China’s Foreign Affairs Apparatus Grapples with Succession Challenges
Executive Summary:
- The detention of Liu Jianchao, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Liaison Department (ILD), has caused instability in the PRC’s foreign affairs hierarchy and signals uncertainty in its succession planning.
- Liu Haixing was appointed to lead the ILD, but his appointment shows that the CCP is struggling to field senior diplomats who have the requisite experience, party rank, and political loyalty to Xi.
- With Wang Yi already having long surpassed the informal retirement age, the CCP must decide by 2027 whether to promote Liu Haixing, retain Wang, or downgrade the chief diplomat’s role altogether.
In August, reports surfaced that Chinese authorities had detained Liu Jianchao (刘建超), a senior diplomat widely viewed as a leading candidate to become the country’s next foreign minister (The Wall Street Journal [WSJ], August 10). Authorities have not commented on Liu’s status, and he was not among the 14 officials expelled at the Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in October (Xinhua, October 23). But his prolonged absence, coupled with the appointment in late September of Liu Haixing (刘海星) to replace him as the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Liaison Department (ILD; 中国共产党中央委员会对外联络部), strongly suggests that Liu Jianchao’s career is over (CCP ILD, September 30).
The foreign affairs apparatus in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has faced a succession crisis since 2023, when Qin Gang (秦刚) was removed as foreign minister only seven months into the job (Lowy Institute, August 20). The reappointment of Qin’s predecessor Wang Yi (王毅), who had moved in 2022 to a higher-ranking role as head of the Party’s Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAO; 中央外事工作委员会办公室), signaled that the Party lacked an obvious replacement for Qin. Wang had already surpassed the customary retirement age before being appointed to lead the CFAO, indicating a shortage of diplomats with the experience, Party rank, and political reliability that the CCP seeks for its top foreign policy leadership, even before the country’s top diplomats started going missing (Baidu/Wang Yi, accessed November 6).
This shortage is now even more severe. Once Liu Jianchao’s downfall is confirmed, Liu Haixing will be the only career diplomat remaining with a senior enough rank to be a strong candidate to replace Wang. Yet Liu lacks some of the key experience generally associated with top diplomatic posts. He has served neither as a vice foreign minister nor in any ambassadorial post. Before the next Party Congress in 2027, Beijing will have to decide whether to make Liu Haixing the next CFAO director despite these deficiencies, hold Wang back from retirement a second time, or appoint a lower-ranked but possibly more experienced diplomat to the post. The latter choice would risk weakening the diplomatic corps at a time when foreign policy is particuarly important to the securing the PRC’s national interests.
Expanding Top Party Oversight of Foreign Affairs
The PRC’s foreign affairs system is fragmented, consisting of multiple state and party organizations with similar, but not identical, functions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, 外交部) is the largest foreign affairs bureaucracy, and is the primary body responsible for foreign policy implementation (Jost and Li, June 26). [1] This includes managing the largest diplomatic network on earth, which consists of 279 diplomatic embassies and consulates (FMPRC, accessed November 11). The foreign minister heads these efforts, but as the leader of a state bureaucracy, he is subordinate to the Party’s top foreign affairs official, the director of the CFAO. The CFAO is the administrative agency of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, which is chaired by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and is the principal organization responsible for making and coordinating foreign policy (Asia Society, March 5, 2024).
The ILD also reports to the CFAO. Like the CFAO, it is a Party, rather than a state, institution. It is smaller than the MFA and has a narrower remit, as it is mainly responsible for outreach to foreign political parties (CCP ILD, accessed November 6). In recent years, its profile has risen, resulting in more overlap with the foreign ministry’s functions. This was especially true under the leadership of Liu Jianchao, who was so active internationally that one think tank report from 2024 called him a “shadow foreign minister” (CSIS, January 20, 2024).
Historically, both foreign ministers and ILD directors have been selected from among the country’s most experienced diplomats. They have almost always been full members of the CCP Central Committee, which consists of around 200 of the Party’s most senior leaders. [2] In 2018, Xi Jinping upgraded the Central Foreign Affairs Commission from a central leading group to a formal commission as part of a broader restructuring of institutions. Every CFAO director since has held a seat on the Politburo, making him one of the top two dozen CCP officials (Xinhua, March 21, 2018).
There is no rule that the CFAO director must sit on the Politburo, but this new trend appears to reflect a conscious decision by the CCP leadership and is in line with Xi’s objectives for the organization. At the upgraded Central Foreign Affairs Commission’s first meeting in 2018, Xi highlighted the growing risks and opportunities the PRC faces on the international stage. He also emphasized the importance of strong Party oversight of and coordination with the foreign policy establishment to ensure the Party’s foreign affairs decisions are implemented. Having the PRC’s most senior diplomat among the Party’s top leaders is the most straightforward way to ensure this coordination and oversight (Xinhua, May 15, 2018).
Succession Planning Remains Fragile
A discernible pattern has emerged under Xi in which outgoing foreign ministers ascend to lead the CFAO. Both Wang and his successor Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) rose to the CFAO role after serving as foreign minister for at least one term. When Qin was elevated to the Central Committee and appointed foreign minister in 2022, it appeared the pattern would continue.
After Qin’s downfall, many Western analysts expected Liu Jianchao to be next in line (VOA, February 2, 2024). Liu seemed well positioned. He was a full Central Committee member, held ministerial rank, and had served as ambassador to two countries. (Unlike most people who go on to become the PRC’s top diplomat, however, he had not served as ambassador to the United States or Japan.) As ILD director, he had traveled extensively, working to repair the country’s image after the pandemic and amid intensifying geopolitical friction. Many expected him to be appointed foreign minister before the 2027 Party Congress, then move into the Politburo and CFAO (Brookings, July 17, 2024). His sudden disappearance instead created another succession crisis.
The causes of Liu Jianchao’s apparent downfall remain opaque, but at least two explanations are plausible:
Disciplinary Issues
One is that Liu is genuinely guilty of corruption or disciplinary infractions. The brief detainment of one of his deputies for questioning in August seemed to confirm that a formal investigation was underway. Western media reports have cited sources claiming that CCP investigators are looking into possible misdeeds from Liu’s time as a graft-buster in Zhejiang province in 2015–2018 (WSJ, September 30). Whatever the actual nature of his suspected transgressions, his formal removal from the ILD indicates that the investigation has not been fruitless and raises the possibility he might become the next “tiger” netted by Xi’s anti-corruption drive.
Liu ultimately could be cleared of wrongdoing or found guilty of misconduct that is not criminal but is deemed inconsistent with Party standards. This appears to have been what happened with Qin, who was never stripped of his Party membership and was allowed to “resign” (辞去) from his role as a National People’s Congress delegate in 2024 rather than be “expelled” (罢免) as is the norm for disgraced cadres (People’s Daily Online, February 28, 2024).
Strategic Maneuvering
Liu Jianchao’s downfall could have been politically motivated. For example, Xi could have removed him either out of distrust or to clear a path for his preferred candidate to assume the CFAO role in 2027. A potential rival within the foreign affairs establishment also could have orchestrated his removal for a similar reason. Rank and experience are among the most important factors in senior personnel appointments, and advancing a less-qualified figure sometimes requires sidelining stronger competitors through measures such as disciplinary probes. Xi’s mastery of this art to maneuver allies into strategic roles helps explain his unprecedented consolidation of power within the Party, and it is well within the realm of possibility that Liu is a victim of similar machinations.
Whatever the precise cause, Liu Jianchao’s fall underscores the fragility of succession planning in the Party’s diplomatic establishment and the challenge it faces in identifying leaders with the experience, rank, and political reliability needed for these jobs.
Short-term Stability But Medium-Term Uncertainty
Liu Haixing’s appointment resolved the immediate question of who would replace Liu Jianchao as ILD director. The identity of Wang’s successor, however, or even whether there will be one in 2027, remains uncertain.
Once Liu Jianchao is formally removed from the Central Committee, Liu Haixing will be the body’s only remaining career diplomat besides Wang. [3] Liu Haixing is also widely believed to have Xi’s trust. This is based partly on their shared status as Party “princelings” and partly on the fact that Xi chairs the Central National Security Commission (中央国家安全委员会), where Liu has served as Executive Deputy Director since 2022 (Asia Society Policy Institute, July 27, 2023). But loyalty ties to Xi did not guarantee immunity for Qin Gang or Liu Jianchao, and notable gaps in Liu’s experience mean that his future is far from certain (Xinhua, October 22, 2022; ThinkChina, March 4, 2024; MFA, accessed October 22).
A lack of formal norms governing succession makes it impossible to predict with certainty who will lead the foreign affairs apparatus after 2027. Three plausible scenarios currently stand out.
Liu Haixing Heads the CFAO
Liu Haixing’s ILD appointment and Central Committee seat make him the most likely candidate to succeed Wang as a Politburo member and CFAO director in 2027. He could move into the foreign minister role first to obtain further credentials, but this would not be necessary. His ministerial rank and portfolio should allow him to move straight into the CFAO.
Liu’s main weakness is his lack of top-level experience relative to previous heads of the foreign affairs apparatus. After three decades in the foreign ministry, he rose to just one rank below vice minister. However, for the past three years, he has served on the leadership of the Office of the National Security Commission, which, like the CFAO, is chaired by Xi (MFA, accessed October 28). By 2027, after two years in the ILD, Liu will likely be well-prepared to manage the bureaucratic and political complexities of the CFAO. More importantly, if his reported ties to Xi are genuine, he could wield more influence than his predecessors despite having thinner credentials.
Liu’s appointment and Wang’s retirement would create vacancies for the foreign minister and ILD director positions, which would probably be filled by younger diplomats with vice ministerial and ambassadorial experience. They would likely have at least two five-year terms left before hitting the unofficial retirement age of 68 so that they could be in the running for the CFAO position when Liu’s term ends in 2032. At least half a dozen of the PRC’s current ambassadors and vice-ministers fit this bill, making it hard to predict who will fill these vacancies. The clearest early indication of their identities will be their appointment to the Central Committee during the Party Congress in 2027. The appointments of these younger officials would help replenish the PRC’s pool of senior diplomats following nearly two decades dominated by Yang and Wang.
Wang Yi Stays On
If Liu Haixing does not get the role, Wang could remain CFAO director for another five years, with Liu possibly staying at the ILD. In this scenario, a new foreign minister would be appointed and made a Central Committee member in 2027 with a view to succeed Wang in 2032. Liu might even be replaced at the ILD by a younger figure being groomed for possible CFAO leadership. The downfalls of both Qin Gang and Liu Jianchao illustrate why the Party prefers to have more than one qualified candidate for important posts.
Keeping Wang in place would ensure continuity and experience at a time of strained human resources and rising international uncertainty that makes someone of his experience invaluable. But Wang is just four months younger than Xi, and it is unlikely that the paramount leader, who is concerned primarily with his own authority, will allow another senior leader to flout retirement norms and cultivate influence indefinitely.
Downgrading Diplomacy
A less likely outcome is that someone outside the Central Committee is elevated directly to the CFAO. Such a figure might bring stronger diplomatic credentials than Liu but their low Party rank would make it more challenging to appoint them to the Politburo. If the Party’s chief diplomat were appointed to the Central Committee but not the Politburo, as was the case before 2017, it would mark a downgrading of the position.
There is precedent for “helicopter” promotions into the Politburo from outside the Central Committee. Current Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi (蔡奇), for example, was appointed directly to the Politburo in 2017 after becoming Beijing party secretary. The same thing occurred when He Weidong (何卫东) was made a Central Military Commission vice chairman in 2022 (Reuters, October 22, 2022). However, both of these individuals were close Xi allies whose positions virtually required Politburo membership. The CCP would likely prefer its top diplomat to sit on the Politburo, but maneuvering a lower-ranked official into that exclusive body in the place of a more qualified official with a higher rank would be politically difficult. Still, if Xi has a preferred candidate, he could most likely override convention to make it happen.
Conclusion
The CCP has difficult decisions to make regarding its foreign policy leadership ahead of the next Party Congress in 2027. With the retirement of chief diplomat Wang Yi already overdue, the downfalls of his two most qualified successors have left the Party without an obvious replacement at a time when foreign policy is increasingly key to the PRC’s national interests.
Beijing has countless diplomats with the foreign policy credentials to fill Wang’s shoes, but the only one with the appropriate rank to do so in 2027, Liu Haixing, lacks the ambassadorial and vice ministerial experience that helped prepare former chief diplomats for the role. By 2027, the CCP will have to decide whether to appoint Liu despite these deficiencies, postpone Wang’s retirement again, or appoint a lower-ranked diplomat and risk downgrading diplomacy at this critical time.
Notes
[1] Jost, Tyler, and Yucong Li. “The Politics of Promotion in China’s Foreign Policy Bureaucracy.” The China Quarterly 263 (2025): 776–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574102510091X.
[2] The current Central Committee consists of 205 full members with voting rights and 171 alternate members who attend meetings but cannot vote on decisions.
[3] MFA Party Secretary Qi Yu (齐玉) is also a full member of the Central Committee, but he spent most of his career in the central and provincial Organization Departments (组织部), responsible for managing the Party’s human resources. As such he has no foreign policy experience (Baidu/Qi Yu, accessed November 6, 2025).
