Future of Russia’s Military Base in Armenia Fraught

Future of Russia’s Military Base in Armenia Fraught

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s base in Gyumri, Armenia, is increasingly controversial both between the two countries and within them. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan says the base is not “vital” to his country, and Russian President Vladimir Putin says he’ll close it if Yerevan thinks so.
• Their words do not mean a settlement is imminent because many Armenians continue to view the base as an ultimate insurance against the growing power of Türkiye, and many Russians oppose closing it lest Moscow lose leverage or appear weak.
• As a result, while a breakthrough could come quickly, the more likely scenario is that the base will remain in operation for some time as Yerevan moves to break with Russia and join the European Union. Moscow seeks to use the base to slow that process.

Russia’s 4,000-man military base at Gyumri, Armenia, is controversial both between the two countries and within them. On the one hand, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan now says the base is not “vital” to Armenia’s security, and Russian President Vladimir Putin responds that Russia “will leave as early as tomorrow if Armenia believes that the base is not needed” (OC Media, September 3). On the other hand, powerful forces within each country oppose closing the base. Many Armenians still view the Russian base as a kind of national insurance policy against Türkiye’s growing power, given the tragic history of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire  (Window on Eurasia, August 24, 2025). Many Russians—including likely Putin himself—are reluctant to close it, lest Moscow lose leverage in Armenia or appear weak in the eyes of others in the region and more generally (see EDM, May 2, 2024; VFokuse, September 3). As a result, while a breakthrough leading to closure could come quickly, the far more likely scenario is that the base will remain operational for some time to come as Yerevan pursues membership in the European Union and Moscow seeks to use the base to slow that process.

The Soviet Union set up the 102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city, at the end of World War II to guard the South Caucasus against any military moves by Türkiye and the West. Many Armenians at that time welcomed it as a defense against Türkiye, but no one in Yerevan complained about what appears to have been often high-handed actions by Soviet officers toward the local population. After the Soviet Union disintegrated, the base remained, again with significant Armenian support, because Armenia was locked into a war with Azerbaijan and counted on Russia to be its ultimate protector. In 1995, Yerevan and Moscow signed a 15-year agreement on that basis. In 2010, the two countries extended it to 2044 (Eurasianet, August 20, 2010).

This agreement became increasingly unpopular in Armenia after that because of how commanders of the base dealt with the surrounding civilian population, often protecting soldiers who attacked or even killed Armenians. These actions sparked protests by Gyumri residents in 2015, as well as complaints from Armenian officials (Window on Eurasia, January 20, 2015, December 26, 2018). Despite these problems, many Armenians continued to support the Russian base, and Armenian officials worried about Azerbaijan’s growing military power and even suggested that Russia send more troops and weaponry to the base to counter Baku (Window on Eurasia, February 24, 2021).

Such official Armenian support for the base began to crumble when Russia did nothing to support Armenia when its conflict with Azerbaijan heated up in 2020 and 2022. Russia’s failure to act on its treaty obligations to Armenia played a major role in leading Yerevan to reach an agreement with Baku, reduce its ties with Moscow, and seek closer ties with the European Union and the West. Over the last three years, Yerevan has responded by reducing its ties with Russian-led organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and especially the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (see EDM, August 5, 2024). At the end of August this year, in advance of his meeting with Putin in the first week of September, Pashinyan said bluntly that his country no longer considers Russia a strategic partner because Moscow and the CSTO failed to live up to its security commitments during the escalation of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict in 2022 (Yenişafak, August 27).

The Pashinyan–Putin meeting on September 2 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan was frosty. The fate of the Russian base at Gyumri was clearly at the center of the controversy (OC Media, September 2; Tema.Glavnoe, September 4). After the session, the Armenian leader said Yerevan no longer considers the Russian base “a vital necessity” and would not object if Moscow closed it. Pashinyan said Armenian officials, however, had never raised the issue. Attempting to make Russia act rather than acting itself has been a hallmark of Pashinyan’s diplomatic approach, one that he has used on many occasions, including Armenia’s de facto exit from the CSTO (OC Media, September 3; see EDM, August 5, 2024). Putin, for his part, responded, “If Armenia believes that the Russian military base in Armenia is not needed, we will leave as early as tomorrow. But is Armenia ready for that? If so, please tell us. We will not impose anything on anyone” (OC Media, September 3).

That exchange is far from the end of the story. Powerful groups within both countries are not prepared to push the issue to the brink, at least not yet. On the one hand, many Armenians still view Russia as a useful counterweight to Türkiye and do not want to see the kind of break that could leave them without that insurance policy. Some Armenians even took to the streets to demand that the base be kept open (Svobodnya Pressa, July 27, 2025). Aware of these feelings, Pashinyan will not press the issue yet, preferring instead that Moscow act on its own. Meanwhile, while many in Moscow are already downplaying the importance of the Gyumri base given changes in geopolitics and military technology, others clearly remain worried (VFokuse, September 3). If Moscow closes that base, it could leave Russia without sufficient leverage on Yerevan to slow Armenia’s exit from the Russian orbit toward Europe. Others could view that action as a sign of Russian weakness and act more independently of Moscow (see EDM, May 2, 2024; OC Media, September 4). Those in Moscow who think that way, including Putin despite his public stance, were certainly behind a Russian decision earlier this year to beef up the Gyumri base with more men and weapons despite all the talk about its possible closure (Svobodnaya Pressa, July 27, 2025).  

The most likely outcome in the coming months, therefore, is not the closing of the base but perhaps some behind-the-scenes negotiation over new terms for the base’s continued operation. These could include the setting of limits to the number of Russian soldiers who can be based there, something the 2010 accord does not do, and new rules on how Russian military personnel will interact with Armenian civilians. Moscow might willingly agree to these steps if they help slow Pashinyan’s push to join the European Union, a process that will likely take several years or more and that will help Russia maintain its influence there and its face elsewhere.