Belarus Offers Uzbekistan Nuclear Expertise 

Belarus Offers Uzbekistan Nuclear Expertise 

Executive Summary

• Belarus is positioning itself as a nuclear energy mentor to Uzbekistan. Uzbek delegates recently visited the Belarusian nuclear power plant to learn about workforce training systems, regulatory coordination, emergency preparedness, and the development of supporting social infrastructure associated with operating Russian‑designed reactors. 
• Belarus’s opportunities to share its nuclear experience lie with countries that are partnered with Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, as Belarus itself depends on Russian nuclear technology and fuel services for its domestic nuclear energy capabilities. 
• As Belarus seeks to convert its dependence on Russia into influence and relevance, it is balancing a fine line that Moscow may interpret as interference and a challenge to its dominant position as a nuclear supplier.

On April 7, Belarus and Uzbekistan announced plans to deepen cooperation on civilian nuclear energy. Uzbek officials visited the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Astravets, where their Belarusian counterparts presented the plant’s infrastructure, training systems, emergency response procedures, technological processes, and operations associated with the plant’s Russian-designed reactors (Belarusian NPP, April 8). The visit also included the city of Astravets itself, so Uzbek delegates could study how Belarus developed a satellite city to support nuclear workers and their families. The visit was part of Belarus’s broader attempts to remain useful within Russia‑dominated nuclear networks without challenging Moscow’s place in the industry. Belarus has been working to leverage its nuclear experience as a nuclear mentor for some time. The surge in new nuclear development across the region, however, has opened new opportunities for Minsk to deliver practical value while reinforcing its relevance irrespective of Russia.

Uzbekistan’s outreach to Belarus coincides with ongoing nuclear energy development back home. Uzbekistan has partnered with Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, to construct the country’s first NPP, which will include two VVER-1000 reactors and two RITM-200N small modular reactors (SMRs) (see EDM, October 8, 2025; World Nuclear News, October 10, 2025). On March 24, initial concrete works on an SMR containment building began at the site (Uzatom, March 24). 

The Uzbek delegation to Astravets proposed inviting Belarusian nuclear specialists to participate in the construction of the NPP (Gazeta; Telegram/@uzatom_info, April 8). Uzbekistan’s ambassador to Belarus, Rakhmatulla Nazarov, stated that Tashkent is interested in Belarus’s experience in constructing and operating an NPP and in developing the necessary infrastructure for a city such as Astravets (UZ Daily, March 10). Azim Akhmedkhadzhaev, head of Uzbekistan’s nuclear energy agency Uzatom, echoed this position, saying that Uzbekistan aims to study Belarus’s experience and collaborate with Belarusian specialists (Belarusian NPP, April 8). Belarusian expertise centers on lessons learned from being new to civilian nuclear technology and is therefore intended to complement and extend Russian expertise rather than compete with it.

Minsk has always focused on the responsibility, skills, and agency it gains from nuclear as a “high-tech” domestic energy source. The technology and fuel supply, however, remain dependent on Russia (Belarusian NPP, May 3, 2013). Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka recently expressed interest in constructing a second NPP with Russia, but said Belarus would build the plant with its own specialists and Russia would only provide the reactor (BelTA, March 14). Lukashenka also suggested that Belarus could export electricity from the plant to Russia (BelTA, March 14).   

Belarus’s experience offers tangible benefits to countries such as Uzbekistan. As a first‑time nuclear operator, Belarus developed the regulatory capacity, workforce training systems, and institutional coordination required to bring civilian nuclear power online. This recent experience allows Belarus to serve as a practical reference point for Uzbekistan as another Rosatom client navigating the early‑stages of nuclear adoption.

Belarus has sought to share this nuclear newcomer experience with other countries, in addition to Uzbekistan, that are constructing or looking to construct new civilian nuclear technology in partnership with Russia. Minsk has been seeking to gain influence in Hungary’s civil nuclear development since at least 2020 (President of Belarus, June 5, 2020). The two countries signed a roadmap in 2025 to deepen nuclear energy cooperation, based on their mutual experience with Rosatom-designed VVER reactors (BelTA, May 22, 2025). Hungary has contracted Rosatom to construct two new reactors at Hungary’s Paks II NPP and also recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States to purchase U.S. nuclear fuel and potentially cooperate on SMR technology (Hungary Today, February 16; Nuclear Engineering International, February 23).

Belarus has also offered Kazakhstan support in developing nuclear energy since at least 2024 (BelTA, August 23, 2024). In December 2025, Minsk and Astana signed a memorandum of understanding focused on nuclear safety regulation and knowledge exchange (Government of Belarus, December 16, 2025; Kazakhstan Today, December 17, 2025). Kazakhstan selected Rosatom in June 2025 to lead an international consortium to construct the country’s first NPP since Soviet times (see EDM, July 15, 2025). Kazakhstan has also selected China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to construct second and third NPPs (see EDM, July 21, 2025; Sputnik Kazakhstan, July 31, 2025).

Questions remain surrounding Belarus’s cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in nuclear energy. The PRC is ranked second to Russia in global nuclear reactor exports (Friedman, Nuclear Energy: Boom, Bust, and Emerging Renaissance, July 3, 2025). Minsk has expressed interest in cooperating with the PRC in nuclear energy and grid infrastructure, and delegations from China National Nuclear Power Company and Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation have visited the Belarusian NPP in the past (see EDM, March 5, 2012; Belarus Segodnya, September 20, 2023; BelTA, September 20, 2023, October 7, 2025). 

Meaningful Belarus–PRC nuclear projects have not yet materialized, likely because Belarus is reluctant of Russia perceiving it as competing in areas where it holds nuclear influence. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Hungary, in contrast, represent low‑risk avenues for cooperation that allow Minsk to raise and expand its nuclear profile without challenging Russia. As Belarus’s nuclear profile-raising is constrained to countries partnering with Russia on new nuclear development, Minsk has either decided to avoid collaborating with Rosatom’s competitors or realized its nuclear expertise, and thereby, its relevance in this field, remains bound to Russia. Pushing beyond these constraints would require risks Minsk has so far been unwilling to take.