Kremlin Institutionalizing ‘Preventive Repression’ in Ukraine’s Occupied Territories

Kremlin Institutionalizing ‘Preventive Repression’ in Ukraine’s Occupied Territories

Executive Summary:

• Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia oblast have adopted a “preventive threat elimination” approach, presuming civilian disloyalty by default and ordering troops to conduct random searches, phone inspections, and detentions.
• Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the resistance in the occupied regions has escalated sabotage operations against Russian military logistics, derailing trains in occupied Zaporizhzhia, spreading pro-Ukraine information, disrupting rail lines in Crimea, and targeting infrastructure inside Russia.
• Ukrainian resistance imposes persistent logistical and administrative costs that compel Moscow to expand repressive measures. The Kremlin has imported police personnel into the occupied territories of Ukraine, expanded surveillance, and increased its budget for “National Security and Law Enforcement.”

Since January, Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia oblast have implemented a “preventive threat elimination” approach, assuming baseline civilian disloyalty to Russia in the occupied territories (Korrespondent, January 10). According to the pro-Ukraine Atesh resistance movement, the soldiers of Russia’s 1152nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in Vasylivka and Kamianske were given orders to take “preventative measures” to stamp out Ukrainian resistance, even including detaining citizens for having Ukrainian apps on their smartphones (Telegram/@atesh_ua, January 10). Russian authorities routinely initiate searches, phone inspections, and detentions of civilians in the occupied territories (Zmina, August 29, 2025; LB.ua, January 10). This development represents a broader shift in the Kremlin’s occupation governance, which institutionalizes suspicion as a default governing principle. Civilian populations are increasingly treated as potential security threats that require constant monitoring and pre-emptive control.

Since February 2022, Moscow has pursued the consolidation of its control over occupied territories through coercive administrative tactics, passportization, and suppression of the Ukrainian language and cultural identity (see EDM, December 3, 2025, January 22). At the same time, civilian discontent with Russian rule has taken on more organized forms of resistance across the occupied territories. The Ukrainian resistance movement is a decentralized network coordinated by the Special Operations Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and supported by civilians who obtain intelligence, sabotage Russian logistics, and spread pro-Ukrainian information in the occupied territories (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, February 26, 2025). Civilian resistance to Russian occupation has included acts of arson and rail sabotage, information campaigns, and the display of Ukrainian symbols in public spaces (Gwara Media, June 16, 2025; Ukrinform, January 22).

In October 2025, resistance members derailed a Russian military train carrying equipment between the occupied settlements of Chernihivka and Stulneve in the Berdyansk district of Zaporizhzhia oblast, damaging over 70 meters (230 feet) of railway (Armia Inform, October 29, 2025). Such operations impose persistent protection and counterintelligence costs on Russia, demonstrating the vulnerability of Russian logistics networks operating in the occupied territories of Ukraine. They signal that the Kremlin’s logistical architecture inside the occupied territories remains structurally vulnerable despite its efforts to integrate the territory into Russia. Even with the risks of detention, coercive interrogation, imprisonment, or even death, many residents continue to challenge Russian rule.

Pro-Ukrainian resistance activities have also recently been reported in Crimea, which Russia illegally invaded and annexed in 2014. In November 2025, the partisan resistance group Atesh, comprising Ukrainians and Crimean-Tatars, targeted railway infrastructure near occupied Simferopol, temporarily disrupting rail traffic along the route supporting Russian military logistics to southern Ukraine (RBC Ukraine, November 9, 2025). 

Since late 2025, there has been a growing pattern of sabotage incidents linked to Ukrainian resistance networks targeting infrastructure within Russia itself. This infrastructure includes railway nodes, defense-related industrial facilities, and communications and data-transfer infrastructure. These activities have been reported across several Russian border regions and major urban centers, including Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Udmurtia, and Belgorod (5 Channel, January 11; ZN.UA, January 28; NV.UA, February 5; UA.TV, February 8). In one of the most notable publicly reported acts, Atesh temporarily halted operations at a metallurgical facility in Izhevsk, Udmurtia, which produces components and special alloys for Russian weapons and heavy equipment (ZN.UA, January 28).

Ukrainian resistance movements particularly targeted railway infrastructure throughout 2025. For instance, in December 2025, they targeted railway infrastructure near the Bataysk rail hub outside Rostov-on-Don, a key logistical node through which Russian forces deliver supplies to the occupied parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Crimea (Ukrainska Pravda, December 21, 2025). These incidents have targeted ground-based technical modules and power supplies supporting telecommunications towers used for military coordination, electronic warfare, and surveillance, indicating a transition from visible protests to sabotage to undermine Russia’s military logistics.

There is also evidence that Ukrainians living under occupation continue to engage in nonviolent forms of resistance. Civil movements such as Yellow Ribbon operate across occupied regions, including Crimea, disseminating Ukrainian national symbols and messages to signal continued rejection of Russian rule (Ukrinform, December 30, 2025; Vgoru.ua, February 3). These activities are typically low-visibility and episodic, reflecting adaptation to pervasive Russian surveillance and repression. In January, for example, activists associated with the Yellow Ribbon distributed Ukrainian ribbons and leaflets across Simferopol, Yalta, and Sevastopol, with messages asserting Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea (Kyiv Post, January 7). Previously, the movement reportedly relied on quick response (QR) codes that linked to secure online platforms providing access to Ukrainian-language content, information, and virtual private network (VPN) tools, enabling residents to maintain informational ties with Ukraine while minimizing risks (Suspilne, October 21, 2025). These largely symbolic actions challenge the Kremlin’s efforts to normalize control over the occupied territories and demonstrate that forced administrative compliance has not translated into political loyalty. Their continued presence, even under systematic repression, indicates that the occupation has secured obedience but not allegiance.  

The Kremlin has expanded its repressive toolkit to contain pro-Ukrainian resistance in the occupied territories. The Kremlin’s ability to isolate resistance risks in the occupied territories from Russian territory is increasingly constrained as the war grinds on, forcing it to expand security expenditures into Russia. Moscow has been forced to invest more heavily in infrastructure protection, counterintelligence, and internal security. In October 2025, Russia adopted a 2026–2028 federal budget, which increased spending for “National Security and Law Enforcement” from 2.499 trillion rubles ($32.45 billion) in 2026 to 2.685 trillion rubles ($34.87 billion) by 2028, about an 8 percent increase over three years (TASS, October 22, 2025). This steady rise in internal security allocations underscores the Kremlin’s expectation of sustained coercive governance requirements both inside Russia and across Ukraine’s occupied territories, suggesting that repression is not a temporary wartime measure but a structural pillar of occupation management.

Russian occupation authorities have focused on expanding policing, digital surveillance, and punitive legal instruments across the occupied territories, increasingly framing even passive dissent as a security threat (UA.TV, July 24, 2025; CTR Center, November 11, 2025; Institute of Mass Information, December 30, 2025). Moscow has systematically imported police personnel from Russia to the occupied territories, excluded local officers from senior police positions, and incentivized their deployment via accelerated career advancement, financial bonuses, and access to confiscated housing (24 Kanal, October 26, 2024; Mediazona, January 16). Police forces in the occupied territories are controlled by representatives of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and collect information on civilians, reinforcing reliance on intelligence-driven governance over civilian administration (Zmina, August 29, 2025).

In 2023, the Kremlin broadened the legal authority of its security services in the occupied territories, codifying the use of so-called “operational and search” measures and investigative procedures. These changes institutionalized arbitrary detention practices under the guise of countering extremism and espionage (Zmina, August 29, 2025). The FSB coordinates this prosecution system, initiating fabricated cases of terrorism and treason. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation then uses its parallel investigative structures in the occupied territories to formalize these charges.

The Kremlin first refined these repressive tools in Crimea, where local occupational authorities have resorted to administrative prosecutions, extended prison sentences, and closed court proceedings, with charges of “extremism” and “terrorism” widely applied against those opposing Russian rule (Suspilne, January 18; Lb.ua, January 27). In the fourth quarter of 2025, politically motivated prosecutions in occupied Crimea were nearly five times higher than the Russian national average, with up to 88 percent of such cases resulting in imprisonment, underlining the Crimean peninsula’s role as a zone of intensified coercive governance (LB.ua, January 27).

These practices demonstrate that the Kremlin is standardizing a securitized occupation model that treats civilian populations as security risks that have to be preemptively neutralized. The Kremlin’s overall occupation strategy has produced compliance under coercion but not durable political legitimacy. While the resistance does not currently threaten Russia’s territorial control of Ukraine’s occupied regions, its persistence forces the Kremlin to rely increasingly on imported security personnel, expanded surveillance, and growing internal security expenditures. Russian governance in the occupied territories remains structurally dependent on sustained repression, challenging its ability to maintain long-term political stability and exposing occupation as a system maintained by coercion rather than integration.