Arms Control Putin-Style Goes Nowhere
Executive Summary:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the New START arms limitations reflects a performative attempt to signal Russia’s commitment to strategic stability, while masking weaknesses in its nuclear modernization.
- The Kremlin narrows current peace talks to territorial concessions and widens the broader bilateral agenda with proposals such as a tunnel connecting Alaska to Chukotka to secure recognition as a global power and a competitor to the United States.
- Putin is inclined to intensify nuclear brinkmanship as Russia’s nuclear capabilities remain its primary area of near-parity with the West, while aeronautic, space, and information/artificial intelligence technologies remain increasingly foreign for its defense-industrial base.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer on September 22 to extend the limitations on the strategic nuclear forces set by the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) between the United States and Russian Federation appeared reasonable and meaningful (U.S. State Department, April 8, 2010; President of Russia, April 8, 2010, September 22). New START is due to expire on February 5, 2026, and even experts in Moscow who are loath to join the ranks of “patriotic” drum-beaters found Putin’s proposition timely and useful (Kommersant, October 7). The Kremlin, however, did not pursue follow-up actions. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov sourly confirmed the failure of opening a dialogue on that traditional high-priority track, despite Russian media celebrating Putin’s offer and U.S. President Donald Trump saying that extending NEW START sounded like a good idea (TASS, October 5; Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, December 8).
Putin’s offer has now all but disappeared. The only trace of it is in the leaked memo, known as the “28-point plan,” which was published in all Russian mainstream media (Kommersant, November 21). Russian experts pointed out a mistake in point 17, which confused New START with START I, stating, “The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.” Russian media concluded that the document was an “odd hybrid” of various drafts prepared by incompetent mediators (Rossiiskaya gazeta, November 21). It is unclear whether this point—or the reference to the long-expired treaty—will survive the presumed reduction of the peace plan to 20 points or its division into four separate packages (RBC, December 8). The absence of any mention of strategic arms control in the new U.S. National Security Strategy is clear. Russian commentators appeared to find this omission flabbergasting (Vedomosti, December 5; Kommersant, December 7). Following the document’s publication, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed disappointment at the lack of a U.S. vision for maintaining the balance of strategic forces (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 8).
Nuclear deterrence has traditionally been central to Russian security thinking. The Russian National Security Strategy approved by Putin in July 2021 places great emphasis on maintaining strategic stability. It prescribes maintaining nuclear capabilities at a level sufficient for neutralizing growing threats, which it claims are caused by the U.S. dismantlement of the system of arms control (Russian Security Council, July 2, 2021). The new Russian Nuclear Doctrine, approved in November 2024, elaborates on this priority and defines conditions for a decision on the first use of nuclear weapons (President of Russia, November 19, 2024). The Kremlin’s preoccupation with nuclear matters came into focus when the Russian Security Council convened an emergency meeting on November 5 to deliberate an appropriate response to Trump’s presumed order to resume nuclear testing (see EDM, November 3; President of Russia, November 5). Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov omitted Russian violations of various agreements when he claimed that the United States would breach the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996) (Kommersant, November 5).
That misunderstanding about nuclear testing has been mostly cleared up. The problem of Russia seeking status as an equal nuclear power to the United States, however, remains. The Kremlin’s desire for a leading role on the world stage is underpinned by sustained efforts at modernizing its nuclear arsenal (Rossiiskaya gazeta, December 8). Much of the new U.S. National Security Strategy denies Russia the status of a major global power in the emerging multipolar world, not least due to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 7). From this perspective, Russia’s role is reduced, and it is uncertain where a possible end to the hostilities will leave Russia (Vzglyad, December 9).
Putin has sought to counter this challenge by simultaneously narrowing and widening the agenda of the ongoing peace talks (see Jamestown, November 26). The former is achieved by focusing peace negotiations on the demand to award Russia the unconquered part of Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast (Republic.ru, December 3). The latter is attempted by impressing upon Washington, D.C., the importance of discussions on strategic stability, primarily by announcing tests of new weapon systems, such as the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, both nuclear-powered and capable of carrying nuclear warheads (Profile, November 11). The Kremlin has proposed a range of presumably lucrative joint projects, including constructing a tunnel connecting Alaska and Chukotka, to persuade the United States to look beyond what the Kremlin perceives as pesky details of territorial exchanges (Izvestiya, October 20).
Putin’s offer to stick to the limits set by New START was not as far-fetched as the Bering Sea tunnel, and it probably had a hidden agenda. Putin did not suggest an exchange of data or a resumption of verification procedures, which were affected by his February 2023 decree suspending Russia’s participation in New START (President of Russia, February 21, 2023; Forbes.ru, September 25). Moscow has no reason to suspect that U.S. nuclear arms will exceed the agreed-upon ceilings, but it probably seeks to hide the shrinking of its arsenal to well below the limits. The only part of the hugely expensive modernization program that is on track, with only slight delays, is the construction of Borei-class submarines. Putin inaugurated the eighth one (Knyaz’ Pozharsky, Князь Пожарский) in July, which joined the Northern Fleet without performing the mandatory launch of the Bulava missile (see EDM, May 30; President of Russia, July 24; Korabel.ru, August 3). Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces need to retire all of the old heavy intercontinental missiles (SS-18 and SS-19) and the lighter Topol (SS-25) as well, but the new Sarmat (SS-X-29) missile, which Putin announced as ready for deployment in March 2018, failed one test in September 2024 and exploded early in another one on November 28 (Meduza, September 25, 2024; Verstka.media, November 28). Russia’s Long-Range Aviation, which has performed hard combat missions since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is currently in an even worse state. Poor maintenance has caused many incidents—including the crash of a Tu-22M3 bomber in the Irkutsk oblast last April—while a dozen planes were destroyed and many more seriously damaged in Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb on June 1 (Meduza, April 2; The Moscow Times, June 6). Current production levels of the Tu-160 bombers at the Kazan plant reach only a couple of planes a year, while the PAK-DA project for the stealth bomber has been postponed indefinitely (Radio Svoboda, June 28; 1.ru, September 20).
The scarcity of data due to wartime Russian censorship obscures the true scale of these setbacks. Putin is keen to deny the degradation of Russia’s strategic arsenal by both engaging in nuclear posturing and demonstrating readiness to discuss issues pertaining to strategic stability. This performance is aimed not only at the United States and Europe, but also at the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is building up its deterrence capabilities and presented many new weapon systems during its Victory Day parade on September 3, marking the end of World War II, which Putin attended (see China Brief, October 1; Top War, November 10). The PRC has so far refused to engage in any talks on limiting its nuclear arsenal. Moscow cannot embrace the PRC as a party to a treaty prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons, but instead hopes that Beijing would approve its intention to preserve the framework of New START (RIAC, July 14).
Putin’s offer to extend New START reflects a deeper struggle to achieve recognition for Russia’s status as a global power and a peer competitor to the United States. The Kremlin cannot, nevertheless, develop any innovative framework to address the rapid progress in aeronautics, space, and information/artificial intelligence technologies, which are increasingly foreign to its defense-industrial base. These constraints make performative gestures an important tool for projecting strength and relevance as “European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure, save nuclear weapons” (The White House, December 4). This reality may compel Putin to resort to nuclear brinksmanship even more often.
