Beijing Sees Opportunity in U.S. National Security Strategy

Beijing Sees Opportunity in U.S. National Security Strategy

Executive Summary:

• Chinese assessments of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) see it as confirmation of hegemonic decline, strategic retrenchment, and a shift to an evolving “neo-realist” posture that sees engaging with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as unavoidable.
• The official response has been minimal, as the PRC seeks to preserve negotiation space for a potential bargain at the April 2026 Trump-Xi summit.
• PRC analysts are weaponizing the document’s framing of Taiwan to argue the U.S. views it merely as a geopolitical asset rather than a democratic partner.
• Interpreting the “Trump Corollary” and rhetoric on European civilizational decline, Beijing aims to fracture U.S. alliances by portraying Washington as a transactional power that treats partners as liabilities.

On December 4, the White House released its National Security Strategy (NSS), the first of three key strategy documents released by the Trump administration. (The other two are the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.) (White House, December 4). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the nation most frequently cited in the document, and Chinese observers have been quick to analyze its implications.

PRC Claims to Force ‘Strategic Stalemate’

Beijing’s official reaction to the NSS remains cautious. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not commented beyond a careful statement from spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) in response to questions. Guo avoided emotional escalation, reiterating that economic and trade relations remain the “ballast” (压舱石) of the relationship and generate “mutual benefit” (互利共赢) (MFA, December 8). This muted response might indicate that Beijing remains tactically committed to maintaining a diplomatic baseline. In doing so, the PRC side can preserve negotiating space for the anticipated presidential summit in April 2026 that, it hopes, will conclude with a favorable transactional deal.

PRC academia and think tanks are more cautiously triumphalist. They view the release of the NSS as further evidence of their long-held belief in the “rise of the East and the decline of the West” (东升西降). Reports from key state think tanks have not voiced alarm at the document, but instead view it as a signal that the United States has finally been forced to acknowledge the end of its unipolar hegemony, retreating from offensive liberalism to a posture of realism (WeChat/CICIR, December 9).

An analysis by Wang Wen (王文), Executive Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, points out that after failing in “four successive offensives” (四轮攻势)—military, ideological, economic, and the initial trade war—the United States has been forced into a “strategic stalemate” (战略相持阶段) with the PRC (WeChat/Chongyang Institute, December 5). This assessment is reinforced by analysis from the cabinet-level think tank, the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), which highlights the NSS’s reclassification of the PRC from a strategic threat to a “near-peer” competitor. The DRC characterizes this terminological shift as “toning down without changing the tune” (降调不变调) (WeChat/DRC, December 12). Both analyses imply that Washington has realized the futility of broad ideological confrontation and has instead pivoted to a strategy of precise, high-tech suppression. This signifies an admission that Washington can no longer overwhelm the PRC across the board and must now concentrate all its resources on choking specific industrial bottlenecks.

Days before the NSS was released, Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Dean of the Institute for International Affairs at CUHK-Shenzhen, characterized Trump as a “neorealist” (新现实主义). But unlike traditional neorealists, who see competition as baked into an anarchic international system, Zheng sees a development in neorealist thinking toward recognition that “the PRC has already risen and cannot be defeated” (中国已经崛起了，已经打不败中国了), leaving Washington with no choice but to “deal with and engage with” (打交道，打交往) Beijing (Guancha, December 5).

Commentary Highlights U.S. Rifts with Partners

The NSS has been poorly received by several U.S. partners. This presents an opportunity for Beijing, which is actively moving to exploit the document to drive wedges between the United States and its traditional partners.

An analysis from Xinhua characterized the strategy’s “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine—an assertion of dominance in the Western Hemisphere—as a “haughty” (趾高气扬) declaration of a “right to intervention” (干预权), arguing that it exposes U.S. hegemonic double standards to the Global South. It also highlighted the strategy’s attitude toward European politics, framing the NSS’s characterization of the “stark prospect of civilizational erasure” in Europe as “extremely combative” (火药味十足) rhetoric (Xinhua, December 6). [1]

Regional experts at the Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) note that the NSS’s demands for Japan and South Korea to assume primary defense responsibilities, while ignoring allies like the Philippines, expose a systemic imbalance in which the United States demands “protection fees” (保护费) while effecting a global strategic retrenchment (全球战略的收缩) (CICIR, December 9). This provides a strategic opportunity for the PRC to stabilize its periphery through economic means while U.S. credibility erodes.

The NSS contains strong language on Taiwan, calling for “preserving military overmatch” as a priority. PRC responses to this section of the strategy exhibit a calm cynicism, focusing on its framing of Taiwan’s status as a geopolitical asset rather than a like-minded partner. Observers and scholars with military backgrounds note that the NSS focuses heavily on Taiwan’s centrality to semiconductor supply chains and global trade routes and ignores democratic values. Military commentator Shi Yang (施洋) described this as a “naked revelation of Taiwan’s strategic utility to the United States” (赤裸裸地把台湾对美国的战略利益和盘托出), implying that Washington views the island merely as a geopolitical token to be secured for its own self-interest (Guancha, December 7). Professor Zhang Jiadong (张家栋) from the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, meanwhile, contended that this section does not represent a display of strength but rather reflects U.S. anxiety over the diminishing marginal utility of its “Taiwan Card” (台湾牌) (Global Times, December 6).

Conclusion

Beijing’s reception of the 2025 NSS is characterized by calculated confidence. The PRC interprets the U.S. retreat toward “America First” as a confirmation of hegemonic decline. This assessment might drive Beijing to adopt a multi-layered strategy: globally, it can weaponize the “Trump Corollary” to fracture Washington and its allies and partners; regarding Taiwan, it can leverage a narrative that views the island as merely a geopolitical token rather than a democratic partner; and diplomatically, it can maintain a disciplined focus on its own economic core interests while minimizing overt criticism of the United States.

As both sides look toward the anticipated presidential summit in April 2026, Beijing appears convinced that the era of containment is yielding to an era of mutual transaction, positioning itself to negotiate a new global division of power with a Washington that it believes can no longer dictate the rules of the game.

Notes

[1] According to the NSS, the “Trump Corollary” refers to the administration’s ambition to “restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” This includes denying “non-Hemispheric competitors”—i.e., the PRC—the ability to “position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets,” in the region (White House, December 4).