Central Asia Walls Off as Russian Fuel Dries Up

Central Asia Walls Off as Russian Fuel Dries Up

Executive Summary:

• Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, most recently the Omsk plant on July 6, have disrupted more than a quarter of Russia’s refining capacity, turning Moscow from a major Central Asian fuel supplier into a competitor for regional supplies.
• Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, importing almost all their fuel from Russia, face the sharpest shortages, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan restrict exports, draw down reserves, and seek alternative supplies from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Belarus.
• The Russian fuel shock compounds the aviation fuel squeeze linked to the U.S.–Iran conflict and comes just months before winter. Alternative supply deals remain marginal, Kazakhstan is drafting an export ban through May 2027, and the region is securing domestic supplies faster than it is realigning.

Russia’s refining system has absorbed sustained damage. On July 6, Ukrainian drones struck the Omsk refinery, Russia’s largest and its top gasoline producer, knocking out primary units that account for roughly three-quarters of its capacity and pushing Bishkek into emergency fuel purchases (Ukrainska Pravda; Meduza; EADaily, July 7). Russian energy analyst Sergei Vakulenko of the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center estimated that about 28 percent of Russian refining capacity was offline by June 20, and the U.S.-based Energy Intelligence put the loss closer to a third, with refining runs at their lowest in 21 years (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 29; The Moscow Times, July 2). By early July, restrictions on fuel sales were in place in nearly all Russian regions (The Moscow Times, July 2). The disruptions are straining Russia’s role as a regional fuel supplier. Russia now competes with its own clients for scarce fuel, and Central Asian governments are building defenses faster than they can line up alternatives.

The U.S.–Iran conflict has closed or throttled the Strait of Hormuz since its opening weeks, disrupting Gulf crude and refined product exports and doubling jet fuel prices within weeks (Economy Middle East, April 20; Arab News, June 1). Central Asia felt the effects directly. Tajikistan’s price rises were partly tied to Gulf disruptions, and Kyrgyz economists urged Bishkek to consider suppliers including Iran (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 29). The Russian shock affects gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, while the Gulf disruption is narrower and concentrated in aviation. Jet fuel is therefore exposed to supply pressures from both directions.

The clearest sign of the reversal is Moscow’s search for imports. Russia has banned gasoline exports since early April, with exemptions for Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) members and intergovernmental deals (The Moscow Times, July 2). On July 8, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced a ban on diesel exports and said Russia would begin importing fuel the same month (Meduza, July 8). Russia has been buying additional gasoline from Belarus and India (EADaily, July 1). Moscow also asked Astana for about 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline. Russian reporting described the volume as humanitarian aid agreed upon, while Kazakh officials said discussions remained preliminary and no firm decision had been made (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 29; The Moscow Times, July 2). For a country that has long set the region’s fuel prices and controlled key fuel routes, turning to smaller neighbors marks a structural inversion of the old patron relationship.

Kyrgyzstan is acutely exposed. Kyrgyz Vice Mayor of Bishkek Nasipbek Kerimov told Birinchi Radio the country consumes roughly 2 million tons of fuel a year, about 95 percent of it from Russia, and Bishkek has appealed to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan for supply (The Times of Central Asia, July 6). Kyrgyz First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev told the 24.kg news agency that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had confirmed a contract for a first 3,000 tons of jet fuel, with talks under way on another 5,000 tons of diesel, while Belarus had agreed to 3,000 tons of jet fuel and about 10,000 tons of diesel, amounts that cover only a small share of national demand (24.kg, July 7).

Price controls in Kyrgyzstan are coming under strain. The government introduced temporary price regulation on May 25 and is subsidizing fuel importers through September 30, but on July 7 it lifted price caps on AI-95 after the grade disappeared from Bishkek filling stations (The Times of Central Asia, July 8). Domestic gasoline output rose 53 percent year on year from January to May, and the modernized Junda refinery in Chuy Region is ramping up, but neither can replace Russian supply (The Times of Central Asia, July 6). Bishkek is also moving to protect domestic supplies. On July 14, the Cabinet of Ministers banned exports of crude oil and petroleum products by road and rail, including to EAEU states, until the domestic market is saturated (Charter97, July 14).

Kazakhstan, the region’s largest oil producer, has so far avoided pump-level shortages, but its exposure is structural (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 29). Astana has banned road exports of gasoline and diesel, including to EAEU states, from May 21 to November 21, and has tightened border controls to curb smuggling (The Times of Central Asia, June 26). On July 7, the Energy Ministry proposed extending the export ban to both road and rail shipments, including to EAEU states, from November 22 through May 22, 2027 (Kazinform, July 7).

Russia’s war against Ukraine has also disrupted Kazakhstan’s energy production. After a June 24 drone strike cut gas intake at the Orenburg plant in Russia that processes Karachaganak’s output, daily production at the field fell from 34,000 to 25,000 tons, a drop of more than a quarter (Uralskweek, June 26). Meanwhile, the Atyrau refinery completed scheduled maintenance early and resumed crude receipt on July 8 (Kazakhstan Today, July 9). Astana is also seeking additional import options. Kazakh Vice Minister of Trade and Integration Zhanel Kushukova said Kazakhstan was preparing to cut import duties to zero on fuel imports from the PRC (Kazinform, June 25).

Russia banned aviation fuel exports from June 1 until November 30, and since its jet fuel reaches the region mainly by rail, that restriction compounds the Gulf shortage (The Russian Government, June 1; The Times of Central Asia, June 26). Russian rail exports of jet fuel to Central Asia and Afghanistan fell by more than 92 percent from May to June, to 3,800 tons, while gasoline deliveries dropped by 34 percent (The Moscow Times, July 13).

Uzbekistan has its own refineries, but rising demand is increasing its reliance on imports. Gasoline imports covered nearly half of domestic demand from January to May, rising about 85 percent year on year by volume (Kun.uz, July 1). A separate customs series put January to April imports at 568,700 tons, more than double a year earlier (Kun.uz, June 3). On June 29, AI-92 hit a record high of 13.919 million Uzbek som ($1,160) a ton on the republican commodity exchange, up 11.8 percent in a month (Spot.uz, June 30; The Times of Central Asia, July 8). Uzbekistan Airways cut some Russia-bound flights on June 12 over jet fuel shortages, and Tashkent is preparing a 120,000-ton gasoline reserve for December and January (Gazeta, June 12; The Times of Central Asia, July 8). Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev paid an official visit to Belarus on July 8–9, where the two sides signed a strategic partnership declaration, potentially reflecting Tashkent’s efforts to secure additional fuel supplies (Kun.uz, July 8; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9).

Tajikistan has the fewest buffers against supply disruptions. Its Antimonopoly Service reported that 84 percent of petroleum products imported in 2025 came from Russia, while authorities attributed the disruption to unnamed external factors (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 29). Diesel prices have risen sharply nationwide, and a shortage hit Dushanbe filling stations in early July, with some limiting sales to 20 liters (5.3 gallons) per vehicle (Asia-Plus, July 3). In Khujand, diesel prices rose from about 9.60 Tajik somoni ($0.89) to 13.50 Tajik somoni ($1.25) a liter (0.26 gallons), an increase of roughly 40 percent (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 29).

The government held a meeting on fuel supplies and prices on July 6, while its civil aviation agency negotiated with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and others for aviation fuel. The Agriculture Ministry also began offering farmers subsidized diesel from state reserves on July 9, while officials explored additional supplies from Iraq (Avesta, July 7; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9; Asia-Plus, July 10). Turkmenistan, despite being a major gas exporter, could also supply crude oil to a proposed regional fuel system alongside Kazakhstan, with Uzbek refineries processing the crude into fuel. Turkmenistan, however, has not yet emerged as a significant alternative to Russian fuel supplies (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9).

The current fuel squeeze could become a broader energy problem as winter approaches. This is a summer shock, driven by harvest and travel demand, and it comes before the heating season, when household gas, coal, and electricity demand will add to the strain. Kyrgyzstan recorded a summer-high daily power demand on June 29 and expects to import around 4 billion kilowatt-hours over the cold months, much of it from the same neighbors now facing fuel shortages (The Times of Central Asia, July 8).

For Moscow, the crisis erodes a longstanding instrument of influence. Cheap and reliable fuel has tied Central Asian economies to Russia alongside labor migration and security ties, but that leverage has now become a liability (see EDM, July 2). The legal architecture of dependence still stands. Russia supplies Kyrgyzstan duty free under EAEU indicative balances already signed for 2026, while the Eurasian Economic Commission extended the union’s zero-duty regime for fuel imports by another year on July 1 (The Times of Central Asia, July 6, 9).

The deals with Beijing and Minsk are marginal, the export bans are defensive, and Kazakhstan may simply trade dependence on Russian fuel for dependence on the PRC (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9). Luca Anceschi, a professor of Central Asian studies at the University of Glasgow, attributes the region’s exposure to short-term, export-focused policymaking and warns that runaway fuel inflation could destabilize the region’s governments (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9). The region is expanding its options through ties with the PRC and the South Caucasus, as well as greater domestic refining capacity (see EDM, July 6, 8). Three developments will indicate whether this becomes a broader realignment. The first has already turned, with Atyrau returning to operation ahead of schedule. The second is whether the preliminary PRC and Belarus deals expand beyond their currently limited scope. The third is whether Russia extends its gasoline and new diesel export bans into the fall. Kazakhstan has already drafted an export ban through May 2027, while Kyrgyzstan followed on July 14 (Kazinform, July 7; Charter97, July 14).