Leadership Turmoil Impacts Eastern Theater Command Readiness
Executive Summary:
- The Eastern Theater Command leadership has been hollowed out. Its commander has been purged and its political commissar has disappeared, leaving the People’s Liberation Army’s most strategically important theater command effectively leaderless.
- The absence of top Eastern Theater Command leaders and uncertainty surrounding potential acting commanders weaken the theater command’s Party committee and undermine its ability to prepare for conflict.
- Despite rising tensions with Japan, the Eastern Theater Command’s compromised leadership structure likely constrains Beijing’s readiness and willingness to engage in high-risk military actions.
Tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have risen dramatically after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on how Japan might react to an attack on Taiwan. Responding to a question at a budget committee meeting on November 7, Takaichi said that a Taiwan contingency involving the use of force could constitute an “existential risk” for Japan (Nikkei, November 7). [1] This comment was met with threats from online PRC commentators. Most notably, the PRC’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian (薛剣), inflamed the situation by posting on the social media platform X to say that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off” (UDN, November 10). [2]
The PRC government subsequently discouraged its citizens from visiting Japan and deployed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships to waters south of Japan’s Kyushu Island (South China Morning Post [SCMP], November 14). The PLA’s theater commands have also mobilized, producing bellicose videos with the goal of intimidation (Sina, November 19).
The PRC’s aggressive rhetoric raises questions about the readiness of the PLA Eastern Theater Command (TC), given its strategic focus on both Japan and Taiwan. Recent purges have impacted its leadership, however, to the detriment of command stability. This suggests military escalation is unlikely in the near future.
The TC Leadership Structure
In the PLA, “the Party commands the gun” (党指挥枪). Each PLA theater command operates under its own Party committee, and every unit is led jointly by a military commander and a political commissar (Lianhe Zaobao, July 6, 2023). Within each TC party committee, the political commissar represents the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and serves as the committee’s chair. The commander, meanwhile, serves as the deputy chair. The rest of the committee includes a chief of staff, deputy political commissars, and deputy commanders who usually also serve as commanders and commissars of the TC Army, Navy, Air Force, and possibly the Rocket Force. [3] Decisions made at committee meetings guide the TC as a whole.
In wartime, the committee functions as a war council. It executes orders from the Central Military Commission (CMC) and directs joint operations across the services, except the Rocket Force, which remains under direct CMC control (960th Cyberspace Wing, October 14, 2021). [4]
Eastern TC Missing Top Officials
Military operations are not only contests between equipment but also competitions of leadership quality. The PLA currently fields the most advanced military hardware in its history. But the quality and stability of its leadership remain dubious.
An ongoing purge of the PLA high command has exacerbated these challenges. On October 17, the Party announced the expulsion of nine generals and admirals, including the Eastern TC’s commander Lin Xiangyang (林向阳) (China Brief Notes, October 17). At the subsequent fourth plenary of the 20th CCP Central Committee, an additional 18 members with backgrounds in the armed forces failed to attend, including Eastern TC Political Commissar Liu Qingsong (刘青松). This unprecedented number of absences has fueled speculation about the full extent of the purge.
Lin Xiangyang was a career Army officer, serving as the commander of the Central TC before becoming the Eastern TC commander in 2022. He was once seen as a rising star from the 31st Group Army, a unit closely associated with Xi (CNA, October 24). The reason for his expulsion from the Party and the PLA is unclear. Official statements point to “serious violations of Party discipline” (严重违反党的纪律) as well as corruption charges (Xinhua, October 17). Still, others suspect that factional conflicts played a role (The Diplomat, October 21; China Brief, November 14).
Liu Qingsong (刘青松), a PLA Navy admiral, is yet to be purged, but is likely involved with ongoing investigations into his links with Lin Xiangyang. This would explain his absence from the fourth plenum—an event where attendance is mandatory. It would also account for his public disappearance since early October (BBC, November 7).
With Lin and Liu out of action, the Eastern TC, which is the PLA’s frontline force for operations in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait, currently has no official commander or political commissar in place. Based on standard succession practices within the PLA, the Eastern TC’s acting commander is likely one of Lin Xiangyang’s four deputy commanders:
- Hong Jiangqiang (洪江强), Eastern TC Chief of Staff;
- Kong Jun (孔军), head of the Eastern TC Army and ex-commander of the PLA Marine Corps;
- Wang Zhongcai (王仲才), Eastern TC Navy commander and former head of the China Coast Guard; or
- Wu Junbao (吴俊宝), commander of the Eastern TC Air Force.
It is not known who among these four is currently serving as acting commander, but Hong’s close personal ties with Lin might put him at risk of investigation.
The three Eastern TC deputy political commissars—Tang Xinghua (唐兴华), Mei Wen (梅文), Zhong Weiguo (钟卫国)—concurrently serve as the political commissars of the TC Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively. It is also difficult to determine who might be shouldering Liu Qingsong’s responsibilities, and it is not known if they have been implicated in the Lin Xiangyang case. While the full scope of the purge within the Eastern TC remains opaque, such investigations seldom stop with a single individual. More purges are likely to follow in the coming months.
Conclusion
The Eastern TC’s leadership has been seriously disrupted by the ongoing PLA purge. The TC formally lacks a commander and its political commissar has vanished. It is unclear who is acting in either role, and the Eastern TC Party Committee is hollowed out. Restoring leadership competence will take time. Given this turbulence, the TC Party Committee is likely functioning at substandard capacity, with remaining leaders lacking substantial experience leading a TC. They also are likely working under acute anxiety due to the ongoing purge of their colleagues.
This level of senior command instability inevitably erodes readiness, disrupts decision-making, and damages cohesion and morale among officers. As tensions rise between the PRC and Japan, concern over a possible military conflict also grows. But the Eastern TC’s destabilized leadership likely constrains the PRC’s ability and willingness to escalate, providing a glimmer of hope that the latest tensions will remain below the threshold of war.
Notes
[1] In the original Japanese, Takaichi said, “武力行使伴うなら存立危機事態なり得る.”
[2] In the original Japanese, Xue Jian wrote, “勝手に突っ込んできたその汚い首は一瞬の躊躇もなく斬ってやるしかない.”
[3] The TC Party Committee also controls core TC organizations, including the Joint Staff Department (战区联合参谋部), Political Work Department (战区政治工作部), Political and Legal Affairs Commission (战区政法委), and the Joint Operations Command Center (战区联合作战指挥中心).
[4] Under conditions of war, the TC commander might hold greater sway at TC Party Committee meetings and have greater operational discretion. But ultimate authority remains with the TC political commissar, whose primary task is to ensure that the TC commander does not betray the Party in any way.
