Igor Strelkov-Girkin: The Rise and Fall of the Former Donetsk Minister of Defense
Igor Strelkov-Girkin: The Rise and Fall of the Former Donetsk Minister of Defense
Introduction
On June 25, the former Minister of Defense of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) Igor Strelkov-Girkin (born December, 17 1970) admitted that “instead of bringing freedom to Donbass, I brought destruction and a six-years` war. Yet, I have no regrets about my actions” (Pr.kg, June 25). He added that instead of becoming a representative of the Russian world, the DPR and the Luhansk People`s Republic (LPR) have been turned into a “trash bin” (Rosbalt.ru, July 5). Strelkov-Girkin has been accused by the Ukrainian government of war crimes and is allegedly co-responsible for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 on July 17, 2014 (Gp.gov.ua, June 16; Unian.net, July 3). This article seeks to examine the profile of Strelkov-Girkin and his evolution from a man who actively participated in the annexation of Crimea to de facto starting the bloody conflict in southeastern Ukraine.
Early Career: From Bosnia to Crimea
A historian by training, Strelkov-Girkin developed a passion for the White movement and pre-1917 Imperial Russia—its ideology, political model and mode of governance—through participation in various historical reenactments since 1989 in Russia and Ukraine (Russdom.ru, July 2014). Monarchist sentiments and imperial nationalism motivated Strelkov-Girkin to travel to Bosnia, where he fought on the Serbian side with the 2nd Regiment of the Black Sea Cossacks Host (Aif.ru, June 4). Later, between November 1992 and March 1993, he fought in Višegrad and Priboj in the Bosnian Serb Army, where, according to some local sources, he participated in war crimes (Klix.ba, July 25, 2014; Lib.ru, accessed July 5).
Upon completion of his mission in the Balkans and following his return to Russia, Strelkov-Girkin was spotted and recruited by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). Between 1998 and 2005, he served in Dagestan and Chechnya (Echo.msk.ru, May 21, 2014). According to some sources, including an anonymous member of the FSB, as a part of his service, Strelkov-Girkin monitored developments in Ukraine. Allegedly, this assignment had a dramatic impact on his vision of that country, since he “[W]ould constantly speak of the Banderaites permeating Moscow […] Ukrainian libraries and other agencies [in Russia]” (Nvo.ng.ru, December 19, 2014). [1]
After retiring from the FSB in 2013 with the rank of colonel, he was employed as the head of security of the Marshall-Kapital Foundation, which belonged to Konstantin ‘the Orthodox oligarch’ Malofeev. The same foundation kept Alexander Borodai, the would-be prime minister of the DPR, on its payroll (Vedomosti.ru, May 16, 2014). Employed by Malofeev, Strelkov-Girkin was given a task of paramount importance: under the pretext of ensuring the secure transportation of the Gift of the Magi relic to Crimea and Kyiv in early January 2014, he performed a reconnaissance mission, collecting valuable intelligence that would be used during the annexation of Crimea between February and March 2014 (see War by Other Means, September 3, 2019). Strelkov-Girkin was on the peninsula during the annexation, from where he would travel to Donbass to stir instability and pursue the realization of the Novorossiya geopolitical project. [2]
Donbass: The Rise and Fall of Strelkov-Girkin
On April 11-12, 2014, Strelkov-Girkin, accompanied by 52 militants, entered the eastern Ukrainian city of Sloviansk and captured administrative buildings there (Vesti.ua, April 12, 2014). Following the “referendum” on “self-determination of the DPR” on May 12, he assumed the role of the DPR’s defense minister and the head of its Security Council. At this juncture, two details are noteworthy. First, despite the claims to the contrary actively disseminated by Russian disinformation outlets, Strelkov-Girkin issued a video statement on May 7 accusing locals of cowardice, claiming that only external help from Russia was keeping the DPR afloat (Korrespondent.net, May 17, 2014). Secondly, unlike other non-state actors—such as the Wagner Group—Strelkov-Girkin, whose criminal role should not be downplayed, attempted to maintain some semblance of discipline. He sometimes punished his own accomplices/subordinates, including with the death penalty, for “pillage and indecent behavior” (YouTube, May 18).
The Ukrainian chapter of Strelkov-Girkin`s career did not last long. On July 5, his forces abandoned Sloviansk for Kramatorsk in order to later move to Donetsk (Ria.ru, July 5, 2014). This was condemned by many Russian conservative nationalists, who called it treasonous. Strelkov-Girkin explained this move by citing a lack of resources and the clear unwillingness of Moscow to provide necessary help (Lenta.ru, November 13, 2014). On August 14, Strelkov-Girkin stepped down from his position and temporarily went to Moscow, never to return to Donetsk. From a military-strategic point of view, his resignation became an important milestone in the Ukrainian conflict, signifying a strengthening of Kremlin control that was reflected in two ways.
First, the semi-professional voluntary formations that played an important role in April-July 2014 in both the DPR and LPR were replaced by paramilitary forces with army-type command and control (C2) structures. These new forces were staffed and led by military professionals, including from the Wagner Group, and regular Russian armed forces deployed on the Ukrainian national border.
Second, a trend emerged in which the first batch of DPR/LPR leaders were replaced (frequently accompanied by physical elimination) with docile Kremlin-appointed figures (Informnapalm.org, January 10, 2015). In effect, over the course of six months, five of the most prominent militant leaders (in the LPR and DPR) were assassinated. Many—including Strelkov-Girkin—believe that their elimination was carried out by mercenaries from the Wagner Group (YouTube, February 10, 2017; Svoboda.org, February 8, 2017). At this juncture, the fact that Strelkov-Girkin left Donbass unharmed could be a result of the power and influence of his Russian patrons. Aside from the already mentioned Malofeev, the militant is said to have been in direct contact with Sergey Glazyev, an adviser to Putin and a key figure in the Eurasian Economic Union (Khpg.org, February 26, 2019). Due to the fact that Glazyev’s vision of Ukraine, its role and peace settlement policies were outweighed by the arguments of Vladislav Surkov—Putin`s personal advisor on relationships with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine—and Strelkov-Girkin was replaced by Borodai, who was handpicked by Moscow (Snob.ru, October 5, 2015). Thus, Strelkov-Girkin was not physically liquidated, unlike many others, and was allowed to abandon Donbass safely only because of his highly-positioned protégés.
Political Career: From Hero to Zero?
The first several months that followed Strelkov-Girkin`s return to Russia became his brightest, albeit short-lived, hour of triumph. According to many Russian sources, the former militant leader hoped to assume a position within the Russian regime, de facto proclaiming his loyalty to Putin and urging to strengthen actions against a so-called “fifth column” (Lenta.ru, September 11, 2014). Later, he made it quite clear that he was hoping to become a part of the “system,” declaring his readiness to “[t]ake any part in defense of the country” (Kolokolrussia.ru, June 25, 2015). Those sentiments may have been deliberately influenced from above, where Strelkov-Girkin was thought to be a tool against the opposition to the Russian ruling class. In 2014, Strelkov-Girkin published a long essay titled “Putin`s decade has brought back Russia’s hope for a rebirth” (Front-novorossii.ru, accessed July 4, 2020). This piece was specifically aimed against the exiled Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In 2014, Strelkov-Girkin launched a popular movement, called “Novorossiya,” for the purpose of delivering humanitarian aid and munitions to the DPR/LPR, which eventually contributed to his marginalization.
The movement became de facto superfluous following the emergence of the Union of Donbass Volunteers (UDV) movement on August 27, 2015. The UDV is headed by Borodai, has far greater resources and enjoys the protection of Surkov (Informnapalm.org, April 30, 2017). These developments led Strelkov-Girkin to break decisively with his former conformist rhetoric toward Putin’s regime and signaled his departure to radical opposition. This course was openly manifested during January-October 2016, when the “Committee of January 25” (later transformed into the All-Russian National Movement) was launched (Kommersant.ru, October 17, 2016). The entity—officially claiming to be a nationalist movement—assembled under its umbrella the most radical and extreme right-wing and neo-nationalist political forces in Russia. The group openly declared its opposition to Putin and simultaneously claimed to be the sole neo-imperial nationalist force in Russian society (Novorossia.pro, May 28, 2016).
The emergence of the Committee of January 25 has had mixed results. On the one hand, its formation resulted in a brief exhilaration among Russian imperial nationalists, who perceived “nationalism […] as a huge modernization force” (Sputnikipogrom.com, June 6, 2016). At the same time, the group increased its anti-Putin rhetoric, condemning Russia`s involvement in Syria and accusing the ruling elites of the “betrayal of [the] Novorossiya” project, which further marginalized Strelkov-Girkin and his associates (Zona.media, July 4, 2016). The sympathies of war veterans and military-patriotic circles also increasingly drifted toward the UDV as the sole representative of the Russian “volunteers” movement.
By 2019, Strelkov-Girkin seemed to have soured relationships even with his (former) patrons/benefactors. On March 9, 2019, he put his medal for the reunification with Crimea up for auction. According to the former DPR military leader, “[t]his medal is not a state-issued piece. It was presented to me by Malofeev during spring 2014 – even before the Donbass campaign. I am selling it because of economic predicaments I am having […] I have never revered this medal since it a) was unofficial; b) was not earned in combat; c) has a face [Vladimir Putin] on it, which I have never – with the exception of a very brief period in 2014 – respected; and since 2015, I have been openly disrespecting this person” (YouTube, May 18). The medal was ultimately sold in 2020. The lot description said the item was “a non-state decoration issued by the Foundation of Saint Basil the Great” (Rbc.ru, May 19). [3]
Conclusion
In the first decade following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia witnessed the emergence of so-called “okopnyje generali” (trench generals)—figures with mounting political ambitions and considerable military experience gained in Afghanistan and other regional conflicts. [4] Usually, their fates were tragic: brief popularity and political elevation was followed by oblivion and/or a mysterious death. Strelkov-Girkin occupies a special place among these individuals: instead of elements of neo-Bonapartism—equally feared by both the Soviet and Russian political leadership – he never openly declared his ambitions for high power, following a pattern of romanticism (revolving around so-called civic nationalism) established by Giuseppe Garibaldi, the Italian nationalist, in the 19th century. Even though Strelkov-Girkin (and people like him) does not pose any immediate threat to Russian ruling elites, his image, principles, and modus operandi could be of concern in the future, if and when Russia experiences turbulent times.
Notes
[1] In Russian parlance “Banderaites” (banderovtsi) are followers of the far-right ideology and supporters of the ideology of Ukrainian ultranationalist Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) [2] Novorossiya (literally “New Russia”) – a concept revived by Russian imperial nationalists, stating that southeastern Ukraine (the Odessan, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Crimean oblasts) should be a part of Russia. [3] The foundation was created in 2007 in Moscow (coinciding with the emergence of the Russian World Foundation). According to some French sources (Canal+ among others), it sponsored Marine Le Pen (the National Rally political party) between 2014 and 2015 (Rfi.fr, November 3, 2015). [4] The most notable personalities include Alexander Lebed, Boris Gromov, Lev Rokhlin, Vladimir Shamanov, Viktor Kazantsev, Gennady Troshev.
