Pragmatism in the PRC’s South Asia Party Diplomacy

Pragmatism in the PRC’s South Asia Party Diplomacy

Executive Summary:

• The International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party held 33 engagements in 2025 with representatives from South Asian countries. The department pursued particular interests in each country, reaching out to institutional, incumbent, and peripheral actors.
• The greatest shift in the ILD’s South Asia strategy has been rapprochement with India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This, alongside meetings with opposition and peripheral parties, as well as media, think tanks, and youth groups, suggests that the CCP views party diplomacy not merely as a tool for building influence with smaller neighbors, as in previous years, but as a mechanism for managing major power relations.
• The institutionalized character of the department’s work is clear in the consistent rhythm of engagements, despite the removal of former minister Liu Jianchao halfway through the year.

The International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began 2026 by meeting with Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in Beijing (ILD, January 9). Subsequently, Vice Minister Sun Haiyan (孙海燕) led a CCP delegation to India from January 12–14, meeting separately with leaders of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the opposition Indian National Congress, and multiple communist parties. This constituted the most comprehensive party-level visit to India since the COVID-19 pandemic and the Galwan Valley clash, after which meetings were suspended until 2024 (ILD, January 20). The visit followed meetings in Pakistan with the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and foreign minister, and with the leaders of nine major ruling and opposition political parties in the country (ILD, January 20).

ILD-led diplomacy enables the CCP to interact with groups that the foreign ministry cannot feasibly engage with. This allows it to maintain relations with political elites in various countries despite electoral outcomes. The department’s intensive start to 2026 followed 33 high-level interactions across South Asia in 2025. The department’s recent engagements have prioritized South Asia as a whole, but the flexibility that a Party unit affords allows for the pragmatic pursuit of particular interests in different countries.

Across 2025, the department’s engagements with South Asian partners focused on advancing cooperation in specific sectors such as healthcare, smart city construction, and cadre training (ILD, January 22, 2025, October 20, 2025). This contrasted with the previous year, which centered on broad, One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative-related frameworks. Discussions on security cooperation reflected this shift, moving from broad assurances by countries against “anti-China activities” to specific commitments, as seen in meetings with officials from Afghanistan and Myanmar (RUSI, February 12, 2025). Other recurring themes included opportunities for collaboration that align with the forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) (Xinhua, October 28, 2025).

A Multi-Tiered Engagement Strategy

Rapprochement with India’s BJP

The transformation of ILD engagement with India represents the most significant shift of 2025. Seven engagements included meetings with the incumbent foreign secretary and minister of external affairs, India’s ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a Vivekananda International Foundation think tank, and a meeting with an unnamed delegation (ILD, January 14, 2025, January 27, 2025, July 14, 2025, August 16, 2025, November 18, 2025, November 20, 2025).

The meeting with External Affairs Minister Jaishankar marked a re-engagement with the BJP after the deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020 damaged relations. At a July meeting, then-minister Liu Jianchao (刘建超) expressed the CCP’s willingness to strengthen exchanges with the BJP. The readout emphasized that the PRC “and India pose no threat but offer development opportunities to each other, and are cooperation partners, not competitors” (ILD, July 14, 2025). This rapprochement is in line with wider India–PRC engagement since the October 2024 Modi–Xi meeting at which the two leaders agreed to strengthen communication (MFA, October 24, 2024).

This shift, from engaging peripheral political players to meeting with the opposition Congress party and broaching rapprochement with the BJP, indicates a willingness on both sides to restart and deepen direct political communication. It also suggests that the CCP now views party diplomacy not merely as a tool for building influence with smaller neighbors, as in previous years, but as a mechanism for managing major power relations.

The ILD’s prominent role in managing relations with India is an important development. During the CCP delegation to India in January 2026, the department also held discussions with Indian think tanks, media, social organizations, and youth (ILD, January 15). The substance of these meetings focused on “establishing a correct understanding to promote China–India friendship” (树立正确认知促进中印友好) (ILD, January 15). For the CCP, this refers to presenting itself as a partner rather than a rival. Alongside recent ILD meetings with U.S. student delegations, this behavior suggests that the department appears to have an expanded mandate for interactions with major powers, shaping perceptions among influential groups (China Brief, February 17).

ILD Hedging During Transition in Bangladesh

The ILD conducted six engagements in Bangladesh in 2025. It met with politicians from various parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), independents such as Interim Government Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain, the Bangladeshi ambassador to the PRC, and delegations from the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami Party and National Citizen Party (ILD, January 8, 2025, January 22, 2025, February 28, 2025, June 24, 2025, July 15, 2025). With uncertainty in the run-up to elections in February 2026, engaging the interim government, major opposition parties, Islamic parties, and emerging political forces positioned the PRC to maintain influence regardless of the referendum’s outcome. Meeting with the National Citizen Party was particularly notable, given its emergence from the student movement that precipitated the country’s political transition in late 2024, and demonstrates the CCP’s agility in engaging new actors.

Maintaining a Comprehensive Network in Nepal

The ILD maintained robust relations with partners in neighboring Nepal in 2025, participating in five dedicated engagements with representatives from across its fragmented political landscape, such as the Nepali Congress, various communist factions, and emerging parties (ILD, January 10, 2025, March 4, 2025, June 16, 2025, July 10, 2025, September 9, 2025). Liu Jianchao’s meeting with former President Bidya Devi Bhandari demonstrated a desire to engage across political generations and party lines, despite Nepal’s general election on March 5, following the country’s 2025 “Gen Z protests” (ILD, May 26, 2025).

Sustained Strategic Partnership with Pakistan

The ILD’s five engagements with Pakistan demonstrated that the country remains an important diplomatic partner. Liu Jianchao’s May meeting with Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) leader and foreign minister came shortly after the brief India–Pakistan conflict earlier that month (ILD, May 20, 2025). Later in the year, ILD Minister Liu Haixing (刘海星) met the Pakistani Ambassador (ILD, November 12, 2025). Vice Minister Sun, meanwhile, met with a multi-party Pakistani delegation in December (ILD, December 8, 2025).

A key meeting was Sun’s reception of a delegation from Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which is critical to advancing the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (China Brief, October 20, 2023, ILD, May 26, 2025). Progress has largely stalled in recent years as Chinese investment sites have become targets of terrorist attacks. The meeting’s readout stated the PRC’s hope that Pakistan “will take more effective measures to actively create a safe environment for bilateral cooperation” (ILD, May 26, 2025; Terrorism Monitor, October 7, 2025).

Other Engagements: Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Myanmar

The ILD conducted three ministerial-level meetings with Sri Lankan officials in 2025, strengthening cooperation in a range of areas (ILD, February 13, 2025, June 17, 2025, October 20, 2025). Two meetings in Afghanistan covered investment, poverty alleviation, and PRC security concerns around combating the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ILD, May 23, 2025, November 3, 2025). Discussions with Burmese leaders similarly covered economic investment and the security of Chinese assets (ILD, June 23, 2025).

Conclusion

The ILD’s party diplomacy in South Asia throughout 2025 demonstrates institutional continuity alongside strategic innovation. The department’s 33 engagements—averaging nearly three per month—were evenly spaced across the year, and do not appear to have been disrupted by the removal of Liu Jianchao.

The India breakthrough, from one marginal party engagement in 2024 to seven comprehensive engagements in 2025, represents momentum that could play an important role in managing bilateral relations between the two countries during a period of renewed engagement. Combined with multi-party hedging in Bangladesh, comprehensive party network building in Nepal, sustained Pakistan engagement, and efficient multilateral mechanisms, 2025 reveals the PRC’s party diplomacy as an important aspect of its South Asian strategy. This momentum has already continued into 2026, suggesting party-level relationships will increasingly shape state-level outcomes across the region.

Appendix: ILD Engagements with South Asia, 2025

Source: Compiled by author