PLA Justice Mission 2025 Further Rehearses Taiwan Invasion Operations

PLA Justice Mission 2025 Further Rehearses Taiwan Invasion Operations

Executive Summary:

• The PLA launched another military exercise in late December 2025, with force scale and deployment locations broadly similar to previous drills.
• The exercise nonetheless signaled an effort by the Eastern Theater Command to sustain year-round readiness, likely in response to Xi Jinping’s directive to achieve the capability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.
• Compared with earlier exercises, this drill advanced invasion-related rehearsals, including scenarios involving the seizure of the Penghu Islands and parts of eastern Taiwan.
• Although China displayed a degree of restraint during this exercise, it also suggested that a future operation without such restraint could carry far more serious consequences, which would likely include significant disruption to air and maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel.

At 7:31 a.m. Taipei time on December 29, 2025, Xinhua News Agency announced that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command would conduct military exercises around Taiwan under the name Justice Mission 2025 (正义使命—2025). The announcement designated seven no-fly and no-sail zones for December 30 and stated that the exercise concluded after 6:00 p.m. on December 31 (Xinhua, December 29, 2025, [a], [b], December 31, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates the deployment of PLA naval and air forces during the exercise from December 29–30 (Liberty Times, December 29, 2025; December 30, 2025).

A contradictory feature of the exercise was the mixture of apparent restraint amid clear preparations for an invasion scenario. On the one hand, the scale and geographic scope of the exercise did not significantly escalate beyond previous exercises, nor did its activities provoke other countries. On the other, its actions revealed the PLA’s intent to strengthen the Eastern Theater Command’s ability to maintain constant combat readiness; and it involved rehearsing operations to seize the Penghu Islands and land areas of eastern Taiwan—stepping stones for a subsequent large-scale invasion of Taiwan’s main island.

Figure 1: PLA Naval and Air Force Deployments, December 29–30

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

The Exercise Largely Remained Within Previous Parameters

Justice Mission 2025 did not differ significantly from previous exercises in terms of the scale of naval and air forces involved, deployment locations, or training content. It was not the largest on record: the number of aircraft sorties and naval vessels detected on a single day was lower than observed in previous exercises (see Figure 2). For instance, a total of 130 PLA aircraft sorties were detected on December 29, which was fewer than during the Joint Sword–2024B exercise that took place in October 2024; while a total of 17 PLA naval vessels were detected on December 30—far fewer than the 27 vessels recorded during the Joint Sword–2024A exercise in May 2024. The cumulative number of detected PLA aircraft sorties reached 210, which also is lower than the total recorded during the Joint Sword exercise in 2023; while the number of detected naval vessels across the three days totaled 48, which is in line with the two-day Joint Sword–2024A exercise, which registered 46. Table 1 presents a comparison of past major military operations conducted around Taiwan.

Figure 2: PLA Aircraft Sorties and Naval Vessels Detected Around Taiwan (August 2022–December 2024)

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

Table 1: Comparison of Past PLA Major Military Operations Around Taiwan

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

The exercise was also broadly similar to previous operations in terms of force deployment. Officially, Justice Mission 2025 consisted of seven designated exercise zones. Information disclosed during a press briefing by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, however, indicated that an eighth exercise zone existed in eastern Taiwan. PLA naval vessels operating in that area temporarily announced the establishment of this zone by radio on the morning of December 29 and terminated it around noon on the same day. Figure 3 compares the exercise zones formally announced by the PLA across different periods (Xinhua, August 2, 2022, May 23, 2024; October 14, 2024; December 29, 2025; CGTN, August 7, 2022; Central News Agency, December 30, 2025).

Two features of the exercise indicate continuity with previous large-scale deployments. First, the spatial distribution of the exercise zones around Taiwan followed patterns seen in earlier drills. Although the total area of the designated zones was the largest on record, the locations themselves had all been used in past exercises. These included the northern and southern ends of the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel, and waters east of Taiwan. Second, although the exercise zones were among the closest to Taiwan’s main island on record, including extending inside the territorial sea baseline off southern Taiwan, they did not vary too much from exercise areas designated during the 2022 military activities around Taiwan and were also positioned very close to Taiwan’s territorial sea baseline.

The main training components of this exercise did not differ widely from those of previous drills. The exercise included sea–air combat readiness patrols, seizure of comprehensive superiority, blockades of key ports and areas, and three-dimensional external line deterrence and denial (海空战备警巡、夺取综合制权、要港要域封控、外线立体慑阻). The stated purpose was to test the Eastern Theater Command’s joint operational capabilities under realistic combat conditions and its ability to conduct rapid maneuvers, establish an all-domain operational posture, and execute a systemic blockade and control (Xinhua, December 29, 2025, [a] [b]). These all have been covered repeatedly in previous large-scale military activities conducted around Taiwan, according to official press releases and statements.

Figure 3: Comparison of PLA-Announced Exercise Zones Across Major Exercises

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on Xinhua and Central News Agency)

Enhanced Eastern Theater Command Readiness and Further Taiwan Invasion Rehearsals

Justice Mission 2025 did involve some new developments, even if on the surface it appeared similar to previous PLA activities around Taiwan. First, the timing was unusual. The decision to conduct a large-scale PLA exercise around Taiwan in December for the first time likely was taken to test the Eastern Theater Command’s year-end readiness. [1] December traditionally marks the end of the PLA’s training cycle and is usually less intensive. This pattern began to shift in 2025, as PLA Daily reported that many PLA units have started linking training plans across calendar years (PLA Daily, January 3, 2025). In other words, the exercise functioned as a readiness validation for the Eastern Theater Command. References to “remaining on high alert” (保持高度戒备) carry greater significance in December, which falls outside the PLA’s traditional peak training season (Xinhua, December 31, 2025). Sustaining high readiness at this time may indicate preparations to develop operational capability against Taiwan by 2027.

Second, in a step beyond previous drills in terms of invasion-related preparations, the exercise for the first time rehearsed the seizure of the Penghu Islands. This objective can be inferred from the nature of the exercises. Of two impact areas designated for live-fire strikes by PLA Army long-range rocket artillery units, official releases specified that the one off southwestern Taiwan, which is near the Penghu Islands, saw long-range joint firepower strikes conducted by the Army in coordination with the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, while those conducted off northern Taiwan involved only Army units (Xinhua, December 30, 2025, [a], [b]). [2] The focus on multi-service participation in the southwestern impact area signals that it was the primary focus and is strongly suggestive of preparatory shaping operations intended to enable a follow-on occupation of the islands. This is because large-scale, cross-service joint operations require the commitment of substantial military resources and command priority. In wartime, such resource-intensive actions would be directed only against targets of high operational value.

Seizing Penghu would offer such high operational value. Beyond degrading its island-based defenses, it would secure a critical forward staging area for operations against Taiwan proper. It would put southwestern Taiwan within range of Army aviation helicopters, which are a key PLA asset for engaging Taiwanese armored formations, including tanks and other heavy ground units.

Figure 4 compares the impact points on December 30 with the corresponding launch distances of PLA Army long-range rocket artillery brigades. The green shaded areas outlined by dashed lines illustrate the approximate firing ranges of the two rocket brigades involved. This suggests that the so-called long-range joint firepower strikes conducted in waters southwest of Taiwan were in fact simulating bombardment of the Penghu Islands. The southwestern impact area is also within range of waters off northern Taiwan, which also suggests that the 27 Army rocket artillery rounds fired on December 30 may have simulated strikes against the Penghu Islands. The decision for the Pingtan-based rocket brigade to fire northward likely reflected both political and military considerations: politically, shots near northern Taiwan generate stronger coercive signaling toward Taipei; militarily, firing toward the southwest risks being misread as an actual attack on Penghu, raising the danger of miscalculation.

The exercise also rehearsed operations to seize eastern Taiwan for the first time. This was more directly observable through the training activities of the Type 075 amphibious assault ship task force. On December 29, in waters southeast of Taiwan, PLA naval and air forces conducted drills on vessel–aircraft coordination, maritime target strikes, long-distance raids, and comprehensive support. On December 30, PLA naval forces carried out training focused on all-domain force projection, breaching and raids by elite forces, and the seizure of key ports (Xinhua, December 29, 2025, December 30, 2025). These training items emphasized the establishment of air and maritime superiority and rehearsed tri-domain landings on Taiwan’s eastern coast. The drills went beyond traditional amphibious beach assaults and included air assault operations involving helicopter-borne troops.

Type 075 amphibious assault ships operated and trained frequently east of Taiwan over the course of 2025. These activities included the hull number 33 Anhui, which transited through the Miyako Strait into the Philippine Sea in February and May, and the hull number 31 Hainan, which participated in this exercise (Japan Ministry of Defense, February 12, 2025, May 16, 2025; Liberty Times, December 30, 2025). Notably, in February 2025, a Type 075 amphibious assault ship task force also conducted training in waters southwest of Taiwan and even temporarily announced a live-fire drill (RW News, February 26, 2025).

Taiwan’s military designates eastern Taiwan as a force preservation area. This region includes two critical air bases that host F-16 Block 70 fighters, many of which are stored in hardened, blast-resistant mountain shelters. If PLA ground forces were to seize eastern Taiwan and these key military facilities, Taiwan would suffer severe losses to its remaining combat power.

Third, this exercise made a notable effort to rehearse the isolation or blockade of the Taiwan Strait. The designated exercise zones largely covered the maritime and air routes linking Kinmen and Matsu with Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan’s domestic airlines ultimately announced the cancellation of a large number of flights between Taiwan and both Kinmen and Matsu (Liberty Times, December 29, 2025). Maritime traffic, although affected, was not fully disrupted (Taiwan FactCheck Center, December 31, 2025).

Figure 4: Comparison of Impact Locations and Launch Distances of PLA Army Rocket Brigade Strikes

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

Avoiding Escalation Amid Political Tensions

The PLA’s frequent training activities involving amphibious assault ships around Taiwan this year, including rehearsals of tri-domain landings against Taiwan, likely reflect an internal assessment that the PLA possesses sufficient combat power within the first island chain and holds a high degree of confidence in its naval and air superiority. On this basis, the PLA appears to be moving toward more intensive training for amphibious operations, which are generally feasible only under conditions of air and maritime dominance, and potentially full air and sea control. This logic may parallel the significance of the dual-aircraft carrier operations conducted beyond the first island chain in June 2025, suggesting that the PLA has concluded that it has achieved a substantial degree of control in this area, including around Taiwan (China Brief, July 25, 2025).

Any restraint shown in the most recent exercise likely stemmed from political concerns, such as a comparatively less intense phase of U.S.–PRC strategic and trade competition. The PLA sought to avoid a force posture that Washington or Taipei might misread as an imminent invasion and that could trigger unintended escalation or accidents, even if it also wanted to signal dissatisfaction with deepening U.S.–Taiwan military cooperation. Amid recent tensions with Tokyo, the placement of the exercise zones at relatively far distances from Japan’s southwestern islands, as in the August 2022 and April 2023 drills, is also indicative of a desire to avoid escalation and miscalculation. This was done even at the expense of rehearsing a true blockade, which likely would include cutting off the waters between Taiwan’s Yilan and Japan’s Yonaguni Island, a narrow corridor of about 60 nautical miles and a key route for Taiwan to maintain external links during wartime, given the presence of Taiwan’s Suao naval base nearby and the fact that this is one of the closest points between Taiwan and foreign territory. It would also involve enforcing a maritime exclusion zone across all seven exercise zones, halting all commercial shipping traffic in the Taiwan Strait. In contrast, though shipping was affected, it was not halted, and there were no reports of PRC government vessels boarding and inspecting Taiwanese ships. If it wished, however, it could fully implement navigation restrictions in these zones, disrupting transit through the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel or intensifying harassment and boarding of transiting vessels from multiple countries.

Conclusion

In conducting Justice Mission 2025, Beijing signaled the seriousness with which it is preparing its capabilities for an invasion of Taiwan. The exercise constitutes a warning that the world should be more vigilant and undertake more comprehensive planning and preparation. The apparent contradiction between avoiding excessive escalation and forging ahead with rehearsals for offensive operations was likely due to overriding political considerations. It is entirely possible that the next major military exercise will not involve the same level of restraint.

Notes

[1] Previous major drills occurred in April, May, August, or October.

[2] According to Taiwan’s Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence, Lieutenant General Jih-sheng Hsieh, impact areas were located northeast of Keelung and west of Tainan. In addition, the launch locations of the PLA Army long-range rocket artillery brigades were identified through open-source geolocation analysis conducted by Joseph Wen, project lead of the open-source intelligence project at the Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative, based on Chinese official media footage. The identified sites include a northern launch location and a southwestern launch location (X/Joseph.W 約瑟, December 30, 2025, [a], [b]).