Diverse Russian Responses to U.S.–Israeli Airstrikes on Iran Reveal Elite Split

Diverse Russian Responses to U.S.–Israeli Airstrikes on Iran Reveal Elite Split

Executive Summary:

• The varied reaction of Russian propaganda to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran reveals the existence of different elite groups, each with its own interests. Each of these groups’ assessments of the airstrikes belies their priorities.
• Narratives about economic benefits for Moscow from the ongoing conflict in and around Iran prevail in the Russian information space. Russian intellectual and military elites advise learning from Iran’s experience of maintaining a regime without its leader.
• There are very few articles in the Russian press that portray the death of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a tragedy. Elite groups in Russia, through their mouthpieces, do not conceal the fact that they are more concerned with their own survival than with their desire to preserve their leader.

The Russian leadership has displayed ambivalence to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran (see EDM, March 2). Moscow is providing no material help to Tehran because of financial and military constraints caused by its war against Ukraine, an expectation that conflict in the Middle East and rising oil prices will profit Russia, and a desire to preserve the possibility of continuing negotiations with the United States over the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, March 9). At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin may uneasily project the fate of Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei on himself, seeing his killing as a threat to any leader of an authoritarian regime (see EDM, March 2).

Russian regime-aligned media show even more contradictory stances on the conflict in and around Iran. The existence of various intra-elite groups may explain these differences. Each of these groups, through its own media outlets, emphasizes the aspects of the fighting in the Middle East that are priorities for it. These priorities and the frequency with which they appear can indicate the group’s degree of influence and the attitudes prevailing within it.

Russian media representing financial pragmatists interested in economic gain have widely reported on the conflict in and around Iran, increasing the global price of oil. Independent economists point out that if the fighting continues, Moscow’s petroleum and gas income will grow. They opine that this will not have a fundamental effect on the Russian economy in 2026, but could somewhat lessen pressure on government finances (Re: Russia, March 3). These commentators note that “in the initial stages, Russia can profit from the price increase and less competition from Iran” (URA.ru, March 4). They see pro-Western regime change as the main threat to Kremlin profits. Armed conflict in the region jeopardizes shipping routes in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 percent of the world’s oil passes, thereby lowering global oil supply. The most optimistic Russian experts assert that the conflict could push oil prices to $100 per barrel (MK.RU, March 1).

The second prominent elite group is the ideologically charged ultra-patriots who are exclusively pro-Iranian. Their narratives are sometimes directly opposed to those of the financial pragmatists. Commentators associated with this segment see Iran as a bastion of  “traditional values,” and consider its defense “sacred” (Тsargrad, March 2). They say that the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran are a trap that will be catastrophic for the United States (Тsargrad, March 3). Not only do conservative sites put forward these narratives, but also the country’s biggest state-operated news agency, RIA Novosti. Its writers promote a conspiracy theory that Washington attacked Iran in exchange for a payoff from Israel (RIA Novosti, March 4). This demonstrates the growth of “ultra-patriot” influence in the mainstream Russian information space.

A comparatively small segment of the information space publishes stories about how the conflict in Iran will “undermine Ukrainian air defenses” because U.S. and Israeli weapons stores will be diverted to the Middle East. They refer to stocks of air defense missiles, primarily Patriot missiles and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system (Vsglyad, March 3). The group promoting this idea may be described as “military pragmatists.” Independent journalists do not share their prognoses and note that Ukraine’s military position is more stable than it was a year ago, and that Kyiv has largely adapted to shifting international aid flows (Re: Russia, March 2).

The fourth group of narratives, the most interesting strain, emphasizes the resilience of the Iranian system and the ability of the regime to survive even after the killing of the supreme leader. The program director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Timofey Bordachev, hopes that there is “a low probability for the collapse of state institutions in Iran” and “an absence of prospects for chaos there, regardless of the war’s outcome,” a fascinating conclusion if applied to Russia’s authoritarian regime (Vzglyad, March 1). Russian military analysts are even franker, writing that the ability of the regime to survive without a leader is one of the most important lessons that Russia should take from events in Iran. They even detail the conditions for such survival, describing a structure in which “the entire upper echelon and more than half of the middle echelon of power are believers and true veterans of the Ukraine conflict.” Veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine would “have an almost religious status,” no “liberal fifth column” would exist, and all Russian elites would “share the idea of the Great Russian Mission” (Topwar.ru, March 1).

Very few commentators focus on the circumstances of the death of Khamenei or on his character (Vzglyad, March 4). Carrying this over to Russia, the picture for Putin is not particularly optimistic. Intellectual and military elites appear most worried about their own survival during conflict and less concerned about their leader. The most radical party of the elite would sooner try to preserve “belief in the mission” than a specific leader. In contrast, others are concerned solely with the financial aspect of the situation. Calls to defend authoritarian leaders following Khamenei’s fate are barely visible in Russian propaganda.