Nearly a Million Tajiks Have Taken Russian Citizenship Affecting Both Countries

Nearly a Million Tajiks Have Taken Russian Citizenship Affecting Both Countries

Executive Summary:

• More than 800,000 Tajiks have acquired Russian citizenship over the last decade. Most have taken advantage of the right to dual citizenship that a 1995 accord uniquely allows among the countries of the former Soviet space.
• This arrangement has limited Moscow’s ability to restrict unpopular immigration and is even changing the country’s ethnic mix. Dual citizenship simultaneously poses a challenge to Tajikistan’s independence from Moscow’s control.
• Some in both countries now want that arrangement canceled. The Kremlin remains largely opposed, since abrogation would represent a retreat from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and his drive to reintegrate the former Soviet space.

More than 800,000 Tajiks have acquired Russian citizenship over the past decade, with many taking advantage of the 1995 Dual Citizenship Agreement between Dushanbe and Moscow. This is a unique agreement in the post-Soviet space that allows citizens of both countries to retain dual citizenship (Garant Company, September 7, 1995; APN Northwest, July 17). This arrangement has limited Moscow’s ability to restrict ever more unpopular immigration from Central Asia while contributing to demographic changes in some cities and regions. Tajiks’ ability to obtain Russian citizenship with relative ease represents a continuing challenge to Tajikistan’s independence from Russian control (A Just Russia, August 4, 2023; Sputnik Russia, July 14).

Many Tajiks benefit from remittances and many Russian businesses rely on their labor. [1] Demands to end the dual-citizenship arrangement, however, have emerged in both countries (see EDM, May 9, 2024; Rhythm of Eurasia, December 8, 2025; Sputnik Russia, July 14). The Kremlin opposes such a move for now, as Russian businesses continue to rely on migrant labor and the abrogation of the arrangement would signal a retreat from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and reintegrate the former Soviet space (Charter 97, August 1, 2025; Novye Izvestia, October 17, 2025; Govorit NeMoskva, March 23).

Moscow and Dushanbe agreed in 1995 that citizens of their countries could obtain the other’s citizenship through a simple application. This created the first, and to date only, arrangement in the former Soviet space, despite Moscow’s hopes that it would serve as a model for Russia’s relations with other post-Soviet states (Window on Eurasia, December 12, 2025). Since then, Tajiks have flooded into the Russian Federation in large numbers, becoming the largest Central Asian immigrant community in the country. Many have obtained Russian citizenship, as permitted under the 1995 accord, limiting Moscow’s ability to regulate Tajik migrants in the same manner as other foreign nationals and giving Dushanbe a stronger position to protest (Window on Eurasia, August 11, 2024).

In response, the Russian authorities have often reduced repressive measures against Tajiks. They have even allowed Tajik police officers to operate in Russian cities and work with immigrants from that Central Asian country, a growing share of whom have acquired Russian citizenship (National Accent, October 20, 2025). The total number of ethnic Tajiks in Russia appears to have stabilized or declined amid rising anti-immigrant attitudes and attacks (Rhythm of Eurasia, August 12, 2024). The number of Tajiks who have acquired Russian citizenship and remained in the country has not fallen significantly, making this a political issue, particularly given the sharp decline in the number of foreigners obtaining Russian citizenship since Putin began his war against Ukraine in 2022. In that year, almost 700,000 foreigners obtained Russian citizenship, and last year, only 152,400 did so (Govorit NeMoskva, March 23).

The scale of Tajikistan’s deepening citizenship ties with Russia was underscored this month when Tajik officials announced that more than 800,000 Tajiks had acquired Russian citizenship over the past decade, including 120,000 in the last two years alone. This figure was previously cited by Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan Semyon Grigoryev (Sputnik Tajikistan, July 14). Perhaps sensing Tajik concerns about what this pattern means, those officials went out of their way to emphasize that Tajikistan was not losing these citizens either as a source of remittances to relatives at home or as members in good standing of the Tajik nation (Sputnik Tajikistan, July 14; APN Northwest, July 17). These assurances have exacerbated concerns among ordinary Russians, as well as many commentators, officials, and politicians, about Tajik immigration and Tajiks becoming Russian citizens (Window on Eurasia, December 12, 2025). Tensions have resulted in clashes between Russians and Tajiks in Moscow and other Russian cities, as well as growing anger over perceptions that Tajiks living in Russia are taking economic opportunities from Russians and marrying ethnic Russians, thus further diluting, in the minds of some, the Russianness of the Russian Federation (Window on Eurasia, August 10, 2019, February 6).  

One of the clearest expressions of such attitudes came in recent years from Sergey Mironov, the head of the Just Russia–Patriots–For Truth Party, who said that the influx of Tajiks and their acquisition of Russian citizenship threaten the unity of the Russian Federation and are contributing to what he called “the Tajikification of Russia” (A Just Russia, August 4, 2023). “Yes, the population of Russia is declining,” Mironov said in 2023, “but it is reckless to solve one problem while creating another. Or do we not care what is behind the growth of migration and the kind of citizens we get? It seems that everyone agrees the country needs highly qualified personnel who are close to us in culture, language, and mentality and who share our values. But in fact,” he continued, “we are getting people from Tajikistan who, with all due respect, do not.” To stop what he sees as a threat to Russian identity, Mironov calls for far stricter controls on granting citizenship to individuals from Tajikistan and Central Asia and even for imposing criminal sanctions on immigration officials who fail to enforce standards. Mironov’s remarks reflect broader anti-migrant sentiment in Russia, where recent polling shows significant support for tighter immigration controls (A Just Russia, August 4, 2023; Levada Center, April 2025). Other Russian commentators and politicians have said much the same thing, including some who are outraged that Tajiks with two passports can move back and forth between countries to avoid paying Russian taxes or serving in the Russian army and who warn that the increasing number of Tajiks with Russian citizenship may lead them to demand the creation of a Tajik republic within the Russian Federation (Rhythm of Eurasia, December 8, 2025). 

Dushanbe’s discussion of the impact of Tajiks taking Russian citizenship shows that some in Tajikistan oppose emigration to Russia and, especially, the idea that Tajiks should change their citizenship (Sputnik Tajikistan, July 14). Most Tajiks recognize how important remittance payments are to their country’s welfare and even survival, and are thus unlikely to challenge the status quo (Window on Eurasia, April 3, 2024). The situation in the Russian Federation is more complicated, making the fate of the dual citizenship arrangement more difficult to predict. Many Russians are alarmed by the influx of Tajiks and other Central Asians and especially by the possibility that these arrivals will follow the example of Tajiks by obtaining Russian citizenship and remaining permanently in the country (Rhythm of Eurasia, June 21, 2026). Russia’s political and business elites, while concerned about such attitudes and about declines in both the population and the share of ethnic Russians within it, clearly fear roiling the waters by abandoning the 1995 agreement, and their voices will almost certainly prove decisive (Govorit NeMoskva, March 23). The political elite does not want to alienate Central Asians further or kill what it views as a precedent for a newly reintegrated Russian empire (Altyn-Orda, January 24, 2026). The business elite recognizes that it faces a difficult future without the ability to attract and retain Central Asian workers, something that the 1995 accord clearly helps it to do (Parliamentary Newspaper, April 19, 2024; Information Agency REX, August 29, 2025). The 1995 accord will therefore likely remain on the books, while the Russian authorities will do what they can bureaucratically to limit not so much the number of new Tajik immigrants as the number who choose to take Russian citizenship. 

Note:

[1] Tajikistan is the world’s most remittance-dependent country, with remittances making up approximately 50 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank Group, accessed July 23).