahara: A Fresh Look at AQIM’s Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Amir of the Southern Sahara: A Fresh Look at AQIM’s Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Personal Profile
Born in the medieval city of Ghardaïa in central Algeria, nearly 372 miles due south of Algiers, on June 1, 1972, Mokhtar Belmokhtar is known by different names and nicknames. He is known as Khaled Abou Abbass, and his many nicknames include: “the Elusive,” “Marlboro man” and Belawarr meaning “one-eyed” referring to the loss of an eye that occurred while involved in jihadi activities in Afghanistan.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar became fascinated with the concept of jihad as a teenager. The mysterious assassination of Abdullah Azzam acted as a catalyst for him. Azzam, a Jordan-Palestinian jihadi preacher based in Peshawar and crucial mentor of the late Osama bin Laden, whose legacy greatly inspired Belmokhtar, represented the turning point in his background. Belmokhtar decided to head to Afghanistan, joining the jihadi current and undertaking training in several mujahideen camps throughout the failed state. [1] Shortly after returning to Algeria, he joined the Groupe Islamique Armeé (Armed Islamic Group-GIA), quickly becoming one of its most important commanders. According to a Mauritanian media source, Belmokhtar allegedly travelled to Sudan for meetings with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri while the two lived there in the 1990s before being expelled back to Afghanistan (Carrefour de la République Islamique De Mauritanie, January 8, 2011).
An internal split occurred among the members of the GIA dividing those that wanted to severely decrease mass casualty attacks on civilians—a hallmark of the Algerian civil conflict—yet still sought to attack international targets and those who retained a more parochial outlook focused tightly on the establishment of an Islamic state within Algeria’s borders. Those that splintered off pledging (in theory) not to attack non-combatants—yet later transform the conflict from a local to regional one—formed the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat-GSPC) in the late 1990s. Belmokhtar joined the GSPC and was the most active militant of the groups in the southern zone. His early rise in the then less strategically important areas for the GSPC—but most vital to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) today—led to the role that he currently plays in the Sahelian/Saharan territories encompassing north-eastern Mauritania, northern Mali and south-western Algeria. The new center of his activities has been the city of Tamanrasset at the base of the Ahaggar Mountains. Belmokhtar’s interest in smuggling and other illicit traffic—including possible human trafficking—sharply increased. In a few years, these types of so-called “collateral” activities became even more significant than proper “minor jihad” in itself. In the eyes of many global jihadi purists, this greatly lessened Belmokhtar’s credibility.
In this period, he also strengthened his relationships with local Tuareg tribes. He reportedly married several Tuareg women from different tribes based in Mali and Niger (Ennahar, January 12, 2011). His intermarriage among these tribes which inhabit centuries-old trade routes has greatly added to his advantage. The local Tuareg’s intimate knowledge of the territory helps them to outwit and evade the respective security forces operating in these vast tracts. Belmokhtar’s political capital helped him to get a local foothold which provides the reliable information and logistical support necessary to not only survive but to thrive in this harsh environment. The familial ties to the Tuareg tribes and payments with the funds that come from smuggling and illegal activities has ensured Belmokhtar’s stance and security among them.
It was at this time that he began to focus beyond the previous narrow scope of overthrowing the Algerian government. He then became interested in fighting the Mauritanian state, in part because of Mauritania’s diplomatic relations with Israel (which have since been severed in reaction to the January 2009 Israeli assault on Gaza and the resultant Palestinian casualties) (Al-Ahram Weekly, March 25-31, 2010). Belmokhtar is considered to be the figure that expanded jihad from a war-fatigued Algeria into a vulnerable Mauritania. He is believed to have been behind the killing of 17 Mauritanian soldiers in the garrison of Lemgheity in the country’s northern Tiris Zemmour Region in 2005, as well as the mind behind the failed attack on the French embassy in Nouakchott (PanAfrican News Agency, June 16, 2005).
The increasing pressure from the Algerian security forces drove Belmokhtar further south. His primary territorial base is believed to be the under-governed realm of northern Mali. When the GSPC re-branded itself as a franchise of al-Qaeda, with the birth of AQIM, Belmokthar retained his operational independence in the south, although he had to “share” this region with another main commander of AQIM, Abou Zeid, leader of the “Tariq ibn Ziyad” brigade, operating mainly in the southern-eastern regions and closely connected to AQIM’s overall amir Abdelmalek Droukdel, based in the northern Kabylie region in the Atlas Mountains along Algeria’s Mediterranean coast. [2] Although rivals, Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid share the same modus operandi, as they are now more focused on utilitarian undertakings, such as smuggling and kidnappings, than on traditional jihadis acts aimed at damaging the government of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
The relationship between Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdelmalek Droukdel has always been rather complex. Although the two personalities have been thought of as peer competitors for years, this did not prevent them from pursuing particular collaborative efforts when their tactical interests converged.
Operational Profile
Belmokhtar’s profile is characterized by a strong mix of ideology and pragmatism, with the latter sometimes overwhelming the former. He is the leader of the Katiba al-Mulathimin – The Battalion of Veiled Men – recalling the religious reformist message of the Almoravids in their struggle against Idrissids. [3] The personal history of his militancy is similar to that of many fellow jihadis the world round. He migrated to Afghanistan, the center of the U.S. and Saudi-sponsored insurgency in the 1980s, where he claims to have fought against the Soviet forces.
However, given the timetable of his Afghan experience at the beginning of the 1990s, it is more likely that he trained in militant camps and possibly took part only in the internecine fighting among different jihadi parties in Afghanistan who sought to oust the relict Marxist regime while jockeying for power among themselves. This initial experience in the Afghan theater marks a stark difference between Belmokhtar and his main AQIM rival in the Sahara/Sahel, Abou Zeid, as the latter never went to Afghanistan, spending his militant years in the inhospitable Sahara rather than in a far-flung jihad.
As Afghanistan mutated from an ideological to a civil war, Belmokhtar then returned to Algeria in 1993. Algeria had by then turned into one of the focal points of the emerging global jihadi landscape. The Islamist victory in the elections of 1991, the consequential annulment, the military coup and the following eruption of a massive domestic crisis threw Algeria into a period of extended turmoil. This disquiet quickly spiralled into a ghastly civil war marking the bloodiest period in the history of post-independence Algeria. The history of Belmokhtar’s militancy has always been characterized by a certain degree of heterogeneity toward the mainstream positions of the Algerian jihad with regard to the morphing of the GIA, GSPC and AQIM. These differences were not based on ideological disputes but on more sordid power conflicts and divergent views on operational strategies.
Again, compared to Abou Zeid, he seemed to have undertaken a diametrically opposing path in life. Abou Zeid moved from smuggling and contraband to jihad, using jihadi ideology as a tool to frame his rage against Algiers, then using his expertise to gain momentum and increasing his operational profile within the organization; Belmokthar, instead, moved from a more typical jihadi fighter profile to a more pragmatic jihadi smuggler, in which carrying out illicit activities in the loosely patrolled areas of the Sahara desert allowed him greater operational autonomy which in turn boosted his role within the group. This evolution highlights a major feature of his militant personality: a rather strong degree of flexibility, that allows him to change priorities, aims and operational modes quickly and depending on the situations.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is considered to be one of the major protagonists behind the increased focus of AQIM on the kidnapping of seemingly hapless Westerners caught in their midst. The institutionalization of kidnapping as a key component of AQIM’s strategy is primarily due to his aggressive initiatives in the Sahara (see Terrorism Monitor January 28, 2010). He took part, along with Adrerrezak el Parà and other militants, in the spectacular kidnapping of 32 European tourists in 2003. In 2007, members of his group were allegedly involved in the killings of four French tourists during the Paris-Dakar rally that led the organizers of the legendary event to relocate it to Latin America in 2008 (Rue89, September 24, 2010). Additionally he is thought to be the organizer of the kidnappings of two Canadian diplomats in late 2008 and of the abduction and killing of two Frenchmen in Niger (France 24, January 11, 2011). The kidnapping racket is one of the most rewarding revenue streams for AQIM. It is also consistent both with the financial, operational and logistical needs coupled with the ideological compulsion to strike out against infidels.
Recently, Belmokhtar participated in an attention-grabbing interview with a Mauritanian online news agency, vaguely explaining how AQIM benefited from the war in Libya by gaining unspecified weapons from the late Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi’s bountiful arsenals (Agency Nouakchott d’Information, November 9, 2011). Aside from the arms assertion, which has been a concern of many Maghreb analysts, Belmokhtar claimed to be fostering new links with Islamist fighters in Libya. In the interview, he acknowledged of the diverging views he has with several members of AQIM, although he downplayed these disagreements to normal dialogue amongst true believers who genuinely share the same overall jihadi ethic.
Curiously, according to Algerian security sources quoted by the local daily Ennahar at the time of this writing, Belmokhtar has founded a new movement named “Southern Children’s Movement for Justice.” In this light, he appears to be detaching himself from AQIM and pursuing his own agenda through this movement, which will carry out attacks against foreign targets in the Sahel (Ennahar, December 5, 2011). The article quoted also the words of a member of the group, a person named “Nemr,” native to Ruwaysat in the eastern Ouargla Wilayat (Province), who said that Belmokhtar refused the idea of carrying out attacks against foreign interests or kidnapping foreign nationals, stressing instead the need to gain the sympathy of Western countries and international public opinion for this strangely named movement. Nemr stated rather inexplicably that this nascent group has received funding proposals from France, Morocco and Libya. These entirely contradictory statements sound eccentric at best. Over the years Belmokhtar has been a target of counter-intelligence efforts to weaken his position, claiming either that he has been killed or has surrendered. It would not come as a surprise that this is yet another such clumsy attempt by the Algerian government to subvert Belmokhtar.
Conclusion
Mokhtar Belmokhtar remains one of the main leaders of AQIM, given his predominant role in the southern theatre of the operation of the group. His strong knowledge of the territory, his connections with local gangs, and his links with Tuareg groups via intermarriage allow him to play a prominent role in the region that has become a major focal point for AQIM over the past few years as their agenda has shifted away from the settled center of Algeria’s north. His predominance in the region, however, has been challenged by the rise of Abou Zeid, who is closely connected to Droukdel and whose emergence in the Sahelian/Saharan region was considered as a move by AQIM central to reduce to counter balance the autonomy of a strident Belmokhtar. The relations of Belmokhtar with the Kabile leadership of AQIM are characterized by a certain degree of mistrust and conflict but these interactions are generally kept fluid in order to accommodate to specific, changing tactical needs of the organization as well as to make necessary adjustments to its changing political center of gravity.
Notes
1. See Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 12 May 8, 2009.
2. For a profile of Abou Zeid, see Militant Leadership Monitor, October 2011.
3. Geoff Porter, AQIM’s Objectives in North Africa, CTC Sentinel, February 2011.
