Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine: The Case of Lithuania
Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine: The Case of Lithuania
Executive Summary:
- Lithuania faces sustained Russian hybrid pressure that blends cyber, informational, economic, and kinetic tactics. This alters peacetime assumptions and makes resilience, infrastructure protection, and rapid decision-making core defense priorities.
- The Nordic-Baltic region is becoming a central arena of European security regardless of the war’s outcome, making stronger regional cooperation, sustained support for Ukraine, military readiness, and faster institutional adaptation essential to credible deterrence.
- Building a layered defense around immediate national resistance, rapid regional reinforcement, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European capabilities will help Lithuania prepare for a Russian threat.
- Lessons from Ukraine, including the acceleration of counter-drone systems, defense production, mobilization, and infrastructure resilience, are essential to preparing Lithuania for potential conflict with Russia.
- Lithuania’s security depends less on individual capabilities than on creating an integrated defense ecosystem linking military forces, government, businesses, infrastructure, and civil society—and adapting faster than Russia’s evolving threats.
Lithuania’s security environment has fundamentally changed over the past decade. Public and institutional thinking, however, has not fully adapted. Lithuania is no longer operating in peacetime. Alongside sustained Russian rhetoric about a future conventional invasion, Lithuania is already facing an ongoing hostile campaign below the threshold of open conflict, eroding the distinction between peace and war.[1]
Those actions go beyond traditional hybrid tools such as disinformation or cyber operations. They are combining informational, psychological, economic, and physical pressure, including sabotage, disruptions of critical infrastructure, Global Positioning System (GPS) interference, drone incursions, instrumentalized migration, and influence operations. In essence, the Baltics are being tested across multiple domains simultaneously, with Russia operating according to wartime logic by probing vulnerabilities, measuring response times, and assessing political will.[2]
Challenges for Lithuania’s Defense
The key challenge is getting Lithuania to fully recognize the nature of the threat from Russia. Much of the state and society still interpret Russian hybrid warfare through a peacetime lens, creating a dangerous mismatch with Russia’s logic of long-term confrontation.
Russia’s objective is not likely the immediate seizure of Lithuanian territory. Its strategy is incremental, aimed at weakening target states internally—politically, psychologically, and institutionally—before any overt military phase.[3] In this sense, the initial real target is the state’s ability to function and society’s resilience.
Hybrid warfare is also becoming more kinetic. Across the Baltic region, this is visible in cable damage, sabotage, GPS disruption, and drone activity.[4] The grey zone is no longer abstract—it produces tangible economic and societal effects.
Drones are a particularly important emerging factor. In general, low-altitude airspace is becoming a contested domain where civilian and military security overlap. Traditional air defense systems—which, in Lithuania, are still in development—are not optimized for small drones, and institutional responsibilities remain fragmented.[5] This exposes a critical vulnerability in Lithuania’s defense posture.
Beyond the military dimension, critical infrastructure has become a central battlefield. Energy, communications, logistics, ports, data cables, water and food systems, and emergency services are high-value targets whose disruption can rapidly undermine civilian life and military readiness.[6]
The informational dimension remains equally important but is continuously insufficiently addressed. Russia seeks to generate panic, erode trust in allies, diminish support for Ukraine, and promote narratives of inevitability and weakness.
Another structural issue is the gap between the concept of “total defense” and its practical implementation. Questions remain about whether citizens, reserves, businesses, and critical sectors are ready to act in synchronization in the first hours of a crisis.[7]
Lithuania’s vulnerability lies both in its military capabilities and in the speed of decision-making. Delays, bureaucratic inertia, and slow transitions from analysis to action can be more damaging than specific capability gaps.
Lithuania faces a security environment in which the boundaries between war and peace, the military and civilian domains, and physical and informational threats are blurred. The core challenge is to adapt thinking, accelerate decision-making, and align the state, the private sector, and society with the realities of modern conflict.
Long-term impact on Nordic-Baltic security
The long-term security outlook for the Nordic-Baltic region is shaped by three scenarios: a prolonged war in Ukraine or an end to the war on terms broadly favorable to either Russia or Ukraine. All point to one reality: the Baltic Sea region is becoming central to European security—both as a shield and a frontline of Russian pressure.[8]
A prolonged war in Ukraine creates a strategic paradox. It eventually gives the region time to strengthen its military posture by building ammunition stocks, improving mobility, further integrating Finland and Sweden into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and expanding air and missile defense. At the same time, it risks strategic fatigue across Europe, weakening political focus, straining budgets, and eroding public support. The region is becoming more resilient, but resilience alone is insufficient without sustained leadership.[9]
In this prolonged war scenario, Russia is likely to intensify hybrid pressure to continue testing NATO cohesion and exploit the gap between the speed of threat evolution and institutional response. This exposes a broader structural issue. Europe’s defense adaptation remains too slow, with industrial scale yet to grow, delayed procurement, and insufficient deployment of key capabilities.
If Russia were defeated, the immediate conventional threat would diminish, but not disappear. Russia would most probably retain an imperialist appetite, intelligence, cyber, and influence capabilities, shifting the threat toward hybrid pressure, internal instability, and spillover risks rather than direct military confrontation.[10] [11] Simultaneously, a weakened Russia could create a longer-term opportunity if internal transformation occurs, though this remains uncertain and dependent on developments inside Russia.[12]
A Ukrainian defeat would have the most severe consequences. It would validate Russian coercion, weaken Western credibility, and likely embolden further escalation.[13] Pressure on the Nordic-Baltic region would intensify through cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, and weaponized migration. At the same time, vulnerabilities such as Baltic Sea infrastructure, Estonia’s Narva, and the Suwałki corridor would become focal points of strategic pressure.
Across all scenarios, the Baltic Sea region is emerging as a central arena of strategic competition. NATO has already adapted by strengthening the eastern flank and integrating Finland and Sweden, but the fundamental challenge remains the mismatch between fast-moving threats and slower institutional response.
For the Nordic-Baltic region, long-term security will depend on stronger capabilities alongside strategic coherence, faster decision-making, deeper regional cooperation, and sustained support for Ukraine. Nevertheless, the region is no longer NATO’s weakest link—it is becoming one of its most important pillars and one of its most exposed.[14]
A Weakened Russia Could Work to Lithuania’s Advantage
A weakened Russia does not automatically make Lithuania safer. It creates a temporary strategic window that can either be turned into long-term security gains or wasted. Russian weakness would not be permanent. It is a transitional phase that benefits those who act quickly.
Historically, Lithuania has advanced most when Russia was weakened or internally constrained. Regained independence in 1918 and again in 1990–1991, as well as NATO accession in 2002–2004, all of which occurred during periods when Russia was unable to resist effectively. This shows a consistent pattern in which strategic opportunities emerge when Russia is distracted or weakened.
A weaker Russia can only temporarily reduce the conventional military threat. Degraded forces, limited equipment, and logistical constraints may lower the risk of large-scale aggression. This advantage, however, is not self-sustaining. If Lithuania and Europe fail to strengthen defense and resilience during this period, Russia’s capabilities can recover. The key factor is not Russia’s weakness itself, but how it is used.
Lithuania, together with allies, has a clear path to turn this situation into a long-term advantage. First, continued energy decoupling will eliminate Russian leverage.[15] Second, strengthened transport and military mobility will ensure rapid reinforcement and resilient logistics. Third, a sustained allied military presence would turn temporary deployments into long-term deterrence.
Lithuania can shape the broader environment by supporting sanctions and export controls to limit Russia’s military recovery. It can also promote democratic initiatives, independent media, and historical awareness related to Russia, contributing to long-term change. Strengthening a post-imperial regional vision—based on sovereignty and rules rather than spheres of influence—remains equally important.
A weakened Russia may become more active in hybrid warfare. While conventional capabilities may decline, activities such as cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and covert influence could intensify. Border pressure, including the instrumentalization of migration and infrastructure disruption, may increase. The threat becomes less visible but more persistent and harder to attribute. This creates a dual reality. There would be a lower risk of immediate large-scale invasion, but a higher intensity of grey-zone conflict.
The main risk is misinterpreting Russian weakness as lasting stability. Historically, periods of weakness have been followed by recovery and renewed assertiveness.[16] If Europe reduces vigilance or defense efforts, the opportunity may be lost. If, however, Lithuania and its allies strengthen deterrence, infrastructure protection, and political unity, they can shift the balance more permanently.
The key question is not whether Russia weakens. It is whether Lithuania and its allies act decisively while it does. A weakened Russia offers a rare chance to reinforce security and shape the regional order, but only if used quickly and effectively. Otherwise, it may become just a pause before the next confrontation.
Implications for the Transatlantic Community and Lithuania’s Likely Paths
Russia’s war against Ukraine has become a central test for the transatlantic community. It is no longer just a regional conflict, but a systemic question of whether the United States and Europe can turn their combined power into effective strategic outcomes. For Lithuania, the result will directly shape its security, deterrence credibility, and the future European order.
At its core, war tests transatlantic credibility. While large-scale support for Ukraine shows strong capacity, delays, fragmented procurement, and uneven burden-sharing reveal structural weaknesses. The key issue is whether the transatlantic community can sustain long-term commitment and achieve tangible results.
For Lithuania, the stakes are high. A weak Western outcome would embolden Russia and undermine deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. A strong outcome based on a rules-based order would reinforce regional security and Lithuania’s position.
The war is also reshaping the transatlantic balance. Lithuania follows a dual approach of maintaining strong U.S. engagement while supporting a stronger European defense role.[17] The United States remains essential for deterrence, intelligence, and advanced capabilities. At the same time, Lithuania is investing in European defense by taking on greater responsibility through higher defense spending, stronger industry, improved mobility, and deeper regional cooperation, especially within the Nordic-Baltic-Polish framework.[18] [19] [20]
Ukraine has also broadened the concept of security. Modern defense now includes energy resilience, cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructure, industrial capacity, and the use of emerging technologies such as drones. Societal resilience, the ability to endure and function under pressure, has become equally important. Lithuania is promoting this integrated understanding of security within NATO and the European Union.
Lithuania’s priorities are clear. First, it continues strong support for Ukraine as a direct investment in its own security.[21] Second, it works to keep the United States deeply engaged in Europe.[22] Third, it strengthens regional defense cooperation with Nordic, Baltic, and Polish partners.[23] Fourth, Lithuania supports expanding European defense production, recognizing that industrial capacity is critical to sustained military effectiveness. Fifth, it invests in resilience against hybrid threats, including cyber defense, disinformation, and infrastructure protection.[24] Finally, it reduces vulnerabilities in key sectors such as energy, logistics, and communications.
Overall, Lithuania is positioning itself not only as a security consumer but as an active contributor to transatlantic strategy. The war has accelerated this shift, reinforcing the need for proactive engagement and strategic clarity.[25]
In this sense, Russia’s war against Ukraine is not just a deep crisis, but a defining moment. It will determine whether the transatlantic community can adapt to a new security environment and whether Lithuania can secure its place within a stronger and more resilient system.
Lithuania’s Options in the Case of Delayed or Insufficient NATO Response
NATO’s collective defense remains central to Lithuania’s security.[26] Planning, however, will need to consider scenarios in which its response is delayed or insufficient. In such cases, security would depend on pre-prepared national and regional measures capable of functioning under pressure.
If NATO’s response is delayed, Lithuania’s first line of defense is immediate national resistance. The aim would not be a decisive victory alone, but to prevent a rapid fait accompli, maintain state continuity, and buy time for allied support. This requires rapid mobilization, the use of pre-prepared defensive positions and engineering obstacles, and resilient command structures that can operate under disruption. Civil resistance would also play a key role, making the country harder to subdue and strengthening deterrence.[27]
In the early phase, the most immediate external support would likely come from regional partners. Poland, the Nordic-Baltic states, and the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) could provide faster military and logistical assistance due to geographic proximity. The German contingent would play a more dominant role in the absence of a NATO response.[28] Existing regional cooperation focused on mobility, interoperability, and joint planning would become critical. Air defense coordination, Baltic Sea security, and the protection of transport routes would be central tasks.[29]
If NATO underperformance became a longer-term pattern, Lithuania would need to strengthen European and regional defense structures. This would not replace NATO but complement it through deeper defense industry integration, increased stockpiles, higher readiness, and stronger bilateral partnerships, especially with Germany and Poland. The deployment of the German brigade in Lithuania already reflects this shift toward a more permanent allied presence.[30]
At the regional level, a more defined Nordic-Baltic defense framework could enhance coordination, align threat perceptions, and enable faster decision-making during crises.
All these options depend on preparation before a crisis. An effective response requires sufficient ammunition, resilient infrastructure, reliable mobilization systems, and robust command and cyber capabilities. Societal preparedness is equally important. Civil protection, public awareness, and the ability to function under stress are key elements of total defense. Lithuania has already taken steps in this direction, including increased defense spending and a stronger focus on mobilization and civil resilience.[31]
Uncertainty about NATO’s response underscores the importance of national and regional capacity. Lithuania’s defense must be layered—national resistance for immediate response, regional cooperation for rapid reinforcement, and European integration for long-term strength.
Lithuania Adjusts to New Threats
Lithuania’s adaptation to evolving warfare has been uneven and instructive. It has developed a relatively strong practical model for resilience, yet remains in a transitional phase in drone warfare and low-altitude threats. The key question is no longer whether Lithuania is adapting, but whether it is doing so fast enough and with sufficient conceptual clarity.
The first adjustment is the recognition that Lithuania operates under continuous pressure rather than stable peacetime conditions.[32] Russian and Belarusian pressure is constant—informational, cyber, and physical—aimed at weakening state cohesion and societal resilience. This recognition, however, still needs to be more explicit and institutionalized. Without clearly defining the situation as an ongoing hybrid conflict, responses risk remaining reactive and fragmented.
Lithuania’s strongest progress has been in hybrid resilience. It has built a practical model based on centralized coordination, shared situational awareness, and whole-of-government crisis management. The establishment of the National Crisis Management Center within the Office of Government marked an important step toward real-time monitoring and coordinated response across institutions.[33] [34] In parallel, Lithuania has treated the information environment as a strategic space, focusing on identifying malign influence, strengthening media literacy, and integrating national efforts with EU and NATO frameworks.
This progress is not matched in the domain of drones.[35] Russia’s war against Ukraine has shown that modern conflict takes place in low-altitude airspace, where traditional air defense is less effective. Drones are already part of the Baltic security reality, as reflected in NATO activities such as Eastern Sentry and Baltic Sentry, European Commission initiatives, and Estonia’s decision to redirect funding toward air defense and unmanned systems.[36] [37] Lithuania is improving but is still catching up on this shift.
A key requirement is a dedicated national program for low- and very-low-altitude air defense and counter-drone systems. This must go beyond procurement and define priorities, responsibilities, timelines, and integration with NATO structures, while also improving public communication. The gap today is not only technological, but also strategic and organizational.
Drone threats cannot be solved through isolated technological solutions. A comprehensive low-altitude security ecosystem covering detection, identification, decision-making, neutralization, incident management, and communication is needed. This system would need to be interagency and regional. The aforementioned European initiatives, such as a coordinated “drone wall,” point in the right direction but remain in an embryonic stage.[38]
Equally critical is the speed of adaptation. Traditional defense planning cycles are too slow for the pace of modern warfare. Lithuania needs a rapid adaptation model that includes quickly testing and scaling solutions, integrating civilian and military technologies, and learning directly from Ukraine’s battlefield experience. This also requires stronger links between defense and innovation ecosystems, including local production and the development of dual-use technologies. It is already happening, albeit too slowly. The challenge is not only to add capabilities, but to transform the system by aligning institutions, technologies, and society with the realities of modern conflict.
Lithuania’s Potential Defense Reforms
Lithuania’s defense is already moving toward systemic adaptation to a changing security environment. The war against Ukraine, Russia’s hybrid tactics, and the rise of drones highlight the core need for defense built on speed, integration, resilience, and immediate response capability.
First, Lithuania could conceptually internalize that it may need to fight from the first moment of a crisis.[39]NATO reinforcements remain essential strategically, but frontline states should be able to absorb and delay an aggressor independently. This requires pre-positioned munitions, fortified defensive lines, resilient logistics, faster, regularly tested mobilization systems, and command structures capable of operating amid disruption.
Second, Lithuania is continuously pressing to preserve strong U.S. engagement and presence while preparing for a more European-centered defense.[40] Given uncertainties in U.S. political continuity and global commitments, deeper cooperation with Nordic-Baltic and Polish partners and strengthened regional frameworks such as the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8), the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) would be beneficial for Lithuania. At the same time, EU instruments should be used more effectively to improve military mobility, logistics, and defense industrial capacity. The aim is to complement NATO and ensure regional defense credibility even with reduced U.S. involvement.[41]
Third, defense planning should still shift from platform-centric to system-centric logic. Traditional capabilities such as armor and artillery remain necessary but are no longer sufficient. Modern warfare depends on interconnected systems, including drones, counter-drone technologies, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, long-range fires, and real-time intelligence. Estonia’s recent reallocation of resources toward these areas, as mentioned above, illustrates this shift and offers a model for Lithuania.
Fourth, Lithuania’s defense is already in the process of integrating with an industrial and technological policy focused on drones, sensors, lasers, and dual-use technologies, but this effort must be scaled up.[42] The ability to produce, repair, and adapt domestically is ever more decisive. Cooperation with Ukraine, especially in defense production, offers a practical approach: build locally, test in real conditions, and scale rapidly.
Fifth, Lithuanian defense planning has already begun to incorporate Ukrainian battlefield experience systematically. Ukraine represents the most advanced real-world example of modern warfare, including drone operations, electronic warfare, and rapid adaptation cycles; without integrating these lessons into doctrine, procurement, and training, new defense systems risk becoming outdated.
Sixth, accelerating the creation of a comprehensive low-altitude defense ecosystem would greatly aid Lithuania’s defense. The growing role of drones exposes gaps in traditional defense systems. Addressing this requires a full chain—from detection and identification to decision-making and neutralization—integrated across military and civilian institutions and coordinated with NATO and EU partners.
Seventh, decision-making speed must become a central reform priority. A key vulnerability lies not only in capabilities, but in slow procedures. If adversaries act in wartime logic while institutions follow peacetime processes, even strong capabilities may fail. Reform would therefore need to prioritize faster procurement, experimentation, decentralized decision-making, and reduced bureaucracy.
Eighth, Lithuania has already taken important steps, including strengthening air defense, integrating counter-drone measures, increasing defense spending to 5.38 percent of GDP, and improving regional cooperation.[43] The scale and pace of these efforts, however, still lag behind the rapidly evolving threat environment.
Lithuania’s defense would need to aim to be difficult to defeat quickly. This requires strong territorial defense, prepared reserves, societal resilience, and the ability to operate under degraded conditions. NATO presence significantly enhances deterrence, but credibility begins with national capacity to resist and endure. In this context, the National Defense Volunteer Forces (KASP) and the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union (Šaulių sąjunga) play a key role by strengthening territorial defense, supporting mobilization, and anchoring civil resistance within society.[44]
Resilience of Civil Society, Civil Defense, and Critical Infrastructure
Russia’s war against Ukraine shows that resilience is now central to national security.[45] The key question is not only military strength but also whether a state can continue to function under pressure by maintaining energy, communication, governance, and social cohesion. Lithuania must move from a conceptual approach to a fully operational, system-wide resilience model.
First, Lithuania’s “total defense” must become a functioning system. This means stronger reserve training, clear mobilization plans, defined institutional roles, and deeper integration of businesses and civil actors. Lithuania could accomplish this by making joint crisis planning between the public and private sectors routine. Without full integration, total defense remains incomplete.
Civil defense measures such as training, evacuation planning, shelters, warning systems, and crisis communication becoming standard governance elements would be a step toward normalizing preparedness. This preparedness could include large-scale exercises with the military, as well as with energy, transport, food supply, municipalities, and emergency services. Without stress-testing these systems, societal functioning may collapse even if military defense holds.
Civil society itself is an essential aspect of defense infrastructure. Organizations such as the Riflemen’s Union, volunteers, and local commandant office networks play a direct role in logistics, order, and morale. Resilience, therefore, depends on community preparedness, business continuity, and public information literacy. Society is not passive; it is an active component of defense.[46]
Redundancy, speed, and coordination are key in protecting critical infrastructure. This includes securing energy, communications, and transport systems, as well as developing backup systems and robust cybersecurity measures. Lithuania has made progress, such as electricity synchronization, but must expand efforts and coordinate regionally within the EU and NATO frameworks.[47] Clear response mechanisms, such as those for Baltic Sea cable incidents, are essential.
Cyber resilience is equally critical. Since all sectors depend on digital systems, disruptions can cascade across the economy and security. Investment not only in regulation but also in skills, the workforce, and technological capacity, especially for businesses, is essential for Lithuania’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity is a core element of economic and societal stability.[48]
Information resilience is another aspect. The goal is not to counter every false claim, but to prevent fear, confusion, and loss of trust. This requires media literacy, targeted communication, and platform responsibility. The main risk is long-term erosion of societal cohesion.[49]
Finally, drone threats are a growing threat to civil defense. Drones now affect not only the battlefield but also infrastructure and public safety. Lithuania needs coordinated systems across military and civilian institutions to cover detection, response, and attribution. Fragmentation in this area remains a key vulnerability and should be addressed in line with EU initiatives.[50]
Resilience is a continuous, system-wide function. Military defense, civil preparedness, infrastructure protection, and societal stability are all connected in resilience. A resilient Lithuania would be significantly harder to destabilize, even under sustained hybrid pressure.
Conclusion
Lithuania’s security is no longer only about preventing invasion alone. It rests on the ability to function, resist, and endure under continuous military, economic, and psychological pressure. Russia’s strategy has already shifted to constant, multi-layered hybrid pressure with growing kinetic elements.
The problem is not the threat itself, but the speed of its evolution. Hybrid warfare has moved beyond cyber and information domains into sabotage, infrastructure attacks, drones, and coercion.
Fragmented responses are no longer enough. More spending or capabilities alone will not solve the problem. The establishment of a single, integrated security system that actually works in practice, not just on paper, is an essential step. This system would combine military defense, rapid decision-making, infrastructure protection, air defense, reserves, and full integration of business and society. Speed is now decisive. Slow institutions are a bigger risk than limited capabilities.
The conflict in Ukraine shows that wars can be won across systems as well as on battlefields, and that those who adapt faster gain the advantage.
The core question is simple: can Lithuania adapt faster than the threat evolves? If yes, it strengthens both its own security and Europe’s. If not, the gap between threats and response becomes the main vulnerability. The objective is clear: not to make Lithuania impossible to attack, but to make it impossible to break.
[1] Defence Intelligence and Security Service under the Ministry of National Defence and State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania, 2026 National Threat Assessment (2026), https://kam.lt/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026-National-Threat-Assessment.pdf.
[2] Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “The Hybrid Threat Imperative: Deterring Russia Before It Is Too Late,” Center for European Policy Analysis, December 2, 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-hybrid-threat-imperative-deterring-russia-before-it-is-too-late/.
[3] Mario Baumann and Katri Pynnöniemi, “European Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” German Council on Foreign Relations, November 5, 2025, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/european-security-era-hybrid-warfare.
[4] Anna J. Davis, “Russia Targets NATO Frontline States,” The Jamestown Foundation, January 16, 2026, https://jamestown.org/russia-targets-nato-frontline-states/.
[5] Jake Epstein, “A NATO Fighter Wing Showed Up for Front-Line Air Patrols with Drone Defenses for the First Time,” Business Insider, January 24, 2026, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-pilots-brought-drone-defenses-air-policing-mission-first-time-2026-1.
[6] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3,” updated November 13, 2024, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Secretary General Engages Industry on Critical Undersea Infrastructure,” May 5, 2023, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2023/05/05/nato-secretary-general-engages-industry-on-critical-undersea-infrastructure.
[7] Gintaras Labutis, “Strengthening the Critical Infrastructures in Lithuania: From Protection towards Resilience,” in Democratic Resilience in the Baltics, vol. 1 of Baltic Security and Defense (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2025), 239–257, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-99286-5_14.
[8] Minna Ålander, “A Region in the Making: The Nordic-Baltic Alignment,” International Centre for Defence and Security, June 4, 2025, https://icds.ee/en/a-region-in-the-making-the-nordic-baltic-alignment/.
[9] Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “Europe’s Vital Nordic-Baltic Shield,” Center for European Policy Analysis, March 31, 2025, https://cepa.org/article/europes-vital-nordic-baltic-shield/.
[10] Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Shadow War against the West,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west.
[11] Mario Baumann and Katri Pynnöniemi, “European Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” German Council on Foreign Relations, November 5, 2025, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/european-security-era-hybrid-warfare.
[12] Maksym Beznosiuk and William Dixon, “Russia’s Imperial Retreat Is Europe’s Strategic Opportunity,” Carnegie Europe, March 19, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2026/03/russias-imperial-retreat-is-europes-strategic-opportunity.
[13] Eric Rosenbach et al., “Russian Threats to NATO’s Eastern Flank: Scenarios, Strategy, and Policy for European Security,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, February 5, 2026, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/russia-nato-baltics-scenarios-europe-security.
[14] Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “Europe’s Vital Nordic-Baltic Shield,” Center for European Policy Analysis, March 31, 2025, https://cepa.org/article/europes-vital-nordic-baltic-shield/.
[15] European Commission, “Baltic States Join the European Continental Electricity Grid after Fully Disconnecting from Russian and Belarussian Networks,” press release IP/25/436, February 9, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_436.
[16] Marina Diakonova et al., “How Russia’s Long History of Conflict and Other Shocks Affects Its Economic Growth,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, April 11, 2023, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/how-russias-long-history-conflict-and-other-shocks-affects-its-economic-growth.
[17] Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, “Lithuania’s Transatlantic Dilemma: How to Maintain U.S. Interest in Baltic Security?,” in The United States and the Future of Europe, ed. M. Kaeding, J. Pollak, and P. Schmidt (Cham: Springer, 2025), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-83350-2_17.
[18] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Implementation of the National Defence Budget,” updated June 11, 2026, https://kam.lt/en/facts-and-trends/implementation-of-the-national-defence-budget/.
[19] Jakub Bornio, “Poland Increases Engagement with Baltic and Nordic Countries,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 2, 2026, https://jamestown.org/poland-increases-engagement-with-baltic-and-nordic-countries/.
[20] Chris Patkin, “Lithuania Tops NATO With Defense Spending Above 5% of GDP,” AdriaDefense, July 31, 2026. https://www.adriadefense.com/lithuania-tops-nato-with-defense-spending-above-5-of-gdp/.
[21] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Lithuania and Ukraine Signs Letter of Intent on Developing the BRAVE Lithuania Programme,” June 2, 2026, https://kam.lt/en/lithuania-and-ukraine-signs-letter-of-intent-on-developing-the-brave-lithuania-programme/.
[22] Justas Kazlauskas, “Tragic Fate of U.S. Soldiers in Lithuania Highlights Growing European Security Concerns,” The Jamestown Foundation, March 31, 2025, https://jamestown.org/tragic-fate-of-u-s-soldiers-in-lithuania-highlights-growing-european-security-concerns/; Jeffery M. Fritz, “President Nausėda Affirms Ironclad U.S.-Lithuania Defense Ties,” U.S. Army, April 10, 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/291616/president_nauseda_affirms_ironclad_u_s_lithuania_defense_ties.
[23] Jakub Bornio, “Poland Increases Engagement with Baltic and Nordic Countries,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 2, 2026, https://jamestown.org/poland-increases-engagement-with-baltic-and-nordic-countries/.
[24] Chris Patkin, “Lithuania Tops NATO With Defense Spending Above 5% of GDP,” AdriaDefense, July 31, 2026. https://www.adriadefense.com/lithuania-tops-nato-with-defense-spending-above-5-of-gdp/.
[25] Tomas Janeliūnas, “Security on NATO’s Edge: How Transatlantic Policy Shifts Affect Lithuania,” Geopolitics and Security Studies Center, March 9, 2026, https://www.gssc.lt/en/publication/security-on-natos-edge-how-transatlantic-policy-shifts-affect-lithuania/.
[26] Kristi Raik and Margarita Šešelgytė, “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania” in The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, ed. Ryan C. Hendrickson and Jonathan P. Olson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 279–99, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192855534.003.0013.
[27] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Strategic Provisions,” February 9, 2023, https://kam.lt/en/strategic-provisions/.
[28] Justas Kazlauskas, “Lithuania Welcomes German Brigade,” The Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2025. https://jamestown.org/lithuania-welcomes-german-brigade/.
[29] Heinrich Brauss, Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French, “Military Mobility Project Appendix 1: Nordic-Baltic Route,” Center for European Policy Analysis, March 3, 2021, https://cepa.org/article/military-mobility-project-appendix-1-nordic-baltic-route/.
[30] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “German Brigade in Lithuania,” accessed May 19, 2026, https://kam.lt/en/german-brigade-in-lithuania/.
[31] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Civil Resilience,” accessed May 19, 2026, https://kam.lt/en/civil-resilience/.
[32] Mario Baumann and Katri Pynnöniemi, “European Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” German Council on Foreign Relations, November 5, 2025, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/european-security-era-hybrid-warfare.
[33] Government of the Republic of Lithuania, “Lithuania’s new crisis management model presented at Baltic States Centres of Government Meeting,” January 17, 2023, https://lrv.lt/en/news/lithuanias-new-crisis-management-model-presented-at-baltic-states-centres-of-government-meeting/.
[34] Gintaras Labutis, “Strengthening the Critical Infrastructures in Lithuania: From Protection towards Resilience,” in Democratic Resilience in the Baltics, vol. 1 of Baltic Security and Defense (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2025), 239–257, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-99286-5_14.
[35] Joanna Hyndle-Hussein and Kamil Kłysiński, “Belarusian balloons prompt emergency situation in Lithuania,” Centre for Eastern Studies, December 9, 2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-12-09/belarusian-balloons-prompt-emergency-situation-lithuania.
[36] NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “Baltic Sentry,” accessed May 19, 2026, https://shape.nato.int/operations/operations-and-missions/baltic-sentry.
[37] Marko Tooming et al., “Estonia halts €500 million combat vehicle procurement to fund air defense,” Estonian Public Broadcasting Company, April 9, 2026, https://news.err.ee/1609991037/estonia-halts-500-million-combat-vehicle-procurement-to-fund-air-defense.
[38] European Commission, “Commission Presents Action Plan to Counter Drone Threats,” press release IP/26/364, April 17, 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_364.
[39] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Strategic Provisions,” accessed May 19, 2026, https://kam.lt/en/strategic-provisions/.
[40] Jeffery M. Fritz, “President Nausėda Affirms Ironclad U.S.-Lithuania Defense Ties,” U.S. Army, April 10, 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/291616/president_nauseda_affirms_ironclad_u_s_lithuania_defense_ties.
[41] Minna Ålander, “A Region in the Making: The Nordic-Baltic Alignment,” International Centre for Defence and Security, June 4, 2025, https://icds.ee/en/a-region-in-the-making-the-nordic-baltic-alignment/.
[42] Invest Lithuania, “Defence in Lithuania: Advancing Innovation and Global Security,” accessed May 19, 2026, https://investlithuania.com/defence/.
[43] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Implementation of the National Defence Budget,” updated June 11, 2026, https://kam.lt/en/facts-and-trends/implementation-of-the-national-defence-budget/.
[44] Benas Gerdžiūnas, “A hedgehog in Russia’s throat? Understanding Lithuania’s citizen army,” New Eastern Europe, October 2, 2024, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/10/02/a-hedgehog-in-russias-throat-understanding-lithuanias-citizen-army/.
[45] Scott Murphy, Kathleen McInnis, and Iryna Nykorak, “Whole of Society Resilience Lessons from Russia-Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 17, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/whole-society-resilience-lessons-russia-ukraine-conflict-focus.
[46] Simona Uksaitė, “Civil Resistance Campaigns in Lithuania: How Does the Ministry of National Defense Implement Advertising Campaign Strategies?” Vilnius University Open Series (2025): 126–142, https://doi.org/10.15388/K-ir-I.2025.8.
[47] BNS, “Baltics synchronise their power grids with Western Europe,” Lithuanian National Radio and Television, February 10, 2025, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2482909/baltics-synchronise-their-power-grids-with-western-europe.
[48] Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Cybersecurity and strengthening civil-military cooperation are the two factors that play a significant role in enhancing total defence, says Vice Minister of National Defence T. Godliauskas,” June 16, 2025, https://kam.lt/en/cybersecurity-and-strengthening-civil-military-cooperation-are-the-two-factors-that-play-a-significant-role-in-enhancing-total-defence-says-vice-minister-of-national-defence-t-godliauskas/.
[49] Government of the Republic of Lithuania, “Chancellor of the Government Stresses the Importance of Social Platforms Responsibility and a Stronger Role for States at OECD Conference on Combating Disinformation,” November 13, 2023, https://lrv.lt/en/news/chancellor-of-the-government-stresses-the-importance-of-social-platforms-responsibility-and-a-stronger-role-for-states-at-oecd-conference-on-combating-disinformation/.
[50] European Commission, “Commission Presents Action Plan to Counter Drone Threats,” press release IP/26/364, April 17, 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_364.
