Growing ISKP Threat Pushes Russia Closer to Taliban

Executive Summary:

• In Russia, the growing threat of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISKP) has pushed the Kremlin to expand ties with the Afghan Taliban and consider delisting the jihadist organization as a designated terrorist group.
• ISKP views Russia as a top-tier target due to, among other grievances, the legacy of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chechen wars, and the 2015 military intervention in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad’s forces.
• Russian officials have applauded Kabul’s support for aiding in Moscow’s counterterrorism efforts, with President Vladimir Putin declaring the Taliban Russia’s “ally” in the fight against regional terrorism

The Russian Federation and the Afghan Taliban have a long history of diplomatic relations. Official contacts were contentious from the founding of the First Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in the 1990s. In 2003, Moscow officially listed the Taliban as a terrorist organization after its leaders publicly supported independence in Chechnya (Meduza, August 17, 2021, May 27). Even so, Russian officials still maintained some contact with Taliban leaders. Relations have been notably more cordial in the years leading up to and since the jihadist organization took back and consolidated control over Afghanistan in August 2021. The mass casualty terrorist attack perpetrated by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on March 22 at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, which killed at least 145 people and injured more than 500 others, has spurred the Kremlin to drastically increase its cooperation with the Taliban and consider officially delisting the group as a terrorist organization (see EDM, March 26, 28; see Terrorism Monitor, May 6; TASS, July 19). Moscow has long warned about the threat ISKP militant networks positioned in northern Afghanistan pose to Russia and Central Asia and is now looking to increasingly work with Kabul to create a buffer to hinder the group’s operational expansion and infiltration into Russian territory.

The Moscow attack was not a one-off occurrence, as ISKP views Russia as a top-tier target and leading enemy on par with the United States and Iran (The Diplomat, March 27). When former Islamic State Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the founding of the Caliphate in 2014, he stated that the “camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies” are “all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews” (see Terrorism Monitor, January 14, 2022). In September 2022, an ISKP suicide bomber detonated himself at Russia’s embassy in Kabul, killing two staff members. This marked the beginning of Khorasan Province’s militant campaign against Russia, which paired well with the group’s anti-Moscow propaganda campaign of criticisms, threats, and calls upon its followers to carry out attacks inside the country. ISKP’s grievances against Russia include the legacy of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chechen wars, the 2015 military intervention in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad’s forces, Moscow’s expanded use of private military companies and military activities across Africa, and the Kremlin’s growing relations with the Taliban (Militant Wire, April 30). Along with external operations, ISKP also recently formed a Russian language arm, in addition to Tajik and Uzbek wings, of the group’s media outlet, al-Azaim, to bolster its intensifying propaganda campaign and inspire supporters to commit violent attacks against Russians (Eurasianet, March 29).

Following through on this hostile intent, ISKP has worked to build up its external operational capabilities and expand its network reach to take the fight to Russian soil (Eurasianet, January 10). A little over two weeks prior to the Crocus City Hall attack, on March 7, Russian state media announced a raid on an ISKP cell in the city of Kaluga, which is situated southwest of Moscow. Two Kazakh nationals were killed and were reportedly plotting to attack a synagogue in Moscow (The Moscow Times, March 7). After the operation, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) made the poorly-aged claim that it had put an end to all Khorasan Province activities inside Russia (TASS, March 7; Barrons, March 9). Furthermore, a report released in late June detailed how Turkish intelligence, while interrogating the ISKP militants who carried out the January 28 shooting at Istanbul’s Santa Maria Church, were told of a subsequent plot to attack a busy shopping mall in the heart of Moscow and assisted Russia in preventing it (Hurriyet, June 18).

ISKP frequently criticizes Russia-Taliban relations, and the attacks are intended in part to undermine them. Yet, these attacks have made Moscow’s ties with Kabul stronger out of necessity (The Diplomat, September 9, 2022). The words of top Russian political leadership and high-ranking diplomats confirm this. In May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared the Taliban as the “real power” in Afghanistan. He also asserted that the potential removal of the group from Moscow’s list of designated terrorist organizations reflects “objective reality” (TOLOnews, May 28). Earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin declared the Afghan Taliban Russia’s “ally” in his country’s fight against terrorism (NDTV, July 4).

In early June, Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, said that Moscow is open to conditionally supporting the Taliban’s admission into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). He also mentioned that Moscow welcomes greater cooperation between the SCO and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization on the grounds that the Taliban holds the “same attitude toward the fight against both international terrorism and drug crime” (Anadolu, June 4). The Taliban can gain international legitimacy through its coordination with Russia and greater integration into said organizations while potentially being provided more resources and assistance for counterterrorism and anti-narcotics operations. This could include more intelligence sharing, funding, weapons, training, advising, and other assistance (TASS, July 20). The ISKP threat to Russia is mounting, and the Taliban is struggling to contain ISKP while desperately seeking international recognition and foreign investment. As a result, Moscow and Kabul are likely to continue enhancing existing forms of cooperation and expand the range of their security partnership.