Kremlin Continues to Eliminate PMCs and Semi-Autonomous Volunteer Units

Kremlin Continues to Eliminate PMCs and Semi-Autonomous Volunteer Units

Executive Summary:

• The October 2025 disbandment of Española—the Russian private military company (PMC)—and the killing of Stanislav Orlov, its leader, by Russian security forces during his attempted arrest in December 2025 are a part of Moscow’s effort to dismantle semi-autonomous paramilitary groups with independent ideological identities.
• Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s “Akhmat” units remain the last significant enclave of relative autonomy. Amid reports of the Chechen leader’s ill health, however, the Kremlin appears to be pursuing a bureaucratic takeover, gradually weakening Kadyrov’s personal control over his security forces.
• The Kremlin reevaluated the threat posed by armed structures built around charismatic leaders with independent agendas following Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion in June 2023. The era of PMCs and semi-autonomous volunteer battalions in Russia is ending, replaced by structures that operate exclusively under Moscow’s direct control to safeguard the state’s monopoly on force. 

On December 4, 2025, Russian security forces killed Stanislav “Spaniard” Orlov—the commander of the Russian neo-Nazi private military company (PMC), Española—during his attempted arrest in temporarily occupied Sevastopol (Telegram/@milinfolive, December 19; Telegram/@astrapress; Vazhnye Istorii; Current Time, December 22, 2025). The incident is one of the most high-profile killings within Russia’s pro-war “Z-community” in recent years. Orlov’s stature among pro-war militants had often drawn comparisons to other late commanders of semi-autonomous volunteer units, including Arsen “Motorola” Pavlov, a commander of the “Sparta” battalion of Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk who was killed in 2016, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner PMC, and Dmitry Utkin, Wagner’s co-founder and military commander (see EDM, March 20, 2024).

The demonstrative nature of these killings unites them. The formations led by these commanders ceased to exist in their previous form after the deaths of their leaders, with their soldiers generally joining more centrally controlled units within Russia’s military. After Prigozhin’s rebellion in June 2023, the Kremlin appears to have reevaluated the threat posed by armed structures built around charismatic leaders with independent agendas (see EDM, March 3, 27, October 3, 2024). Even proven loyalty no longer seems sufficient to guarantee survival. The era of private military companies and semi-autonomous volunteer battalions in Russia appears to be drawing to a close, replaced by structures that operate exclusively under Moscow’s direct control (see Jamestown Perspectives, February 23, 2025).

Orlov was shot and killed by Russian security forces during an attempted arrest at the unofficial Española base in occupied Sevastopol. The arrest was carried out on suspicion of arms trafficking and participation in an organized criminal group. Several weeks earlier, security forces detained another prominent member of the unit, Ruslan Kazantsev (call sign “Altai”), the former commander of the Española naval detachment, on the same charges (Current Time, December 22, 2025). The Española naval detachment was specifically tasked with coastal defense in occupied Crimea and securing gas production platforms (see EDM, March 20, 2024).

Orlov had participated in combat operations in eastern Ukraine since 2014. In the spring of 2022, he established a formation made up of former fighters, far-right activists, and football hooligans. The unit initially operated within the Vostok battalion  and was later formalized as an independent PMC named Española (Astra, December 23, 2025). According to investigative journalists, the group was financed by the Rotenberg brothers, close associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The brigade was reportedly managed by Viktor Shendrik, head of security at Russian Railways (RZD) and a protégé of the Rotenberg brothers (Vazhnye Istorii, March 4, 2022). 

In October 2025, Española announced its disbandment. A full “reorganization” was planned, with core personnel set to transfer to new structures within the Russian Ministry of Defense and security agencies (Telegram/@spainrus, October 2, 2025). At the same time, Orlov stated that the unit would receive new leadership and personnel. Some Z-bloggers suggested that these decisions may have been directed “from above,” but no official comment was issued (Telegram/@/DmitriySteshin, October 3, 2025).

The disbandment of Española and the killing of its leader represent a logical continuation of the process that began in June 2023 after Prigozhin’s mutiny. Both cases illustrate how the Kremlin now treats semi-autonomous armed groups heavily centered on a single leader (see EDM, March 3, 2024). Prigozhin and Orlov were more than commanders; they were the primary “brands” of their formations, and without them, both structures quickly fell apart and lost appeal to their fighters.

Española was made viable by its far-right fan base and shady patrons. Wagner, on the other hand, depended on Prigozhin’s managerial skills and political influence. Though Orlov did not engage in open confrontation with the Kremlin like Prigozhin, he created a closed caste within the armed forces, complete with its own ethics, symbols, and media resources, which the Kremlin could have perceived as the potential seeds of a mutiny.

The timing of the units’ disbandment and leaders’ deaths is strikingly similar. Russia dissolved Wagner in July 2023, and a month later, on August 23, Prigozhin was killed (see EDM, March 20, 2024). Española announced its disbandment in early October 2025, and Orlov was killed in early December 2025. Both deaths—the plane crash that killed Prigozhin and Orlov’s shooting during his arrest—were accompanied by a high level of informational uncertainty, including in official statements and pro-Kremlin media.

It appears that the Kremlin has decided to dismantle and absorb military structures centered on charismatic leaders who could potentially become alternative centers of power following Prigozhin’s mutiny. The disbandment of Española seems to have been part of this effort to “tie up loose ends,” seeking complete centralization and leaving no room for independent field commanders or units with their own ideologies that could pose a threat during internal instability.

The Akhmat units, led by the leader of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, remain one of the few structures in Russia with significant autonomy. Most well-known semi-autonomous battalions and smaller PMCs, such as Redut and Konvoy, are now fully integrated into the Russian Ministry of Defense (see EDM,  June 26, 2023, February 13, 2024). Despite some of Akhmat’s units formally being part of Russian agencies such as the National Guard, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, they operate as Kadyrov’s personal force, reporting directly to him rather than only to the federal authorities.

Starting in late December 2025, Russian and Ukrainian media reported a sharp decline in Kadyrov’s health, including kidney failure (Novaya Gazeta.Europe, December 31, 2025; Important Stories, January 11; see EDM, January 21). Kadyrov has denied the rumors (Lenta.ru January 14). On January 5, he suddenly appointed his 20-year-old son, Akhmat, as acting deputy prime minister of Chechnya (Telegram/@kadyrov_95, January 5, 2026). The move was widely interpreted as an effort to strengthen family control and pave the way for a future successor.

The gradual subordination of Akhmat to Moscow is already underway. With fighters’ salaries, weapons, and supplies going through the federal budget and the Ministry of Defense, operational independence is limited without central approval. The 2024 appointment of Akhmat special forces commander Apti Alaudinov to a senior position in the Russian Ministry of Defense illustrates this process of “absorption” through the placement of leaders in the central government (see EDM, June 12, 2024). While Moscow is likely to avoid drastic action against Akhmat or Kadyrov to prevent instability in the North Caucasus, it continues the steady erosion of semi-independent Chechen units within the National Guard and Russian Armed Forces.

The Kremlin is systematically eliminating autonomous centers of power to safeguard the state’s monopoly on force. The negative experience with the Wagner PMC has transformed any charismatic field commanders and units loyal to them into potential threats to the regime’s security. The system now preemptively eliminates them, regardless of their past achievements. Under these conditions, even the most loyal structures, like Akhmat, are subject to gradual bureaucratic absorption into the central military chain of command.