Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine: The Case of Estonia

Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine: The Case of Estonia

Executive Summary:

• Reconstituted Russian forces may next attack Estonia if its war against Ukraine subsides into a stalemate.Estonia’s proximity to Russia, large Russian-speaking minority, and limited conventional military capabilities make it a potential target for future Russian military aggression. 
• Seizure of the Russian-speaking majority area in and around Narva using unmarked forces and fabricated separatism or a larger offensive through Lithuania to link Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave with mainland Russia toisolate the Baltic States are the two most likely scenarios for a Russian invasion of Estonia. 
• The war against Ukraine can teach Estonia how to better prepare for potential aggression from Russia through Ukraine’s example of expanding its ground forces, extending conscription, and investing in tanks, mechanized infantry, drones, artillery, and air defenses. 
• Effective deterrence would benefit from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stationing a full combat brigade in Estonia. It would also benefit from NATO air and naval support being readily available, alongside stronger interoperability among the Alliance and help financing Estonia’s defense modernization.

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After more than four and a half years of war, a decisive Russian victory in Ukraine appears more unlikely than ever. Desperate to achieve a major success and in fulfillment of an imperialist vision he has championed for years, Russian President Vladimir Putin may well turn next to Estonia, a former Soviet republic on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) border with Russia. Badly damaged in Ukraine, the Russian armed forces will not be ready for such an adventure for the next few years. Once reconstituted, however, their offensive use against neighboring states—Estonia above all—is a legitimate possibility.^[1]

The Strategic Setting 

Located on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, Estonia shares a 294-kilometer-long (182-mile-long) border with Russia. Its easternmost city, Narva, is only 136 kilometers (84.5 miles) from St. Petersburg. Formerly a possession of the Holy Roman Empire and later the Kingdom of Sweden, Estonia was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1710 following the Great Northern War. Estonia enjoyed brief independence from 1918 to 1940 before being reoccupied by Soviet troops and remaining part of the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1989, the presence of ethnic Russians in Estonia increased from 3 percent to 39 percent as part of a deliberate “Russification” policy.^[2]Since its independence in 1991, Estonia has grown into a modern functioning democracy with a thriving economy and robust institutions. A member state of both NATO and the European Union, Estonia has a population of 1.4 million, 21 percent of whom are today ethnic Russians, and 4.5 percent of whom are resident non-citizens.^[3] Most ethnic Russians live in Tallinn, the capital, and in Ida-Viru, Estonia’s northeastern province centered on Narva.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Estonia has approached its Russian-speaking minority and Soviet legacy as a security variable rather than a simple demographic fact. Estonia, a frequent target of Russian influence operations, has wrestled with effectively integrating its ethnic Russian citizens, many of whom hold Russian passports and do not speak Estonian. A recent constitutional amendment stripped third-country permanent residents of Estonia, mostly Russians and Belarusians who lack Estonian citizenship, of the right to vote in local elections.^[4] In December 2022, the Riigikogu—Estonia’s unicameral parliament—mandated that all education fully transition to the Estonian language by 2030. The parliament made this law in response to debates about how to integrate the country’s large Russian-speaking population, considering the security threat from Russia following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.^[5] In August 2022, Estonia removed six Soviet war memorials in and around Narva. The Estonian Prime Minister at the time, Kaja Kallas, who currently serves as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, explained the decision, saying, “No one wants to see our militant and hostile neighbor foment tensions in our home.”^[6] In 2007, the government moved the Soviet-era Bronze Soldier of Tallinn from the city center, sparking days of rioting, largely by ethnic Russians, and more than 1,000 arrests. The 2022 removal of Soviet memorials in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine despite past blowback from similar decisions demonstrates Tallinn’s resolve to remove Soviet symbols and thereby limit Russian influence.

Estonian defense spending exceeds 3 percent and is increasing. Its small population and tiny GDP of $47 billion, however, mean that external support is essential for its defense. Its armed forces consist of a small active brigade, one reserve brigade, and no tanks or fighter aircraft; its navy consists of a handful of coastal patrol craft. A U.K.-led NATO battalion battle group based in Tapa is also present as a deterrent. In 2022, NATO committed to stationing brigades in threatened eastern flank states “where and when required,” but that promise never fully materialized.^[7] A NATO Air Policing activity is located at Amari Air Base in Estonia, and border fortifications are being constructed but will take time.^[8]

With such a small and poorly equipped military, Estonia depends on NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees to deter possible Russian aggression. That threat is looming. As Jamestown analyst Pavel Luzin opined in February 2024, “Russia is thinking seriously about a combat operation in the Baltic region.”^[9] Estonia explicitly revised its National Security Concept in 2023 in response to this threat. Discussing the new concept, Kallas put it openly, saying, “The main threat to our security comes from Russia.”^[10]

The Threat

As the conflict in Ukraine subsides into an uneasy stalemate, Nordic and Baltic defense and intelligence chiefs consistently warn that the chances of further Russian aggression are mounting.^[11] On numerous occasions, Putin has expressed a desire to reincorporate former imperial territories in support of “oppressed” Russian minorities. This is a real threat given the pattern of Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine and large-scale hybrid operations across the region.^[12] Although the Russian armed forces have taken severe losses in Ukraine, force generation is underway on a large scale, with some sources reporting as many as 15 new Russian divisions forming.^[13] Some experts estimate that renewed Russian aggression targeting the Baltic States could take place in the next two to five years.^[14]

There are at least two likely scenarios for a Russian invasion of Estonia. In the first, Russian paramilitary troops, special operations soldiers, and intelligence officers without markings would enter eastern Estonia to carve out a separatist enclave.^[15] Using this cover story, Russian operatives backed by armed forces would occupy the area around Narva and Lake Peipus. “Separatists” would then set up a mock government and “vote” for reincorporation into the Russian Federation, as seen in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea. The operational objective would be to test NATO’s resolve, to intimidate and destabilize a neighbor and former imperial possession, and to set conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic States.^[16] Removing a thriving Western democracy from its doorstep, with the added possibility of fracturing a divided NATO, makes this an attractive option.^[17]

Estonian authorities would surely act quickly in response to this threat, alerting military and police forces, mobilizing reserves, stiffening cyber defenses, and calling for immediate Article 4 and Article 5 consultations under the Washington Treaty. Should actual fighting break out, which is likely, Russia would likely swiftly escalate and introduce combat troops under the pretext of assisting ethnic Russians seeking “self-determination.” Local Estonian active and reserve forces and police might be able to deal with smaller incursions, but a sophisticated operation backed by Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) and special operations troops, supported by Russian airpower and conventional forces such as the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division in nearby Pskov and the 6th Combined Arms Army (6CAA) in St. Petersburg, would exceed their capabilities.^[18] Russia’s 6CAA is home-based in the Leningrad Military District, but is currently deployed in Ukraine. If Russia prepares to invade Narva, 6CAA would likely redeploy to Leningrad for reconstitution and be available for operations within two to five years. The lone NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battalion in Estonia is not enough to materially alter the balance of forces. In this circumstance, Russia might consider following up on its success by attempting to occupy the entire country.

NATO intervention in strength should Russian troops enter Estonian territory is uncertain. In spring 2025, senior national security officials from Sweden, Finland, and Norway said that their countries are more likely to send air and naval support than they are to send ground forces or risk direct confrontation with Putin because of the small size of their active-duty armed forces (Author’s Interviews, Spring 2025). They also expressed worry that Russian aggression against the Baltics could spread into their territories, in which case they would need their ground forces at home. Given the proximity of Russian forces, it is unlikely that strong NATO ground reinforcements would arrive in time. 

Large Russian forces may not be required if they only face the Estonian military. Estonia currently fields one small active brigade, a small reserve brigade, local territorial defense units, and no tanks. The lone Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalion—a NATO initiative established after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea to strengthen deterrence in Eastern Europe—does not add a decisive element to the balance of forces. Russian forces are much larger and are located nearby. Russia’s 6CAA and 76th VDV Division constitute a manpower advantage over Estonian forces on the order of nine to one and still leave 11 Russian CAAs and approximately 12 VDV brigades uncommitted.^[19] Substantive NATO reinforcements would need to come from far away. A Russian incursion into Estonia would expose cleavages within NATO and compel neighboring Baltic and Nordic states to reassess their relations with the Russian Federation, thereby altering the security environment in profound and negative ways. Follow-on offensive operations throughout the Baltic region would then be likely.

A second possibility is a much larger incursion by Russian forces through Lithuania to seize the Baltic States and link up with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad—home of the Baltic Fleet.^[20] [21] If successful, such an operation would cut off Latvia and Estonia, reestablish Russian control of the Baltic, fracture the NATO alliance, and profoundly alter the European and North Atlantic security environment. In this scenario, the reconstituted Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA) would attack from the Moscow Military District, with its main effort astride the Minsk–Vilnius–Kaunas–Kaliningrad axis and a supporting effort along the Pskov–Riga axis.^[22] As described above, 6CAA would conduct offensive operations to seize Tallinn, remove the government, and establish a Russian protectorate. Here, the prospect of meaningful NATO reinforcements is even more remote, as available forces would likely be committed to Lithuania. Russian forces described are likely sufficient to succeed under present circumstances, leaving some 80–90 percent of the Russian military for Ukraine and other contingencies.^[23]

These scenarios are not likely now, when the war against Ukraine is absorbing the bulk of Russian forces. As that conflict subsides into something like the frozen conflict of 2014–2022, and as Russia stands up new formations, however, Putin may well look elsewhere for military success—particularly as U.S. commitment to NATO and Article 5 is seen to waver.^[24] This is certainly the view of a growing number of experts.^[25] Given Russia’s record of attacking its neighbors in this century, the frequency and intensity of Russian propaganda and disinformation (which regularly trumpets the theme of conflict with the West), the high volume of hybrid events directed against the Baltics and the increasing militarization of the Russian economy and society, prudence suggests—and even demands—that the Russian threat to Estonia be taken seriously.

Estonia’s Lessons Learned

Estonia is a world leader in cyber, civil defense, and resilience, with a technologically advanced population, strong institutions, and a stable, democratically elected government. Admission to NATO and integration into European security structures have improved the quality of the Estonian armed forces, which are absorbing key lessons from the conflict in Ukraine. Even so, there is much Estonia could do to enhance its security posture.

The first challenge is to increase the size of Estonia’s ground forces and equip them for high-intensity combat against Russian forces. At present, they are likely too small and lightly equipped to defend successfully, especially when NATO reinforcements may take many weeks to arrive. The current military organization, the “Estonian Division,” consists of a small regular brigade and a reserve brigade, augmented with limited enablers.^[26] Excellent South Korean K9 155mm self-propelled howitzers are being fielded, but these units currently field only two maneuver battalions each and lack main battle tanks and mechanized infantry fighting vehicles.^[27]

Estonian ground forces would ideally field a full-time, regular division of three brigades, each comprised of a tank battalion, two mechanized infantry battalions, and artillery, reconnaissance, air defense, engineer, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), logistics, and special troops battalions, augmented by a second, similarly organized reserve division capable of full mobilization in 72 hours.^[28] Territorial defense forces, liberally equipped with anti-tank weapons, Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS), and drones, can play important roles in delaying and disrupting advancing Russian forces and securing critical infrastructure. A small corps-level headquarters with appropriate enablers would be required for command and control.^[29]

These potential enhancements to Estonia’s military would amount to a regular ground force of 20,000, with a reserve establishment of approximately 50,000. With a population of 1.4 million, this equates to some 5 percent of Estonia’s population in military active duty or reserve status—a reasonable proportion given the threat. With 456,000 citizens fit for military service and 13,200 males eligible for conscription each year, Estonian demographics can support a military establishment of this size.^[30]

In the air and at sea, Estonia would need to rely on external assistance, as the capital expenditures required to procure combat aircraft and warships are beyond its means. Small coastal craft and anti-ship missiles are the best acquisition bets for the small Estonian navy, hopefully with naval assistance from Sweden and other NATO neighbors. NATO airpower and high-altitude air and ballistic missile defense early in the conflict will be essential.^[31] Given its limited financial resources, low-cost weapons that can be produced en masse and employed at scale would be beneficial for Estonia to focus on.^[32]

To generate these forces and ensure a trained reserve, Estonia could overhaul its system of military conscription. Today, the annual intake of recruits is small, and the term of service is only 12 months, ensuring constant turnover in standing formations and a limited ability to replace combat casualties.^[33] By increasing the term of conscription to 24 months on active duty and doubling the annual intake of conscripts from 3,600 to 7,200, full manning of the regular division can be supported. Each year, 7,200 soldiers can then be discharged into the reserve division, with older cohorts moving into the territorial defense formations after an additional three years or so.  For reservists, regular mobilization exercises and annual refresher training of approximately 45 days could be required.

Standing and reserve forces of this size, if properly trained, equipped, and led, constitute an effective deterrent capable of taking on an initial attacking force of 6CAA and the 76th Air Assault Division, buying time for reinforcements to arrive. Estonian soldiers can be counted on to offer fierce and sustained defense. Russian forces, however, are highly combat-experienced and are supported by some of the world’s best drone and electronic warfare units, as well as very strong artillery and combat aviation. Their mass, geographic proximity, and advanced cyber, hybrid, and disinformation capabilities give them clear advantages in any potential conflict.

Here, terrain offers both opportunities and challenges for Estonian commanders. A lack of strategic depth and generally flat topography favor the Russian attacker. Conversely, a sparse road net, major obstacles such as the Narva River and Lake Peipus, and a heavily forested landscape marked by peat bogs and marshland favor the Estonian defense. A “Baltic Defense Line” is under construction that, when completed, will present a layered defense of bunkers, anti-tank obstacles, and minefields. The two main axes of advance—the E20 highway from Narva to Tallinn and the E77 running north toward Tartu—include multiple bridges that, if destroyed, will slow attacking forces.^[34]

The Estonian government is well aware of the threat and understands that there is a window of time before Russian forces are reconstituted. The challenge now is to complete the defense program before that window closes. That means completing planned field fortifications, accelerating the delivery of drones and air defense, building out active and reserve forces and the munitions they require, and mechanizing the regular and reserve divisions. Accomplishing all this in the next two to five years will be a heavy lift. Without question, Estonia will need outside help.

Where Estonia Needs Help

The first and most pressing need is for NATO to station a full combat brigade with enablers in Estonia. Waiting until an invasion begins ignores time, distance, and correlation of forces factors that are determinative. NATO ground reinforcements would need to alert, assemble, and move hundreds of miles to reach the scene, a process that will take weeks and even months, with every chance that Estonia will have fallen by then. A strong Alliance air and naval response, begun early upon receipt of strategic indicators, will be imperative. Financial help for critical defense investments is another urgent need, as Estonia’s GDP is far too small to fund its defense requirements. A declaratory policy that Russian aggression in the Baltic region will result in the closure of the Baltic straits to all Russian commercial maritime traffic can materially help with deterrence, as approximately 60 percent of Russian energy exports transit the Baltic Sea.^[35] Regular exercises and emphasis on standardization and interoperability can also reinforce alliance commitments and credibility. Without this assistance, Estonia can offer stout and determined resistance, but a successful defense is unlikely.

Conclusion

Estonia provides an excellent example of a small, self-reliant NATO ally committed to its own defense and willing to shoulder more than a fair share of its defense burden. It cannot face down the threat of Russian aggression alone. This is precisely why Estonia sought NATO membership, and why NATO’s assurance of collective defense would need to be honored with concrete steps. The Russian Federation has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use military force and to run risks to achieve its stated objectives. The threat is real. Solutions are available, but they require political will and prompt action. The alternative is grim, with consequences that extend far beyond Estonia. 

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^[1] Richard D. Hooker Jr., “Putin’s Next Move? Five Russian Attack Scenarios Europe Must Prepare For,” Atlantic Council, February 12, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/putins-next-move-five-russian-attack-scenarios-europe-must-prepare-for/.

^[2] Archana Upadhyay, “Borderland Geopolitics In Estonia,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, Vol. 21, No.3, 2017), 163, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48531360. 

^[3] Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Estonia’s Road to Comprehensive Security,” Heinrich Böll Foundation, July 24, 2025, https://pl.boell.org/en/2025/07/24/estonias-road-comprehensive-security.

^[4] Iida-Mai Einmaa, “How Will the Stripping of Voting Rights Affect Integration in Estonia?,” ERR News, March 31, 2025,https://news.err.ee/1609649165/how-will-the-stripping-of-voting-rights-affect-integration-in-estonia.

^[5] Ministry of Education and Research of Estonia, “Transition to Estonian-Language Education,” accessed July 6, 2026, https://www.hm.ee/en/node/234.

^[6] Euronews with AP, “Estonia to Remove Soviet-Era Monuments to ‘Ensure Public Order,’” Euronews, August 16, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/16/estonia-to-remove-soviet-era-monuments-to-ensure-public-order.

^[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Madrid Summit Declaration,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.  

^[8] Leevi Lillemäe, “40-Kilometer Anti-Tank Ditch to Be Built on Estonia’s Southeastern Border,” ERR News, August 16, 2025, https://news.err.ee/1609801725/40-kilometer-anti-tank-ditch-to-be-built-on-estonia-s-southeastern-border.

^[9] Pavel Luzin, “Russia Reorganizes Military Districts,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 29, 2024, https://jamestown.org/russia-reorganizes-military-districts/.

^[10] Government of Estonia, “Government Updated National Security Concept of Estonia,” accessed July 6, 2026, https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/government-updated-national-security-concept-estonia.

^[11] Andrew Michta and Joslyn Brodfuehrer, “NATO-Russia Dynamics: Prospects for Reconstitution of Russian Military Power,” Atlantic Council, September 19, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/.

^[12] Fiona Hill and Angela Stent, “The World Putin Wants,” Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/world-putin-wants-fiona-hill-angela-stent.

^[13] Thomas Grove, “The Russian Military Moves That Have Europe on Edge,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian-military-europe-threat-2c4d8b3e.   

^[14] Ben Barry, “Defending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequences,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 15, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/05/defending-europe-without-the-united-states-costs-and-consequences/. 

^[15] Archana Upadhyay, “Borderland Geopolitics in Estonia: The Case of Narva—The Russian Majority Enclave,” World Affairs 21, no. 3 (Autumn 2017): “In the national perception, Narva has acquired the image of the regional ‘other’ inhabited by fifth columnists with pro-Russian sympathies. The city’s ethno-linguistic ‘Russian-ness’ within an ethnic Estonian nationalizing state, sharing borders with the neighboring Russian-kindred state raises concerns about security challenges emanating from this borderland amidst rising geopolitical tensions between Russia and NATO,” 167. 

^[16] Liliana Oleniak, “Russia May Try to Seize Part of Estonia—Politico,” RBC-Ukraine, December 26, 2024, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-may-try-to-seize-part-of-estonia-politico-1735214959.html. 

^[17] Eric Rosenbach, Carlo Giannone, Slavina Ancheva, Luc Hillion, Ethan Lee, and Lukasz Kolodziej, Russian Threats to NATO’s Eastern Flank: Scenarios, Strategy, and Policy for European Security (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, February 5, 2026), https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/russia-nato-baltics-scenarios-europe-security.

^[18] 6CAA’s principal maneuver formations today are the 68^th and 69^th Guards Motor Rifle Divisions, supported by powerful artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, electronic warfare and other enablers.

^[19] Richard D. Hooker Jr., How to Defend the Baltic States (Vilnius: General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, 2021), https://www.gssc.lt/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/165_162_Hooker_proof.pdf.

^[20] Richard D. Hooker Jr., “How to Defend the Baltic States,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 17, 2019, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-full-web.pdf.

^[21] R. D. Hooker Jr., “Major Theatre War: Russia Attacks the Baltic States,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), March 25, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-journal/major-theatre-war-russia-attacks-baltic-states.

^[22] 1GTA currently includes the 4th Guards Tank Division, the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division, the 47th Tank Division and the 27th Independent Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, along with standard enablers.

^[23] Sten Hankewitz, “US Institute Recommends Two-Year Conscription for the Baltic States,” Estonian World, November 1, 2019, https://estonianworld.com/security/us-institute-recommends-two-year-conscription-for-the-baltic-states/; Richard D. Hooker Jr. with Max Molot, Building a Stronger Europe: A Companion to the Belfer Center Task Force Report on a New Transatlantic Bargain (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, February 2025), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/Belfer_Building%20a%20Stronger%20Europe_Companion%20Report_1.2.pdf. 

^[24] Frances Mao, “Can Europe Still Count on the US Coming to Its Defence?” BBC News, February 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0l1w1w41xzo. 

^[25] David Cattler, “Signals from the North: What Nordic and Baltic Intelligence Assessments Reveal About Russia,” International Centre for Defence and Security, March 20, 2026, https://icds.ee/en/signals-from-the-north-what-nordic-and-baltic-intelligence-assessments-reveal-about-russia/.

^[26] Lukas Milevski, “The Evolution of Baltic Military Divisions,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 27, 2024, https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/12/the-evolution-of-baltic-military-divisions/. 

^[27] The Swedish CV90 family of tactical vehicles could be an excellent candidate to equip Estonian formations.

^[28] The special troops battalion would include headquarters, signal, electronic warfare, medical, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) companies. The reserve division should be led by full-time, regular commanders, and senior noncommissioned officers from company level and above.

^[29] This headquarters would command all regular, reserve, and territorial defense forces and include appropriate enablers. These enablers include tubed and rocket artillery, air defense, signal, engineer, intelligence, logistics, medical, electronic warfare (EW), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and NBC. 

^[30] Global Firepower, “2026 Estonia Military Strength,” Global Firepower, last reviewed January 20, 2026, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=estonia.  

^[31] Paul Cormarie and John Hoehn, “Sweden, Finland, and NATO’s First-Class Airpower Upgrade,” Modern War Institute, April 19, 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/sweden-finland-and-natos-first-class-airpower-upgrade/.

^[32] T. X. Hammes, “The Melians’ Revenge,” Atlantic Council, June 27, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/defense-industrialist/the-melians-revenge/. 

^[33] Piotr Szymanski, “Universal, Selective and Lottery-Based: Conscription in the Nordic and Baltic States,” Centre for Eastern Studies, August 23, 2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2024-09-23/universal-selective-and-lottery-based-conscription-nordic-and.

^[34] Jennifer Kavanagh and Jeremy Shapiro, “The Bear in the Baltics: Reassessing the Russian Threat in Estonia,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 18, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-bear-in-the-baltics-reassessing-the-russian-threat-in-estonia/.

^[35]  Anton Fillipov, “Why the EU Still Fails to Restrict Russian Oil Exports and What Should Be Done Instead,” European Pravda, December 20, 2024, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/12/20/7201059/.