Iran’s Post-Conflict Political Structure

Iran’s Post-Conflict Political Structure

Executive Summary:

• The launch of U.S.–Israeli joint operations against Iran on February 28 has not fundamentally changed Iran’s political structure, but has led to a greater role of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders in decisionmaking centers such as the Supreme National Security Council.
• Unlike in the past—when the Supreme Leader stood above all institutions and held absolute power—the new Iranian political leadership operates within a decentralized, collective framework in which power is distributed among security institutions, with the IRGC as the most influential.
• The weakening of the middle class and the marginalization of reformists and moderates set the stage for the IRGC’s increasing dominance, which accelerated dramatically after the beginning of the conflict and the killing of Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The influence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been growing for decades. The killing of Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the rise of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to the position have centralized the IRGC’s role in strategic decisionmaking. Although many top IRGC commanders were killed early in the conflict, they have been replaced by other experienced men who have so far managed the complex war effort (Reuters, March 23; see Terrorism Monitor, April 17).

The IRGC, answerable only to the Supreme Leader, is now responsible for maintaining internal order in addition to fighting foreign enemies. Its power extends beyond military force, as many economic elites who have benefited from access to power centers during the sanctions era hold influential positions within the IRGC (CNN, March 1).

The conflict has not pushed Iran toward a simple civilian-versus-security dual structure. Instead, power has become more concentrated within a military-security core. The system is under simultaneous pressure from external diplomacy and an internal hardline base that sees any flexibility as weakness. Since the war began, authority over war, diplomacy, and escalation has increasingly shifted to a relatively cohesive military-security core. Institutions like the Foreign Ministry continue to implement the decisions of the Supreme National Security Council, and figures such as Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi operate in a system where diplomacy is not separate from military strategy but embedded within it—the same structure that manages escalation also regulates de-escalation (Time, April 21).

Historical Foundations

Following the 1979 revolution, Iran’s political system developed two parallel structures: electoral institutions—such as the Parliament and the Presidency—and revolutionary institutions that operate under the direct supervision and appointment of the Supreme Leader. Candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections had to be approved by the Guardian Council, however, which is part of the latter body.

Accordingly, the Islamic Republic has transitioned from an ideological state in its early years to a ‘facade democracy,’ and then to a ‘quasi-democracy.’ In this quasi-democracy, as the legitimacy of the traditional clergy declines and democratic institutions weaken, military forces gain increasing importance. [1]

Following the Iran–Iraq war, the strengthening of the middle class during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency led to Mohammad Khatami’s presidential victory in 1997 and the resurgence of executive institutions. Conservatives undermined this trend, however. With Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rise to the presidency in 2005, the IRGC’s economic power accelerated. In 2013, the moderate Hassan Rouhani came to power with reformist support and secured the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, but U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the deal and subsequent sanctions further empowered hardliners. The obstacles created by hardliners became so severe that some reformist theorists, such as Saeed Hajjarian, called for Rouhani’s resignation to resolve the “duality of sovereignty” and achieve a “unified sovereignty” (Mashghe Now, May 11, 2019).

Even some reformists, such as Saeed Laylaz, believed that bringing a person from within the IRGC to power for up to 10 years would benefit Iran. In this theory, IRGC control would resolve the lack of coherence and efficiency in the power structure—a version he called ‘Bonapartism.’ Other reformists view the push for a unified power structure as a gradual trend pursued by the hard core of power since the 1979 revolution (Euro News, January 3).

Iran’s middle class has been increasingly alienated from the political system over the past decade. Factors for this alienation included economic pressure from sanctions, despair over the reformists’ lack of influence, and the protests and subsequent crackdowns in 2018 and 2019.  The alienation became evident in the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections, in which low turnout brought Ebrahim Raisi to the presidency. The 2022 Mahsa movement deepened this alienation, allowing hardliners to dominate an increasing share of the government’s political structure.

This system—defined by the marginalization of reformists and the rise of a radical conservatism—had hardened by the beginning of the U.S.–Israeli joint attacks on February 28. The conflict has brought the IRGC more openly into the political arena and sidelined the moderate government of current President Masoud Pezeshkian. His limited influence became clear in early March. After a series of Iranian attacks, he apologized to the Persian Gulf states, which provoked IRGC anger, and he was forced to partially retract his statements (Euro News, March 8).

The hardline faction of the IRGC has since sought to consolidate its power within Iran’s political structure, especially amid the power vacuum created by the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei. This does not mean that the IRGC has formed a new position in Iran’s system, as these factions were already powerful long before the conflict (Spectator, March 28). The conflict, therefore, has only sped up the empowerment of this group.

Emergence of New Leaders

One of the consequences of the U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran has been the emergence of a new generation of leaders. Many of whom are considered more militaristic and reckless than their predecessors. A battle-hardened group of IRGC commanders and their allies now serves as the key decisionmakers on topics of security, war, and diplomacy.

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and two other security figures—Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, Head of the Supreme National Security Council, and Ahmad Vahidi, Commander of the IRGC—effectively run the day-to-day affairs of Iran’s government. Despite Qalibaf’s presence in Pakistan negotiations, these two are considered far more influential than he behind the scenes.

The Trump administration assessed Qalibaf as a potential partner and leader for Iran after the killing of Ali Larijani, the relatively pragmatic Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Qalibaf had previously led an Iranian delegation in peace negotiations with the United States and held a historic meeting with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance in Pakistan—the highest-level meeting between the two countries since Iran’s 1979 revolution (New York Times, April 14).

Qalibaf joined the IRGC during the Iran–Iraq war and allied himself with figures such as Qassem Soleimani and Esmail Qaani. During that same period, he regularly met with then-president Ali Khamenei. His rise coincided with Khamenei’s in 1989, and he served in positions including Deputy Commander of the Basij, Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, and Commander of the IRGC Air Force. In 1999, he signed a letter warning President Khatami of consequences if student protests were not decisively suppressed (Tabnak, June 9, 2024).

Qalibaf later entered politics and ran unsuccessfully for the presidency several times. Since 2020, he has been Speaker of Parliament and a member of the Supreme National Security Council. He has adopted hardline positions—including supporting a law that mandated the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program if U.S. sanctions were not lifted within two months (Euro News, May 9, 2017).

Qalibaf is known less for his formal parliamentary position and more for his role as a prominent figure within the security corps that rules Tehran. He is part of a network defined by shared military and institutional backgrounds, within which disagreements are largely tactical rather than strategic; thus, the internal structure of this core is relatively cohesive, not a scattered field of rival centers (Time, April 21). While Qalibaf tries to maintain his key role, he faces opposition from Vahidi and his close team—known as the Shiraz faction within the IRGC (Washington Times, April 29).

The conflict has also led to the rise of Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr. Following the death of Ali Larijani, Zolqadr was appointed to the post of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (ISNA, March 24). Zolqadr, who is under UN sanctions, has had an extensive career. He is a member of the IRGC’s old guard and the pre-revolutionary ‘Mansourun’ guerrilla network. He has held positions such as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces for Basij Affairs, Deputy Interior Minister, Deputy Head of the Judiciary, and, most recently, Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council  (Mehr News, March 25). Unlike Larijani, Zolqadr has no diplomatic experience—he is entirely a product of the military and administrative establishment. In the 1990s, he cooperated with the Basij and the radical Ansar-e Hezbollah group (Iran International, March 25). Some observers believe that Zolqadr’s appointment as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council will consolidate the IRGC’s militarism and accelerate this military institution’s increasing control over Iran (New Yorker, April 16).

Ahmad Vahidi was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC on March 1. As former commander of the Quds Force—the IRGC’s special operations unit—he played a key role in developing Iran’s asymmetric warfare and intelligence operations after the Iran–Iraq war (Nour News, March 1). Vahidi is subject to an Interpol Red Notice for his role in the 1994 attack on Argentina. He is a senior IRGC strategist, has served as head of the Supreme National Defense University, and previously served as Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior (Washington Times, April 29).

According to some reports, he was instrumental behind the scenes in Zolqadr’s appointment as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council—demonstrating the extent of his influence in Iran’s current power structure.

The Leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei

In recent years, the name of Mojtaba Khamenei—son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—alongside figures such as Ayatollah Arafi and Mirbagheri, has been raised as a successor to Ali Khamenei (Iran International, November 17, 2024). Former President Ebrahim Raisi was previously considered a serious candidate for future leadership of Iran, but he was killed in a helicopter crash three years after becoming president (Iran Wire, September 15, 2025).

Despite criticism of the hereditary nature of the succession, Mojtaba Khamenei was ultimately chosen as Iran’s leader after Ali Khamenei’s death. Following the U.S.–Israeli attack on Ali Khamenei’s residence, Mojtaba was also targeted and severely wounded; in addition to his father, his wife and child were killed in the attack. Due to his injuries and current residence in a hidden location, Mojtaba Khamenei does not yet effectively hold the reins of power. This process would also seem to require time, as Ali Khamenei himself was only able to exercise absolute power after years of consolidation. Ali Khamenei was not only the most powerful figure in Iran’s power structure but also the architect of Iran’s institutions, constitution, and revolutionary-military apparatus—and thus no future leader can exert the same influence as him (Rasanah, May 25).

Mojtaba Khamenei currently serves as a single voice in a broader consensus-building process among security elites—a role that reflects both the transitional nature of the moment and the evolving balance of power within the Islamic Republic (Time, April 21; New York Times, April 23). Given Mojtaba Khamenei’s religious background and experience in the IRGC, his selection represents a victory for the IRGC and its commitment to the system (RAND, March 10).

He could emerge as a central figure in a militarized Islamic Republic. He studied under the fundamentalist cleric Ayatollah Taqi Misbah Yazdi, and maintains extensive relationships with security forces and the IRGC. According to reports, the recent January protests and the intensified U.S. military presence in the region had already strengthened Mojtaba’s position prior to the launch of Operation Epic Fury (Council on Foreign Relations, February 2026). 

The defining characteristics of Mojtaba Khamenei are his relationships with both the IRGC and the senior clergy, and his potential for broader legitimacy as a publicly known figure (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 6). Abdolreza Davari, a politician who served as a senior advisor to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his presidency and knows Mojtaba Khamenei, told The New York Times that“Mojtaba manages the country as if he were the manager of a board of directors. He relies heavily on the advice and guidance of board members, and they collectively make all decisions. The generals are the board members” (New York Times, April 23).

Competition Between Which Groups?

The main competition after the conflict will likely be within the conservative camp itself. The reformist and moderate factions in Iran’s political scene have been weakened by the existential nature of the conflict and the near-transition of their traditional social support base—the middle class—away from politics. This competition, which had taken shape before the war, has become more unbridled following Ali Khamenei’s death, pitting the traditional security wing against the far-right/extremist wing of the Paydari Front. This group vehemently opposes any negotiations with the United States and Israel, considering it a betrayal of the nation. During Ali Khamenei’s lifetime, the leadership used the Paydari Front not only to create balance within the conservative camp but also to weaken the reformists’ position.

Prior to the war, Ali Khamenei was able to pressure this group and, at times, criticize them. With his death, however, the Paydari Front—relying on its supporters within the political and military power structure—has largely seized power on the streets and dominates the nightly gatherings that have formed within Iran’s leadership. This front is currently hidden behind Iran’s public leadership. According to prominent reformist theorist Mohammad Reza Tajik, however, past experience has shown that the group could prove dangerous for this public leadership (Tabnak, September 18, 2025). In contrast to the hardline and extremist view of the Paydari Front, the pragmatist conservative camp, represented by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, considers diplomacy alongside war.

Conclusion

Iran’s formal political structure does not fundamentally differ from what existed before the conflict. The increased involvement of IRGC commanders in political decisionmaking centers, however, represents a significant informal deviation. The IRGC now maintains significant influence in the Supreme National Security Council and is the arbiter of many strategic decisions, such as the fate of Iran’s nuclear program and control over the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, the ultimate authority was the Supreme Leader, who had consolidated power under his office for decades. Ali Khamenei arbitrated between competing groups and provided the final word in all important decisions. Currently, the new political leadership operates within a system where Mojtaba Khamenei does not play an absolute role. Power has now become decentralized and has been transformed into a collective security council distributed among security institutions, especially the IRGC.

The IRGC has now emerged as the sole institution capable of maintaining stability. The balance of powers lies in the hands of this small circle of security elites. The likelihood of reformist figures rising to power within Iran’s political structure in the near term remains low. Reformists and moderates have been almost completely excluded from the political decisionmaking during the conflict. Accordingly, the primary competition lies between the pragmatic conservative faction and the radical conservative, far-right faction, the Paydari Front.

Notes: 

[1] Bashiriyeh, Hossein. Political Sociology of Iran. Tehran: Negah-e Moaser, 2024. https://www.iranketab.ir/book/28000-political-sociology-of-iran.