EMP Weapons Expose PRC Military Vulnerability
Executive Summary:
- The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) drive toward military “informatization” has left it vulnerable to the use of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. PRC scientists have expressed doubts about the ability to develop effective hardening measures.
- EMP weapons could be used to blunt an attack on Taiwan, which would likely rely on drone swarms in the early stages.
- Civilian and military targets in the PRC are vulnerable to the effects of EMP weapons, ranging from civilian electric grids to the Eastern Theater Command Headquarters in Nanjing.
The Jiutian (九天) unmanned aerial system (UAS), the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newest drone, made its first flight in December 2025. Capable of carrying a 6,000-kilogram payload, it was tested releasing 100 smaller loitering drones (Xinhua; CCTV, December 11, 2025). Akin to the rest of the PLA’s drone fleet, however, it remains to be seen whether it can withstand electromagnetic pulses (EMP) to counter it.
EMP weapons deliver pulses of radiation that induce electrical charges in conductive materials, which can disable or destroy electronic systems. While EMPs can be produced via nuclear or non-nuclear methods, non-nuclear EMPs are more targeted, with a narrower range, and focus on specific frequency bands. A recent article in PLA Daily notes that EMP weapons are rapidly moving from theory to reality, citing recent tests of prototype microwave-based counter-UAS systems and overseas trials that disabled large drone groups (PLA Daily, November 28, 2025). The article underscores the importance of EMP weapons as a speed-of-light, non-kinetic “electronics-kill” (以电能为主要“弹药”) option that can scale against drone swarms and other electronics-dependent targets. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to electrify its civilian infrastructure, and the PLA continues to “informatize” (信息化) its operations, vulnerabilities to EMPs continue to grow (PLA Daily, May 2, 2024).
Recent Operations Indicate EMP Efficacy
PLA strategy over the past decade has entailed increasing dependence on integrated digital networks that consist of sensors, radars, and data links used to create “kill webs” (杀伤网). [1] As a result, the PLA’s electronic nodes are increasingly vulnerable to EMP attacks. The use of electronic warfare by U.S. forces against Chinese radars and other command and control systems during the recent arrest of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela is a case in point (Army Technology, December 19, 2025; ExecutiveGov, January 13).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been illustrative, with Ukraine downing hundreds of Russian drones through electronic warfare measures such as GPS jamming and, according to some accounts, high-power microwave (HPM) electronic attack (IEEE Spectrum, July 30, 2022). EMPs can also be effective against systems guided by fiber-optic cables, as first-person view drone motors and their cameras are composed of conductive materials. [2] The PLA is likely aware of these vulnerabilities, as the Science of Military Strategy makes direct reference to the potential of EMP bombs to destroy electronic systems, but strategic documents stop short of explaining any defensive measures it has taken. This is likely due to the difficulty in adequately hardening against these threats and the sensitive nature of EMP regulations (China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2020).
Systems can be hardened against the threat of EMP attacks, but only up to a point. State-affiliated scientists in the PRC have expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of hardening measures to fully protect electronics against EMP effects, given the difficulty in combining protection methods against multi-vector EMP attacks (Wu Zhaofeng et al., 2024). [3] But many PLA systems, especially legacy platforms or civilian dual-use infrastructure and equipment, are not hardened at all. [4]
The extent to which the PLA has integrated civilian technology into its capabilities means that a significant portion of its electronic systems may be vulnerable to cyberattacks and other types of electronic warfare (Guangming Daily, March 13, 2018). State-affiliated scientists acknowledge that electromagnetic security measures have not yet been clearly planned by the state (Wu Qi et al., 2022). [5] EMP protection is not addressed in the PRC’s “Regulations on the Security Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure” (关键信息基础设施安全保护条例) (Chinese Government Net, August 17, 2021).
Initial PLA Attack Phase Vulnerable to EMP Response
In the initial phase of an attack on Taiwan, the PLA likely would launch a massive number of missiles, rockets, and air, surface, and subsurface drones (CNA, October 2025). A series of EMP weapons could disrupt the electronics of these weapons, preventing them from reaching their intended destinations.
Long- and mid-range targets can be countered with electromagnetic bombs (e-bombs) and EMP-mounted missiles. E-bombs—essentially extremely fast conventional explosions that convert the blast’s energy into an EMP—have long been in existence, though they have never been fielded (Kopp, 1996; INSS, September 11, 2025). [6] With the emergence of aerial and naval drone swarms, e-bombs may see a resurgence. Cheap and convenient to build using civilian-grade technology, they can be mass-produced at scale and used to attack waves of drone swarms, similar to anti-aircraft artillery (IEEE Spectrum, April 1, 2009). They also can be fitted onto artillery shells or missiles (America’s Seed Fund, accessed January 16).
HPM-mounted missiles can also be used against distant targets. [7] Unlike e-bombs, these weapons produce a focused EMP beam against specified targets. PLA drones or missiles are all vulnerable to vehicle-mounted HPMs, hand-held anti-drone guns, including those Taiwan has begun fielding, and lasers (Taiwan News, November 5, 2025). [8] Taiwan has also developed its own vehicle-mounted lasers capable of disabling drones and missiles. These produce an EMP when they interact with a target, creating focused electromagnetic interference that disrupts electronics (Newsweek, March 12, 2024). [9]
EMP weapons do have potential drawbacks. Fratricide is a challenge, with cell phone networks and other electronics becoming collateral damage when EMP weapons are used near one’s own urban environment. They are also expensive: two systems cost upward of $44 million, though this will likely drop as HPM research and development advances (Epirus, July 17, 2025).
PRC Vulnerable to EMP Counterforce and Countervalue Strikes
Numerous PLA assets are vulnerable to EMP attacks. Seaports, air bases, missile launch sites, and command and control centers, including in the Nanjing area where the Eastern Theater Command Headquarters is located, are all exposed. If struck, the PLA’s ability to launch attacks or retaliate would be severely limited (Taipei Times, June 23, 2025). Similarly, EMP strikes against ground-controlled intercept centers or airborne early warning platforms could limit airborne platforms from launching across the Taiwan Strait or vectoring fighter aircraft to conduct defensive and offensive counter-air operations, while disabling the electronics within missile launchers would deprive attackers of a critical method of attack.
Even fortified targets, such as bunkers, are somewhat vulnerable. Conventional strikes may fail to penetrate many C4ISR facilities, which are hardened to withstand large conventional strikes (Financial Times, January 30, 2025). [10] But radar, antennae, external wiring, and other conductive materials linking these facilities to the outside are exposed to a potential attack (PLA Daily, October 16, 2020). As noted above, PRC scientists have argued that it is extremely difficult to completely harden facilities (Wu Zhaofeng et al., 2024).
Civilian infrastructure that directly or indirectly assists military operations are also vulnerable to countervalue EMP strikes (Qi Wu Qi et al.l, 2022). Energy infrastructure in particular is deeply integrated with electronics, making the PRC highly susceptible to paralyzing strikes (Ember, 2025). The PRC’s increasingly electrified energy system, which includes an ultra-high-voltage grid network linking energy production in its western regions with the population- and industry-dense eastern regions, is highly interconnected, enhancing system-wide vulnerability (Baker Institute, accessed January 16). Strikes to critical choke points in its power grid could produce widespread blackouts, slowing military operations and increasing public pressure to resolve the conflict as the civilian population faces prolonged energy shortages.
Conclusion
Rapid increases in investments for research and development by all great powers indicate the growing importance of EMP weapons to future warfare. The utility of these weapons, especially in countering the drones and guided missile systems that dominate the landscape of modern warfare, is clear.
The PLA’s lack of recent combat experience, especially in a heavily contested electromagnetic spectrum environment, may also hinder its ability to effectively coordinate C4ISR under electronic attack.
The PRC’s expanding electronic infrastructure and informatized combat capabilities make its vulnerabilities increasingly acute, presenting opportunities for adversaries to rapidly paralyze PLA operations, and even PRC critical civilian infrastructure, should a conflict erupt.
Notes
[1] This strategy has been geared toward “winning informatized local wars” (打赢信息化局部战争) and succeeding in “systems confrontation” (体系对抗). See: China Brief, July 2, 2015; Xiao Tianliang, ed. The Science of Military Strategy, trans. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Military Science Press, 2020.
[2] For missiles, both the Ukrainians and Russians have been effective at electronically jamming advanced guided missiles, revealing their vulnerability to electronic interference (United24media, April 8, 2025).
[3] Wu Zhaofeng [毋召锋], Xu Yanlin [徐延林], Liu Peiguo [刘培国], et al. “Review and prospect of electromagnetic protection technology development” [电磁防护技术发展综述与展望]. High Power Laser and Particle Beams [强激光与粒子束], 2024, 36: 043001. doi: 10.11884/HPLPB202436.230375.
[4] This includes PLA tactical gear, such as radios and GPS receivers.
[5] Wu Qi [吴琦], Yuanan Liu [刘元安], Yinghong Wen [闻映红], Mingmin Zhao [赵明敏], Weimin Wang [王卫民], Jinbao Zhang [张金宝], and Donglin Su [苏东林], “Non-nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse Threat of Critical Infrastructures and Protection Strategies [重大基础设施非核强电磁脉冲威胁与防护策略研究],” Chinese Engineering Science [中国工程科学] 24, no. 4 (2022): 249–258, https://doi.org/10.15302/J-SSCAE-2022.04.022.
[6] Kopp, Carlo. “The electromagnetic bomb—a weapon of electrical mass destruction.” Airpower Journal, March, 1996. E-bombs are single-shot weapons that use explosively pumped flux compression generators (EPFCG) to generate a strong electrical charge that is funneled through a device called a vircator, which produces a high-powered microwave (HPM).
[7] The US fielded such weapons with its Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) in 2012 and later improved it and tested the High-Powered Joint Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Strike Weapon (HiJENKS) in 2022 (Foreign Policy, October 22, 2012; Department of Defense). The missile used to carry the HiJENKS’s HPM system is reportedly an AGM-158B Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile. The use of a cruise missile as the delivery system allowed the HiJENKS to successfully strike multiple targets in a single launch.
[8] Hand-held jamming devices are not technically EMP weapons, but these devices are useful force multipliers.
[9] The United States has developed advanced HPM anti-drone weapons in the form of its Leonidas and Mjölnir HPMs, designed by Epirus. In August 2025, Epirus’s Leonidas system killed 49 out of 49 drones in a swarm with one shot in less than a second (Air & Space Force Magazine, September 29, 2025).
[10] C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
