Belarus Looking to Normalize Relations with the United States

Executive Summary:

• Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka welcomed U.S. Special Envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, to Minsk on June 21 in the highest-level meeting between U.S. and Belarusian officials since February 2020.
• The talks resulted in a goodwill gesture from Minsk with the release of fourteen political prisoners, including former presidential hopeful Siarhei Tsikhanouski.
• The meeting symbolizes a broader effort by Minsk to re-establish normal relations with Washington and demonstrate Belarus’s role and place in regional security.

On June 21, a U.S. delegation led by General Keith Kellogg, Assistant to U.S. President Donald Trump and Special Envoy for Ukraine, paid an official visit to Minsk for talks with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (President of Belarus, June 21). The event marked the highest-level visit to Belarus by a U.S. official since February 2020, when then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in Minsk (President of Belarus, February 1, 2020; see EDM, February 11, 2020). Kellogg’s visit shed some public light on the behind-the-scenes contacts that have taken place between the two countries in recent months. The meeting, however, highlighted some fundamental challenges that Belarus and the United States would need to overcome for a breakthrough in normalizing their relations.

The first public signs that Minsk and Washington might be looking for ways to de-escalate bilateral tensions appeared in late January with the release of political prisoners (see EDM, January 29, February 20). According to several Western diplomats, however, some officials in the outgoing Joe Biden administration began to suggest a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Belarus as early as late 2024 (Author’s interviews with a former U.S. official in Washington, February 26; Author’s interviews with a European diplomat in Minsk, May 7). The policy as it stood amounted to isolating Belarus by means of reducing diplomatic ties with Minsk and exerting maximum political pressure and harsh economic sanctions on it.

With that pressure, the United States and other Western countries likely aimed to change the Lukashenka government’s behavior in both domestic affairs and foreign policy. According to official statements, the expansion of U.S. sanctions on Belarus was meant to force Minsk to liberalize the political climate inside the country, free numerous individuals that the West categorizes as political prisoners, and also distance itself from Russia amid Moscow’s war against Ukraine (U.S. State Department, April 19, August 9, 2021 March 24, 2023; U.S. Department of Commerce, March 2, 2022). On all those accounts, according to the United States’s own assessments, no improvements took place despite the ever-expanding sanctions and diplomatic pressure (U.S. State Department, November 20, 2024, accessed July 19). 

Recently, Minsk has been responding differently to the United States compared to previous years. This change is most notable in releasing individuals qualified by Western governments as political prisoners at the request of the United States. In the early days of the second Trump administration, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Belarus released a dual Belarusian-American citizen, Anastasia Nuhfer, from prison (see EDM, January 29). In February, three more individuals, including a U.S. citizen, were freed and handed over to U.S. diplomats who visited Minsk for confidential talks with Lukashenka (see EDM, February 20). At the time, The New York Times reported that Washington offered a “possible grand bargain” to Minsk, which could involve the release of “a slew of political prisoners” in exchange for sanctions relief on Belarusian banks and potash industry (The New York Times, February 15). In late April, yet another group of U.S. officials held confidential talks with Lukashenka, resulting in the release from prison of another dual American-Belarusian citizen, Yury Ziankovich (SmartPress, May 1; Politico, July 20).

This series of behind-closed-doors meetings appears to have helped establish at least a minimal level of trust between Minsk and Washington ahead of the Lukashenka-Kellogg meeting on June 21. Kellogg’s visit was big news in itself, but the Belarusian president’s decision to pardon 14 more prisoners following the meeting made it even bigger news. Among them were ten foreign nationals and Siarhei Tsikhanouski, the husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the Belarusian opposition in exile (CTV; TASS, June 21).

According to Belarusian officials, the Lukashenka-Kellogg talks covered a wide range of topics, including Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, Belarus’s role in Eastern European security, the conflicts in the Middle East, and Belarus-U.S. bilateral relations (YouTube/@BelTA, June 22; BelTA, June 22). Valentin Rybakov, Belarus’s ambassador to the United Nations, claims that the Trump administration understands the role and place of Belarus in regional security, which is an important pillar of the evolving dialogue between the countries (BelTA, June 22). Based on this understanding and Minsk’s own interest in de-escalating tensions with the West in general and the United States in particular, the sides are discussing possibilities for a full normalization of diplomatic relations. This includes the resumption of full operations by their respective embassies, the exchange of high-level visits, and the lifting of sanctions against Belarus (BelTA, June 22).

The extent to which the Lukashenka-Kellogg meeting managed to advance this normalization discussion, and whether a “grand bargain” between Minsk and Washington is truly in the making, remains unclear for now. The talks clearly contributed to improving the diplomatic dynamic and demonstrated the benefits of constructive engagement. They seem to have emphasized, however, the multiple challenges that the sides need to overcome to make significant progress in repairing their ties.

Key among these challenges is the lack of mutual trust on both sides. Without it, Minsk has come to believe that concessions and goodwill gestures, which they are prepared to make in principle toward the United States, will hardly lead to reciprocal positive moves on the part of the United States (Author’s interview with a Belarusian official, June 30). Instead, Belarusian officials are convinced that such steps will be interpreted as weakness, not goodwill, and will therefore result in further sanctions. Kellogg’s visit to Minsk appears to have done little to dispel this belief. In its immediate aftermath, many voices in Western capitals and the Belarusian opposition, including freshly released Siarhei Tsikhanouski, called for tougher sanctions against Minsk (Obzor, July 2; Pozirk, July 10).

While both Minsk and Washington appear to agree that they would benefit from improved relations, the process of starting and structuring a normalization process is much less certain. A strategic vision of a realistic long-term model of bilateral relations and a feasible roadmap to normal relations are also missing. Without adequately addressing all these challenges, Belarus and the United States will likely struggle to convert numerous meetings into a sustainable and meaningful rapprochement.