Belarusian Oreshnik Deployment Planned for December

Belarusian Oreshnik Deployment Planned for December

Executive Summary:

• Minsk and Moscow are completing the infrastructure to place Russia’s new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) system on combat duty in Belarus in December, presenting it as a joint Union State deterrent against alleged Western militarization.
• Belarusian officials claim defensive intent, but the Oreshnik system’s offensive deployment patterns, combat duty patrolling regime, and command-and-control arrangements indicate otherwise.
• Russia may be preparing for an escalation scenario against Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where the Kremlin retains authorization and operational authority over Oreshnik.
• Belarus would primarily serve as a launch platform with shared political responsibility for Oreshnik deployment and would likely be a first retaliatory target.
• Deployment may create a need for enhanced missile defense in Eastern Europe and Ukraine and for the deployment of counter-strike assets capable of hitting the Belarusian Oreshnik units during their launch-preparation phase.

On October 31, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka confirmed plans to deploy the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) system in Belarus in December. Lukashenka warned the West that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin could jointly use the weapon if necessary (BelTA, October 31). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk say the deployment of Oreshnik in Belarus creates new missile threats—both conventional and nuclear—for all of Europe, given Oreshnik IRBMs’ 5,500-kilometer (3,418-mile) range (Reformation, October 26; Focus, October 31).

On October 28, at the third Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, Lukashenka framed the Belarusian Oreshnik deployment as a response to regional escalation and emerging threats. According to Lukashenka, these threats include perceived attempts by Western neighbors to build military superiority on Belarus’s borders, U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and plans by several European states to host medium-range missile systems. Lukashenka went on to claim that Belarus would suspend Oreshnik placement and discussion if Western rhetoric about escalation stops, but just three days later confirmed the system’s imminent deployment (President of Belarus, October 28; BelTA, October 31).

Various Belarusian officials and analysts have commented on this issue. Belarusian Security Council Deputy State Secretary Alyaksandr Nevyarousky said the stationing of Russian weapons, including Oreshnik, on Belarusian territory is a deterrent amid “escalating militarization” by neighboring states (BelTA, November 4). Nevyarousky claims that military cooperation with Moscow is defensive in nature and not preparation for aggression. In his view, it is intended to form a defensive shield to avert potential threats. Nevyarousky pointed to substantial Western defense spending—sometimes at domestic social cost—citing Estonia’s large arms acquisitions from South Korea, Latvia’s agreement with Rheinmetall to build a 155 mm ammunition plant, and Germany’s 45th Tank Brigade stationed near the Belarusian border in Lithuania. Nevyarousky also said that he sees recent Baltic military exercises, infrastructure upgrades, and intensified reconnaissance activity along Belarusian borders as offensive measures (BelTA, November 4).

Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces and current Member of the Belarusian House of Representatives, Nikalai Buzin, characterized Russian tactical nuclear weapons and the deployment of the Oreshnik system as elements of strategic deterrence that enable Belarus to secure its safety without overburdening the economy or entering a costly arms race. He claimed these systems would be employed only if an adversary crossed Belarusian borders or committed hostile acts against the state (BelTA, November 8). Military expert and former head of the State Border Committee Press Center, Alyaksandr Tsishchenka, describes Oreshnik as a counterbalance to the West, which has deprived Belarus of diplomatic leverage (BelTA, November 1).

Belarusian military analyst Alyaksandr Alesin believes the Oreshnik system is a strong deterrent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which he says is increasingly aggressive toward Belarus and Russia. He catalogues Oreshnik’s key characteristics, noting the missile is considerably lighter than the Yars strategic missile system and reportedly carries a “package” of independently propelled and guided warheads—each with its own engine and guidance—effectively multiplying strike potential, meaning a single launch could be equivalent to six missiles with 36 submunitions in total (BelTA, September 6). Former chief of the Belarusian military intelligence agency and current deputy chair of the Permanent Commission on National Security of the House of Representatives, retired Major General Ruslan Kasygin, argues that Oreshnik and other tactical nuclear weapon capabilities are not intended for offensive use as Western commentators claim (Belarus Segondya, August 8).

Lukashenka confirmed that the Oreshnik system is mobile and will patrol designated areas to strike when “required” (see EDM, March 13; BelTA, November 10). Security Council State Secretary Alyaksandr Valfovich confirmed in March that deployment sites had already been prepared (BelTA, March 23).

In July, the chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, First Deputy Minister of Defense Pavel Muraveika, stated that all logistical issues related to the development of units equipped with the Oreshnik system had been resolved. He noted that Belarus has personnel ready to master and employ this system and to cooperate with their Russian counterparts operating units armed with this weapon on Belarusian territory (Belarus Segodnya, July 10).

Official Minsk presents the Oreshnik system as a product of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and its deployment in Belarus is envisaged by the recently adopted Union State security guarantees agreement (see EDM, February 12, June 26). According to Valfovich, the Oreshnik system is jointly produced. The Belarusian defense industry manufactures the main chassis, while the strike components are produced in Russia. The full-scale mock-up of the chassis was first spotted driving through the streets of Minsk in March and later displayed in Lukashenka’s office as a compact model in October (Telegram/@Nevolf, March 21). The Belarusian Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (MZKT) produces the chassis, designated MZKT-79291. MZKT supplies all of Russia’s ground-based strategic missile systems, as well as several other missile complexes, including the Iskander operational tactical missile system. The MZKT-79291 chassis was initially developed in the early 2010s for the RS-26 Rubezh missile system. In Russia, the Rubezh was officially classified as a “light” intercontinental ballistic missile, while in the West it was considered a violation of the now-defunct INF Treaty and categorized as a medium-range missile (Defence-ua.com, October 1).

According to satellite imagery, approximately 60 kilometers (37 miles) south of Minsk, in the Slutsk district near the village of Pavlovka, construction is underway at a site likely designed to host the Oreshnik system. The area has a long military history. From late 1959 until 1993, the location housed the 306th Strategic Missile Regiment of Slutsk. In 1960, the 1057th Repair and Maintenance Base was established to provide “nuclear-technical support” for the regiment. Initially, the missile base hosted ground-launched medium-range R-12 (SS-4) missiles with a range of up to 2,100 kilometers (1,305 miles), followed in 1981 by the mobile RSD-10M Pioneer (SS-20) systems with a range of 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles). From 1989, the regiment was rearmed with strategic Topol (SS-25) mobile ground-based missiles capable of reaching 11,000 kilometers (6,835 miles).

Construction at the site near Pavlovka began in June 2024 without an announcement, covering over two square kilometers (0.77 square miles). The facility consists of four main sections, all connected by new roads. In 2025, Minsk cleared one square kilometer of forest, built 13 ammunition storage buildings with defensive walls, erected three 100-meter-long (328-feet-long) hangars, and laid foundations for multiple other structures. The northern site on former farmland now hosts eight building frames resembling hangars. On the eastern section, a 150-meter (492-feet) building frame and earthworks are under construction. The southeastern site, located on the highest hill in the Slutsk district, continues earthworks and road construction, possibly indicating future placement of air defense systems (Radio Svaboda, September 10). Oreshnik unit crews will be operating in Belarus, frequently changing routes and positions, using facilities such as the one near Pavlovka as resupply bases.

In late 2024, Lukashenka claimed that he would jointly make decisions for Oreshnik use with Putin, and Belarus would exclusively define the target list (Kommersant, December 10, 2024). Combat duty, however, is the core activity of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), designed to keep forces and equipment ready to execute nuclear missile strikes under any conditions. RSVN ensures nuclear deterrence and, if directed by Putin, the delivery of strategic strikes (Voennaya Mysl, 2023, 5, 137–146). Target identification and use authorization is ultimately Putin’s, not Lukashenka’s, prerogative.

A reference to the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) of Russia and Belarus suggests that the Oreshnik missile unit will be operating under the operational command and control of the RTG Joint Command (Interfax, March 31). The situation with the Oreshnik system is, in practice, similar to the U.S. deliveries of Tomahawk missiles to partner countries. The partner country may operate the weapon, but U.S. specialists exclusively configure all flight missions and routes for them. Without coordination with Moscow, Minsk will not be able to use these missiles independently, and Russian military personnel will program the flight mission data into the guidance module of the Oreshnik IRBMs, leaving Belarus with a secondary logistical role (Telegram/@Milioptimist, October 28). Russian officials have shown no objection to Lukashenka’s statements because they place part of the responsibility for the system’s potential employment against Ukraine or NATO on the Belarusian leadership (see EDM, February 3). In such a crisis scenario, Belarus, not Russia, would become the first natural target for a retaliatory strike (see EDM, April 30, 2024).

Lukashenka says that by the end of 2025, Russia will deliver several missiles for the Oreshnik system to Belarus (Interfax, March 14). According to Ukrainian intelligence, as of the end of October, Russia has accumulated six Oreshnik IRBMs, with a planned production rate of six units per year (RBC-Ukraine, October 31). Given the mention of several chassis and missiles, at least one Russian RVSN missile battalion—two to three launchers, plus one mobile command post—will deploy to Belarus for combat duty, with more units coming later.

The Belarusian leadership claims that the placement of the Oreshnik system in Belarus is purely defensive and a deterrent. The forward deployment of such strike systems close to a potential theater of operations, however, typically indicates preparations for offensive action. The U.S./NATO missile-defense echelons in Eastern Europe are capable of intercepting Oreshnik IRBMs during the early phases of their trajectory if launched from Belarusian territory. This means that, in a conflict scenario, the effective use of Oreshnik would first require disabling those sites through a massive combined missile and drone strike and/or tactical nuclear weapons (see EDM, March 13). If Russia and Belarus genuinely anticipate an attack from NATO, such systems would be among the first targets, which makes it more logical to deploy them deeper inside Russian territory with echeloned air and missile defenses. In opposition to official statements that only aggression against Belarus or Russia could trigger use of the Oreshnik system, updated bilateral security frameworks, which contain broad mutual security assistance language, could be used to justify preemptive use of Oreshnik on the basis of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine or potential conflicts with NATO (see EDM, February 12, June 26).The risk of direct military conflict on the NATO eastern flank necessitates reinforcing the missile-defense posture in Eastern Europe. NATO could consider adding to the facilities in Redzikowo, Poland, and Deveselu, Romania; establishing a missile-defense site in Ukraine; and positioning strike assets near Belarus capable of disrupting Oreshnik IRBMs launches during the pre-firing phase (see EDM, February 3). This approach mirrors the actions of Ukrainian intelligence services in July 2024, when they successfully destroyed an Oreshnik launcher at the Kapustin Yar range before it could conduct a launch (Telegram/@DIUkraine, October 31).