For Profit Jihad: An In-Depth Profile of AQIM’s Abou Zeid

For Profit Jihad: An In-Depth Profile of AQIM’s Abou Zeid

One of the key figures in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda’s North African franchise, is Abou Zeid. Though there is no agreement on his precise given name, it has recently emerged that his real name is likely Mohadem Ghadir, which surfaced among certain Algerian judiciary sources (Echorouk, Jan 21, 2011). For many years Abou Zeid was known as Adib Hammadou. On the United Nations webpage outlining sanctions against AQIM, he is still referred to as such. [1] Abou Zeid’s birth date, like his real name, is also unclear. He was born sometime between 1957 and 1958, in the area of Azouz Toureg, in Algeria’s desertified eastern region of DebDeb, in the wylaya (province) of Illizi, near the juncture of the Tunisian, Libyan and Algerian borders. Several nomadic families settled near this triple border region and from one of these, the Mabrouk Ghadir – part of the large Sulaymi Arab tribe of Chaamba, hailed Abou Zeid’s family. This physical environment in which he was raised had a strong impact both on his personality and the choices he would make later in life. Abou Zeid never attended a modern school. He briefly attended a local madrassa where he studied rudimentary Arabic and the Quran but soon abandoned even that. During his teenage years he worked with his father in the desert tending to their family’s camels and rams. [2] In the late 1970s, Abou Zeid became involved in existing local smuggling networks that crisscrossed the Sahara. 

Four factors help explain why he evolved from shepherd to smuggler:

• The scarcity of legitimate job opportunities for young men in Algeria during the period in question;
• His intimate knowledge of the local desert environment and pistes;
• The ease of porous borders – Ghadamès, Libya is approximately 12 miles from the Algerian border; and
• A strong desire to earn a better living. 

He started smuggling bulk quantities of tea and electronics from Libya into Algeria where he then sold those products on the black market in the town of al-Oueda. He was initially wary of smuggling items prohibited by Islamic strictures such as cigarettes. In his daily work as a smuggler, he regularly encountered the Algerian gendarmerie on patrol. He was arrested for the first time in 1984. His subsequent encounters with the gendarmerie fostered a strong enmity toward local authorities enforcing the writ of Algiers in the territory he traversed. This early arrest and future arrests were key moments in Abou Zeid’s radicalization. As his views towards security forces hardened, he began a progression that transformed him from a petty smuggler to radical Islamist militant. [3] 

A mixture of hatred toward the Algerian state and his father’s death in 1989 pushed a disaffected Abou Zeid further toward radical Islamist ideology. He joined the ranks of the Fronté Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front-FIS) in the late 1980s. He soon became one of the main FIS members of his local community, running several rallies in the area of DebDeb. He climbed the ladder within the FIS before he then joined the Groupe Islamique Armé (The Armed Islamic Group-GIA). In the 1990s, he was very close to Kamareddine Kherbane, the GIA’s external relations delegate at the time. He also became one of the main collaborators of Amir Belabdi Derradji and enjoyed good relations with Adrerrezak el Parà. In this milieu Abou Zeid was one of the core militants involved in the creation of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat-GSPC) in the late 1990s. He accompanied El Parà during the spectacular kidnapping of 32 European tourists in 2003. He then became the head of operations in Zone 5, encompassing the areas of Tébessa, Khenchela, and Batna. Since then he has played a major role in the area (El Watan, Oct 1, 2010). 

Rising to the Top: Abou Zeid and AQIM 

The GSPC was re-branded between 2006-2007 and declared itself the local franchise of al-Qaeda after pledging bayat (an oath) to the late Osama bin Laden. The operational links with al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan were rather loose and AQIM enjoyed substantial organizational autonomy. [4] As mentioned earlier, Abou Zeid operates mainly in the Sahelian strip, leading the brigade operating in the east of this area. [5] He is the head of the “Tariq ibn Ziyad” brigade, named after the Berber general known in Spanish texts as “Taric el Tuerto” (Taric the one-eyed), who led the conquest of the Visogothic Spain in the early eighth century.  

This strong symbolic meaning is aimed at recalling the epic deeds of the Islamic empire at the peak of its expansion, when much of the Iberian Peninsula was part of “Dar al-Islam.” Using such historical terminology is a way of framing the movement in the Salafi-jihadi ideological box. [6] When observed closely in a more empirically oriented analysis, operationally AQIM demonstrated a strong proclivity to act as a normal illegal business organization rather than as an ideologically driven jihadi group. In the past few months there has been a revival of more traditional terrorist attacks in northern Algeria (see Terrorism Monitor, September 22, 2011). The operational trends seem to indicate a different reality. In this context, Abou Zeid played a rather key role as he is one of the main men responsible for the change in the movement’s brand name from GSPC to AQIM, as well as the north to south shift that occurred in terms of geographical priorities. 

Five years ago Algeria was the core focus of AQIM’s wrath with the Sahel. During that period waging jihad against Algiers was AQIM’s key strategic aim. Today the situation is starkly different. The broader Sahel region that spans across Niger, Mali, Algeria and Libya is now the key operational theatre of AQIM. The most important activity of AQIM is no longer attacking government targets—though they still carry out such acts—but rather smuggling weapons and illegal goods of various kinds along with kidnapping Europeans. The latter is a way to achieve a financial goal while simultaneously pursuing a jihadi aim. Kidnapping infidels is consistent with the jihadi ideology.  Savvy AQIM militants roaming the Sahel are all too well aware that Europeans governments—unofficially—are more willing than anyone else to pay ransoms for their kidnapped nationals.  

Abou Zeid has been accused of involvement in the abduction of more than 20 European hostages in the Sahel countries since 2008, many of them ransomed for millions of Euros. He also ordered or carried out the executions of Edwin Dyers, a British hostage, in 2009 (Algeria 360, June 4, 2010) and Michel Germaneau, a French hostage in July 2010 (Afrik, July 26, 2010, L’Expression, July 25, 2010).  Moreover, he was also the accused of kidnapping seven workers of the French uranium mining consortium, Areva, in Niger (Radio France Internationale, September 21, 2011). Three of the workers were released after a few months, while the other four are still believed to be held by AQIM (Reuters, October 4, 2011). 

AQIM’s Operational Evolution and Abou Zeid’s Personality: Is There a Connection?

In light of his rise through the FIS to the GIA to the GSPC to today’s AQIM, Abou Zeid has a long history of personal involvement in the radical Islamism that has bled Algeria for decades. He joined the FIS in the late 1980s and since then he has been a key figure of the “Southerners”—those jihadis originally from southern Algeria and whose theatre of action was the wider Sahelian area. After dealing with the Algerian gendarmerie patrols he found the rhetoric of radical of the 1990s an apt means of expressing his resentment and rage against the central government whom he viewed as perpetrators of oppression. 

Abou Zeid’s rise to the upper echelon of Algerian Islamism occurred at a slow pace. Although he has held several important roles in these organizations, he became one of the very top players only in the past six to seven years. Given his long standing relations with AQIM’s overall amir Abdelmalek Droukdel – Zeid was one of his main allies during the 1990s – the increasing role played by Zeid in the Sahelian and Saharan dimension was considered also a move supported by Droukdel to counter-balance the autonomy and the independence of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM’s other major leader in southern Algeria. Abou Zeid and Belmokthar are by far the most important AQIM personalities in the Sahel region. But the two men have contrasting personal and historical backgrounds. Their relations are rather complex, to not say controversial: while Abou Zeid was a smuggler that then turned jihadi, Belmokthar had the credentials of an international jihadi fighter from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. 

Although he never completed a proper religious education, Abou Zeid has always tried to live according to his interpretation of Islamic doctrine. It is for this reason that he was hesitant to engage in smuggling that could be seen as contradicting his Islamic principles. Given the type and volume of goods that AQIM is believed to move through the Sahel, it seems that for purely pragmatic reasons Abou Zeid overcame his more idealistic beliefs. The necessity of finding reliable, constant sources of income to finance AQIM’s exploits coupled with his strong desire for obtaining wealth may help to explain as to why he is currently engaged in this rather un-Islamic business. Trumping his illicit smuggling, the Abou Zeid of today appears to be more focused on AQIM’s lucrative kidnapping enterprise. He is considered the main figure responsible for the recent wave of kidnappings of Westerners afflicting the Sahel. Moreover, his knowledge of the human terrain in this region—his being able to factor in local and tribal loyalties and support networks—and his reserved, severe nature, makes him the perfect brand ambassador of Algeria’s present Islamist incarnation in the form of AQIM.

Conclusion 

The operational profile of AQIM that has emerged over the past few years is consistent with Abou Zeid’s background, personality and modus operandi. It is therefore extremely realist and results-oriented tinged with a ruthless bent, evidenced by the dramatic execution of foreign hostages. Proper “minor jihad” against the near and the far enemies remains the most important rhetorical aim of the group. More concretely, it seems to be one of several goals among others and not the central and sole goal of the group. The emergence at the top of the group of a figure like Abou Zeid who does not have a proper “global jihad” credential like Belmokhtar– whose Islamic beliefs were built during his daily life in the desert rather than rooted in a more formal Islamic education – and was originally a simply tea and electronics smuggler, could help to explain the increasing importance that these activities acquired for AQIM. Moreover, his desire for accumulating personal wealth could explain why he began engaging himself in haram (non-permissible in Islam) traffic. The picture of Abou Zeid is then that of a brutal, committed and resilient militant whose jihadi credentials were not quite as strong as those of many other Algerian jihadi fighters. It was his notion of the group’s raison d’être combined with his demonstrable leadership capabilities that elevated him to play a leading role in AQIM despite his shortcomings in terms of jihadi credentials. These traits held by Abou Zeid have contributed to the main operational transformations that have taken place within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in recent years. 

Notes

1. https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.shtml.

2. Mohamed Mokaddem, Al Qaida Au Maghreb Islamique. Contrebande au nom de l’Islam, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), pp. 9-15.

3. Ibid, pp.16-24.

4. Geoff Porter, “The Impact of Bin Laden’s Death on AQIM in North Africa,” CTC Sentinel, May 1, 2011.

5. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Policy Paper Number 15,  May 2011.

6. Mathieu Guidere, “The Tribal Allegiance System Within AQIM,” CTC Sentinel, February 1, 2011.