Near-Seas Force Locking Reshapes Gulf of Aden Naval Missions

Near-Seas Force Locking Reshapes Gulf of Aden Naval Missions

Executive Summary:

• The 46th and 47th Gulf of Aden escort task groups of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) set consecutive records for deployment length, suggesting a deliberate shift from high-frequency rotations to extended tours. The escort mission is increasingly being reconfigured into a low-density, long-duration batch-deployment model.
• Rising near-seas operational demand (in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea) has created a force-locking effect, shrinking the pool of high-end surface combatants available for distant deployments. At the same time, the Red Sea crisis has raised the cost and risk of task-group handovers, incentivizing the PLAN to keep in-theater units on station longer.
• Improved sustainment capacity at the PLA’s Djibouti support base enables longer forward presence but Beijing continues to pursue a selective escort posture that preserves operational and political autonomy rather than joining coalition strike operations. This reflects continued constraints in munitions replenishment and risk tolerance.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is quietly rewriting the tempo of its most routine far-seas mission (Global Times, September 30, 2024). Since December 2008, Gulf of Aden escort deployments have been among the PLAN’s most predictable overseas operations, typically lasting four to six months per rotation (People’s Daily, December 25, 2018). That regular rhythm served multiple purposes: it provided a steady pipeline for far-seas training, stress-tested logistics and sustainment, and supported Beijing’s narrative of contributing to international maritime security (Global Times, December 25, 2023).

In 2024–2025, however, the long-standing pattern broke. The 46th escort task group—Type 052D destroyer Jiaozuo (焦作号), Type 054A frigate Xuchang (许昌号), and Type 903A replenishment ship Honghu (洪湖号)—sailed in February 2024 and returned to Zhanjiang only on January 24, 2025, completing a 339-day deployment (Xinhua, January 24, 2024). The follow-on 47th task group reportedly departed on December 15, 2024 and returned to Zhoushan on December 18, 2025, setting a new record of 368 days (PLAN, December 19, 2025). Taken together, these two consecutive “year-long” tours indicate an emerging model in which the PLAN sustains its Indian Ocean presence by keeping fewer ships deployed for longer periods, rather than maintaining earlier high-frequency rotation cycles. This model is driven by a dual dynamic: a near-seas “push” created by competing operational demands and finite high-end hulls, and a far-seas “pull” shaped by evolving mission requirements and risk conditions along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. [1]

Lengthening Escort Deployment Cycles

For roughly 16 years, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden escort mission followed a notably stable operating pattern. Over the period 2008–2022, Beijing generally maintained a rhythm of three escort task groups per year, with deployments departing at roughly four-month intervals. Most task groups spent approximately three to four months on-station in the Gulf of Aden, with total deployments typically lasting five to six months (including transit). [2] The mission has therefore been one of the PLAN’s most regularized far-seas operational tasks and has served as a primary channel for accumulating experience in sustained out-of-area operations (CISS, December 27, 2021).

A shift began with modest adjustments in the 45th task group cycle and became fully visible in the 46th and 47th rotations. The 46th task group’s 339-day deployment spanned Asia, Africa, and Europe and reportedly covered more than 160,000 nautical miles (China Military Online, January 27, 2025). More importantly, the follow-on 47th escort task group—comprised of the Type 052D destroyer Baotou (包头舰), the Type 054A frigate Honghe (红河舰), and the Type 903A replenishment ship Gaoyouhu (高邮湖舰) pushed deployment duration to an historic high. These consecutive rotations suggest that the PLAN is extending the overall escort cycle: handover intervals are lengthening, and each individual task group is deployed for longer periods.

The ‘Push’ Factor: Near-Seas Force-Locking Effects

The PLAN’s decision to extend the deployment length of its Gulf of Aden escort task groups is likely rooted in a worsening security environment along the PRC’s maritime periphery. Chinese analysts have pointed to frictions in PRC–Japan relations, heightened cross-Strait tensions, and PRC–Philippines disputes in the South China Sea as key variables directly shaping Beijing’s overall security outlook (CNR, December 20, 2025). In April 2023, during an inspection of the South Sea Fleet, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the need to “firmly and flexibly conduct military struggle” (坚定灵活开展军事斗争), improve the ability to respond to complex contingencies in a timely manner, and resolutely safeguard the PRC’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, while maintaining stability in the surrounding environment (CCTV, April 13, 2023). This guidance suggests that the PLAN’s top operational priority is increasingly concentrated on maritime competition and crisis management in the near seas.

This prioritization matters because the platforms routinely assigned to Gulf of Aden escort missions—most notably Type 052D destroyers and Type 054A frigates—are also core assets for anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations within the first island chain (Global Times, August 12, 2021, June 2, 2025). Although the PLA has promoted the “normalized and diversified” (常态化多样化) employment of military power, competing mission demands impose hard tradeoffs. When priorities diverge, Beijing is likely to privilege near-seas contingencies and preparations for escalation (PLA Daily, November 25, 2022).

Evidence from Taiwan, Japan-adjacent waters, and the South China Sea points to a sustained near-seas surge that locks in the PLAN’s most capable surface combatants, making longer, lower-frequency Gulf of Aden deployments a rational way to preserve distant presence while freeing hulls for higher-priority contingencies.

High-Pressure Testing in the Taiwan Strait

In 2023 and 2024, the PLA conducted multiple blockade-oriented exercises targeting Taiwan, including “Joint Sword–2024A” and “Joint Sword–2024B” (China Brief, July 26, 2024, November 1, 2024). These activities emphasized seizing critical maritime chokepoints and, by implication, cutting Taiwan’s energy imports, restricting external reinforcement routes, and constraining Taiwan’s access to the outside world (Global Times, April 2, 2025). Carrier-strike-group coordination further elevates the demand signal for 052D destroyers and 054A frigates, which have become principal escort and screening platforms for Chinese carrier operations (CCTV, December 17, 2025).

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reporting, as shown in Figure 1, indicates a clear step change in PLA and PRC government vessel activity around Taiwan beginning in mid-2022. Monthly counts rise sharply after that point, remain elevated throughout 2023, and reach new highs in 2024, including a peak of 282 vessels in August, before stabilizing at levels well above the pre-2022 baseline. Although the data do not disaggregate by ship class, the persistence and intensity of this operating pattern imply sustained heavy tasking of modern PLAN surface combatants that underpin blockade exercises, carrier screening, and routine presence operations. The key implication is the normalization of high-tempo near-seas operations that absorb high-end hulls over extended periods, tightening the PLAN’s force-generation margins and reinforcing incentives to sustain distant missions such as Gulf of Aden escorts through longer, lower-frequency deployment cycles.

Figure 1: Number of PLA/Governmental Vessels Active Around Taiwan (August 2022–October 2025)

(Source: Created by the authors based on Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense press releases)

Japan-Adjacent Waters: Expanding Tempo and Wider Strait ‘Penetration’

Japanese scholar-compiled data show a steady rise in PLAN warship observations around Japan from 43 (2021) to 71 (2022), then jumping to 107 (2023) and reaching a new high of 108 (2024) (see Figure 2) (SPF China Observer, September 8, 2025). Importantly, the surge includes sustained high-end surface combatant activity: Type 052D observations increased from 11 (2021) to 28 (2023) (and remained high at 27 in 2024), while Type 054A rose from 15 (2021) to 33 (2024). Overall, the 2023–2024 peak suggests intensified near-seas tasking around key approaches and straits, reinforcing the argument that near-seas demand is absorbing modern surface combatants and tightening the pool available for far-seas rotations.

The pattern shift is also geographic. Japanese analyses highlight the Okinawa–Miyako Strait as the clearest growth corridor: transits rose from 3 in 2020 to 31 in 2022 and peaked at 41 in 2024, suggesting it has become a principal artery for PLAN access to the Philippine Sea. By 2024, activity was no longer concentrated in a single route; frequent passages were also recorded through the Tsushima Strait, Ōsumi Strait, the Amami–Yokoate corridor, and the Taiwan–Yonaguni channel (SPF China Observer, September 8, 2025). The expansion toward the Taiwan–Yonaguni and Yonaguni–Iriomote waterways is especially relevant to Taiwan contingencies because it reflects routine presence-building east of Taiwan, which is an area central to denial operations and crisis signaling.

The net effect of more hulls, more routes, and more repetitions is that near-seas tasking pressure is increasing on the same classes of ships that normally anchor Gulf of Aden rotations.

Figure 2: PLA Warships Observed Around Japan (2021–2024)*

*Counts reflect observed warship appearances as compiled by Japanese researchers; Type 052D (Luyang III) and Type 054A (Jiangkai II) are highlighted. (Source: Created by the authors based on SPF China Observer/Japanese scholar compilation)

South China Sea: Persistent ‘Holding Missions’ That Consume High-End Hulls

Philippine monitoring data point to a similar force-locking effect in the South China Sea, where routine coercive operations function as an attritional holding mission. During a single week (September 17–23, 2024), Philippine reporting counted 251 PRC vessels in the West Philippine Sea, including 16 PLAN warships (Philippine News Agency, September 24, 2024). In 2025, Philippine reporting suggested local peaks of PLAN warships in May, June, and July, detecting a total of 57 warships (Philstar, July 9, 2025).

Operational risk has risen alongside tempo. On August 11, 2025, a reported high-speed collision near Scarborough Shoal between a China Coast Guard vessel and a PLAN destroyer underscored how routine confrontation can generate escalation risks and mishaps (USNI, August 11, 2025). Subsequent reporting suggested that by November, 19 PLAN warships were present across multiple locations in the West Philippine Sea, consistent with a broad, sustained pressure posture rather than episodic patrols (Philstar, December 3, 2025). For fleet management, these missions matter because they are “sticky”: they require continuity, command-capable escorts, and frequent re-tasking, precisely the kind of demand that shrinks the residual inventory available for distant rotations.

‘Pull Factors’: The Red Sea Crisis and Selective Escort

The deterioration of the Red Sea threat environment has created an operational “pull” that makes longer PLAN escort deployments in the Gulf of Aden more attractive. Since late 2023, Houthi forces have repeatedly targeted merchant shipping with missiles and drones, impacting vessels linked to Chinese interests (CNA, March 24, 2024). Combined with Beijing’s doctrinal emphasis on protecting strategic sea lanes and overseas interests, the crisis provides a plausible military logic for keeping a seasoned task group on station rather than repeatedly rotating fresh crews and platforms into a high-threat environment (SCIO, May 26, 2015).

Beijing’s pursuit of this “pull” without coalition integration reinforces a selective escort posture designed to preserve political and operational autonomy. U.S. officials have described efforts to encourage the PRC to cooperate—citing Djibouti-based forces and past counter-piracy precedents—while the PRC Ministry of National Defense publicly has insisted the 46th escort was a “routine” (常态化) deployment unrelated to the crisis and framed it under the “Global Security Initiative” (全球安全倡议) (PRC MND, February 29, 2024). This approach prioritizes route security and limited protection for Chinese (and selected) shipping while avoiding coalition command chains and shared rules of engagement. [3] This shows that the Red Sea crisis can explain why a task group is “held” forward longer but not why rotations slow, unless the PLAN is also reallocating scarce high-end hulls back to near-seas priorities.

Djibouti Support Base Maturation Enables Shift

The PLAN’s move toward low-density, long-duration escort cycles would be operationally difficult without forward sustainment. The shift has therefore led to a maturation of the Djibouti support base from one focused on replenishment and limited maintenance support to one in which overseas-base support is the primary pillar, complemented by foreign port calls and domestic backup (HK01, June 14, 2022; PLA Daily, January 3, 2024). This reduces the operational penalty of keeping a three-ship task group deployed for 11–12 months and turns the “time-for-hulls” trade into a workable substitute for high-frequency rotations.

Chinese analysts further link Djibouti to a broader ambition to expand global logistics networks—combining accompanying replenishment, forward support, and overseas commercial nodes—to sustain distant operations. [4] State media messaging similarly implies that as blue-water tasks grow, the PRC will seek additional overseas support points (CCTV, July 12, 2025).

Djibouti is best read as an enabler, however, and not the primary driver of PLA blue-water operations. It makes extended deployments feasible while the underlying impulse to stretch rotations suggests competing near-seas missions are forcing the PLAN to economize on escort task groups rather than increase them (CMSI, August 13, 2024). In this way, the Red Sea crisis “pulls” the escort force forward and Djibouti makes long stays possible. But the reason the rotation cycle has changed is that Beijing appears to be conserving high-end surface combatants for intensifying near-seas demands.

New Ambitions and Material Constraints

The PLAN’s escort rotation cycle adjustment offers a case study of how Beijing allocates its most capable surface combatants under multi-theater pressure. The new rhythm reflects a deliberate tradeoff: when the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, South China Sea, and Red Sea all impose operational demands, the PLAN appears to prioritize retaining more high-end hulls in the near seas while sustaining a minimum-cost presence in the Indian Ocean. Three implications can be derived from this.

First, longer escort deployments underscore an interest-driven logic of force employment. Today, military power is expected not just to defend territory but also to protect “development interests,” including energy sea lanes and overseas investments. Nevertheless, safeguarding core national interests remains the overriding principle. When development and sovereignty compete in force allocation, the latter takes absolute priority (Qiushi, June 25, 2022).

Second, the PRC’s far-seas missions are likely to become more diverse. As the Djibouti support facility matures, a three-ship task group can now remain in-theater for 11–12 months without returning to a home port, signaling growing confidence in logistics support, maintenance capacity, and crew endurance. Operationally, this resembles a scaled-down forward-deployed naval posture: personnel and systems can be sustained through in-theater support, while the PLAN learns to conduct extended cruising far from the mainland to secure sea lanes, sustain influence, and build practical far-seas mission competence. New large surface combatants continue to enter service and the PLAN has also expanded large-formation activities in the North and South Pacific in recent years, providing additional indicators for tracking the PRC’s evolving blue-water capabilities (China Brief, March 11, 2025, July 25, 2025).

Third, a “selective escort” approach highlights strategic autonomy while exposing ammunition and risk constraints in high-threat environments. Chinese commentary has noted that during the Red Sea crisis, PLAN escort task groups deliberately avoided substantive participation in coalition strikes against the Houthis, reflecting limits in ammunition sustainability and political risk tolerance. Even if the PLAN can sustain a routine presence around the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea remains a high-intensity air-defense and counter–unmanned systems operating environment; once an escort task group is drawn into a coalition-style operational tempo, shipborne air-defense missiles and intercept munitions could be expended rapidly. The key issue is not whether replenishment is possible in principle but whether the PLAN can rearm at the forward edge in sufficient quantities and at sufficient frequency (Guancha, December 19, 2025). Open sources do not confirm that the Djibouti support base maintains the forward munitions stockpiles and rapid rearming capacity required to sustain prolonged high-tempo engagements. Beijing thus has strong incentives to adopt a “selective escort” posture. This involves maintaining a visible presence and a minimum level of route security along critical sea lanes, prioritizing the protection of PRC-linked and selected friendly shipping, and avoiding integration into U.S.- and Europe-led coalition command chains and shared rules of engagement. This approach reflects a political preference for autonomy but also underscores practical constraints on firepower sustainability and risk tolerance in high-threat, out-of-area operations.

Conclusion

The PLAN’s 46th and 47th Gulf of Aden task groups mark a structural shift from frequent rotations toward longer single-deployment cycles. This shift is downstream of push and pull factors. The push comes from intensified near-seas tasking along the first island chain that locks in the availability of 052D and 054A vessels, while the pull comes from a deteriorating Red Sea threat environment that raises the operational risk of frequent handovers.

Beijing’s preference for “selective escort” shows that forward rearm limits and political risk calculus still constrain blue-water operations, even though the Djibouti base lowers logistical barriers to an annualized rotation model. Going forward, key indicators to watch include changes in escort rotation intervals and overlap patterns, the composition of escort task groups (especially the share of 052D and 054A vessels versus newer large combatants), the frequency and purpose of Djibouti maintenance and replenishment activities, and third-port calls during extended deployments.

The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the positions of the National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense, or the government of ROC (Taiwan).

Notes

[1] This article builds on analysis by Dennis J. Blasko from mid-2024 in his paper “Recent Changes in the PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Deployment Pattern” (CMSI, August 13, 2024).

[2] The main exception was the 26th escort task group, whose tour coincided with the formal opening of the PRC’s logistics support base in Djibouti on July 11, 2017, and became the only rotation at the time to extend to roughly eight months (CRNTT, December 4, 2017).

[3] Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed. The Science of Military Strategy [战略学]. Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2020. p. 321–323.

[4] Guo Feng [郭峰] and Suqin Zhang [張素琴]. “An Exploration of an Equipment Support Model for Far-Seas Defense Based on Civil–Military Integration” [基於軍民融合的遠海防衛裝備保障模式探索]. Value Engineering [價值工程], 2020 (39)4: 26–27.