Belarusian Prisoner Releases Hold Potential to Facilitate Belarus-West Relations

Executive Summary:

• Since early July, at least 115 political prisoners have been released from Belarusian prisons, raising important questions about the reasons for such decisions and how they might pave the way for a potential reopening of Belarus’s relations with the West.
• The Belarusian opposition calls for more restrictive measures against Minsk following these releases and argues that only maximum economic and diplomatic pressure will facilitate the freeing of remaining prisoners.
• There is little evidence that harsh economic sanctions lead to the release of political prisoners, and if the West chooses this course instead of diplomatic engagement, it appears unlikely that much progress will be made in Belarusian-Western relations.

Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka signed a decree pardoning 37 people in prison on September 16, the eve of the recently established National Unity Day (President.gov.by, September 16). Belarusian officials explained the move as “another humane gesture on the part of the state” toward those “who had made a mistake” and stressed that they had all filed petitions for pardon. Since early July, at least 115 people whom Western governments classify as political prisoners have been released from Belarusian prisons. This noteworthy development raises important questions about the reasons for such decisions and their prospects to pave the way for an opening in Belarusian relations with the West. Western policymakers must consider how Minsk will look at the specifics of future Western sanctions and attempts to diplomatically engage with the country before they act on any such developments.

The United States and EU members have highlighted the issue of political prisoners as a central problem in their relations with the Lukashenka government since the crackdown against Belarusian protesters in late 2020. Additionally, Western policymakers have cited the issue of political prisoners as one of their main justifications for introducing multiple sanctions packages against Belarus (Consilium.europa.eu, October 2, 2020; US State Department, June 21, 2021). At the time of writing, the European Union considers over 1,300 Belarusian inmates as having been convicted on political grounds (EUneighbourseast.eu, September 19). Washington’s estimates are similar (US Embassy to Belarus, July 11). Minsk, for its part, insists that the country has no political prisoners and that all the individuals in question were sentenced for extremist activities (President.gov.by, September 10).

In early July, mid-August, and mid-September of this year, Lukashenka made three separate decisions to pardon prisoners. This series of prisoner releases has attracted significant attention in Belarus and the West, as Minsk has not taken such steps in the last four years. Much speculation followed about what exactly prompted the releases. Leaders of the Belarusian opposition in exile, who have long lobbied for harsh economic sanctions against the country, continue to make the case that Lukashenka greenlit the pardons under the burden of the Western sanctions (IPG, September 2). Building on this premise, they now call for even more restrictive measures against Minsk following the releases, arguing that only maximum economic and diplomatic pressure will facilitate the freeing of all remaining political prisoners.

There is no evidence to support the claim that harsh economic sanctions lead to the release of political prisoners in the Belarusian context.The European Union alone has already introduced at least nine sanctions packages against Belarus since late 2020 (Minskdialogue.by, July 23). Additionally, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—the three EU member states that border Belarus—have adopted a series of individual restrictions that exceed the requirements of the EU-level sanctions. In effect, these countries’ efforts have amounted to a logistical semi-blockade of Belarus (see EDM, March 14). If all previous sanctions failed to facilitate prisoner releases as well as other political concessions sought by the West, it appears exceedingly unlikely that the ninth EU package will succeed.

This latest package established on June 29 mirrors some of the restrictive measures already in place against Russia (Consilium.europa.eu, June 29). Several segments of the Belarusian economy have undoubtedly suffered, but it should be noted that the earlier restrictive measures were far more damaging and nevertheless failed to alter Minsk’s policy or behavior. In sum, these restrictions only incentivized Belarus to reorient its economy away from the West (see EDM, August 7). Considering a counterfactual, if the Belarusian government was particularly concerned about the effects of this latest package, it would have been logical for Minsk to take preventive measures. In that case, Minsk would have begun to release prisoners before its adoption. This was not the case—almost eleven months separated the eighth and ninth sanctions packages  (Consilium.europa.eu, August 3, 2023).

The June 29 package aims to “address the issue of circumvention stemming from the high degree of integration existing between the Russian and Belarusian economies” (Consilium.europa.eu, June 29). Hence, according to their own wording, the additional sanctions are not even directly aimed at changing the domestic situation in Belarus. It would not be logical on the part of Minsk, therefore, to assume that releasing political prisoners would hypothetically forestall or lift this round of sanctions.

There appears to be no direct causal link between the latest sanctions and Minsk’s decision to start releasing individuals identified by the West as political prisoners. Similar developments have already taken place in Belarus: for instance, the release of political prisoners in 2008–2009 and 2014–2015 (see EDM, February 25, 2008; September 4, 2015). Based on that previous experience, some broader calculations likely stand behind the most recent releases. In that context, the intricacies of Belarus’s geopolitical position and its implications for the domestic political scene appear to result in decisions that demonstrate  recurring patterns.

In the past, the Lukashenka government took similar steps in the run-up to presidential elections in order to ease tensions with the West and deprive domestic political opponents of the “political prisoner” argument. Besides preparing for an upcoming presidential campaign, such moves also signaled Minsk’s willingness to diversify its foreign diplomatic and economic relations. Today’s situation is difficult to compare to past Belarusian pre-election cycles, as the events of 2020, the war in Ukraine, and the semi-blockade of Belarus have fundamentally changed the realities on the ground and made a return to usual political cycles impossible. Nonetheless, the same rationale seems to be driving the decision-making in Minsk.

Whether these developments can lead to an opening in Belarus-West relations remains to be seen. Minsk appears interested in exploring the possibility of this opening. It will continue, however, to stick to its long-accentuated position of no unilateral concessions toward the West. As a senior Belarusian government official, who requested to remain anonymous, stated: “We do not know what other signals Western diplomats expect from us. We have long been ready to start a dialogue, but only if it is a mutually respectful one, without any preconditions” (Author’s interview, September 19). Some Western officials also indicate interest in looking into prospects to start de-escalating tensions with Belarus (Author’s interviews, September 6, 12). They reiterated, however, that they had no trust in Minsk and, thus, demanded that the Belarusian government provide additional gestures of goodwill.

Given the unprecedented magnitude of the crisis in Belarus-West relations, both sides must manage their expectations. Arguably, no major breakthroughs are possible as long as the fighting in Ukraine continues. Yet, it seems realistic for Minsk and interested Western capitals to at least explore de-escalation options in bilateral relations and ways of cautiously building on the initial prisoner releases in Belarus. However, even such modest prospects will quickly dissipate if, instead of diplomatic engagement, the West chooses to buy the argument that sanctions help to free prisoners.