Hungary’s Ukraine Reset Off to a Shaky Start

Hungary’s Ukraine Reset Off to a Shaky Start

Executive Summary:

• Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar initially aimed for a quick reset with Ukraine by unblocking Kyiv’s EU accession talks in exchange for a bilateral deal on protecting and expanding the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine.  
• The bilateral relationship has seen major setbacks in recent weeks over Hungary’s refusal to advance Ukraine’s EU accession talks, Magyar saying that a Ukrainian petroleum storage facility would not be built in Hungary under Tisza rule, and Budapest’s decision not to join the Carpathian Eight, a new Ukraine-led regional cooperation format. 
• Future Hungary–Ukraine relations will be defined by Ukraine’s implementation of the minority rights agreement, with legislative progress expected in October. A failure to implement the deal could risk slowing down Kyiv’s EU path and decoupling the Ukrainian and Moldovan accession bids. 

Hungary blocked progress on Ukrainian EU accession on September 8 for the fourth time since the first negotiating cluster opened on June 15. Hungarian diplomats said Budapest’s approval of new negotiating clusters is contingent on Kyiv’s implementation of commitments protecting the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia oblast (Index, September 9). Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry responded that Hungary should not make the implementation of minority-rights commitments a condition for opening unrelated negotiation clusters. Kyiv argues that it already incorporated the commitments into its action plan, the execution of which the European Union will evaluate as a part of the accession process (Shelter, September 21). This incident demonstrates that Budapest’s Ukraine policy under Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar may be contingent on Ukraine’s approach to the rights of its Hungarian minority.

Hungary’s continued refusal to advance Ukraine’s EU membership talks is the latest manifestation of Budapest’s evolving Ukraine policy under the country’s new government. After Magyar’s Tisza party defeated Russian-friendly Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in April parliamentary elections, the new pro-EU government vowed to restore Hungary’s relations with the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Magyar subsequently downgraded diplomatic and political relations with Russia (see EDM, April 15). This new government has offered Ukraine an opportunity to reset ties with Hungary after years of anti-Ukrainian policy and rhetoric under Viktor Orbán’s consecutive governments from 2010–2026 (see EDM, March 25). 

Only a month after Hungary’s new government was installed in May, Magyar announced a surprise agreement between Budapest and Kyiv. Under the deal, Hungary dropped its opposition to opening new EU accession negotiating clusters with Ukraine in exchange for comprehensive legislative reforms protecting and expanding the cultural, educational, and language rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Ukraine committed to restoring the system of schools for national minorities, allowing the use of Hungarian in education and school communications. In settlements where the proportion of the Hungarian population exceeds 10 percent, Kyiv will also allow the free use of Hungarian national symbols. 

Disagreements about how implementation of this “historic agreement” should be evaluated flared in recent weeks. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry insisted progress should be assessed through existing EU accession mechanisms and not via new conditions from Hungary. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sibyha said the previous Hungarian government’s policies of “obstructionism and isolationism continue to thrive,” blocking Ukraine’s EU path (Népszava, September 22). At the same time, Kyiv emphasized that the deal’s educational reforms will be implemented by the end of this year, and legislation on the remaining issues will be passed by May 2027 (Karpat.in.ua, September 22). 

Following weeks of uncertainty, Hungarian Foreign Minister Anita Orbán announced that Budapest and Kyiv resolved the misunderstandings after a series of meetings with her Ukrainian counterpart during the UN General Assembly High-level Week. The Hungarian foreign minister expects legislative progress on the Hungarian minority in Ukraine by the end of October (Index, September 24). On October 2, Magyar welcomed Ukraine submitting draft legislation on Hungarian educational rights to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament (HVG, October 2). The Verkhovna Rada is expected to vote on the bill on October 12 (Evropeis’ka Pravda, October 6).

On September 21, Magyar, a critic of Ukraine’s fast-track EU accession, said that Hungary is not participating in a new regional cooperation format launched by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that would include Austria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Dubbed the Carpathian Eight, its inaugural regional summit was held on September 18. Romanian President Nicușor Dan, Polish President Donald Tusk, and then-Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić were present, while Budapest was only represented by Hungary’s chargé d’affaires to Kyiv. Following the summit, however, the Hungarian foreign minister did not rule out the possibility of Budapest joining the forum in the future. 

Magyar’s post-summit comments may have been fueled by a memorandum signed by Ukraine’s Naftogaz and Hungarian oil company MOL on the sidelines of the gathering to explore the construction of Ukrainian petroleum-product storage facilities in Hungary near the border. Magyar said the negotiations between the two oil companies were started under the previous Orbán-led government and criticized MOL for continuing negotiations without informing his government. He also said that no Ukrainian storage facility would be built in Hungary while Tisza is in power (444, September 22). The Hungarian government owns a 25 percent stake in MOL and has said that it is unacceptable that the company conducted negotiations with the Ukrainian government-owned Naftogaz without Budapest’s consent. 

Combined, these developments signal that Magyar is consciously keeping himself away from Ukrainian affairs. Ukraine and Hungary have repeatedly discussed dates and locations for a formal bilateral summit between Zelenskyy and Magyar that has still not taken place. Advancing Ukraine’s EU accession bid without tangible results in protecting ethnic Hungarians would directly undermine Magyar’s pre-election promises, erode support for Tisza, and provide Orbán’s Fidesz–KDNP with fuel for attacks.

Hungary’s new ruling party operates in an environment that was shaped by years of Orbán-driven anti-Ukrainian narratives, and most of the Hungarian population has an unfavorable view of Ukraine (24.hu, December 19, 2025). Public sentiment could be the primary reason why Magyar is criticizing Kyiv for not implementing an agreement that is supposed to be completed later. Employing tough rhetoric against Kyiv may also be intended to retain the Ukraine-skeptic part of the Tisza voter base and gain the sympathy of some right-wing opposition voters. In parallel, this signals that Hungary’s Ukraine approach has a dual track that combines tough rhetoric from the prime minister with more conciliatory negotiations led by the foreign minister.

While some observers see Hungary’s opposition to advancing Ukraine’s EU bid as a continuation of Hungary’s Orbán-era Ukraine policy, the new government promised pragmatic bilateral relations focused on protecting Hungarian interests while also affirming a Western orientation. Even with recent setbacks, the contrast with the Orbán era remains notable because of the new government’s decision to unblock EU aid to Ukraine and the opening of new EU membership talks in June. 

In the coming months, a full implementation of the minority rights agreement could pave the way for the opening of two of the remaining four EU accession negotiation clusters. In contrast, a Ukrainian failure to implement these changes or other bilateral disputes will risk slowing down the Ukrainian accession bid or even decoupling it from Moldova’s. Hungary has no opposition to advancing the Moldovan application, but the European Union has linked Ukrainian and Moldovan accession through its “package approach.” Even after the accession talks end, Ukraine’s entry into the organization—as Magyar has repeatedly stated—could come down to a Hungarian referendum, the outcome of which is uncertain.