Moscow’s Double Standards on Full Display Over Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities
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Executive Summary:
- Kremlin officials are condemning the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities as violations of international law while simultaneously committing violations of Ukrainian sovereignty.
- Moscow presents itself as a defender of sovereignty and global nuclear norms in its discourse toward Iran, yet it disregards these same principles in its war against Ukraine.
- Moscow manipulates international rules to serve its interests, rather than follow them, a tactic Russia will likely use in any negotiations for the end of its war against Ukraine.
On June 23, Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow one day after the United States conducted missile strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan (YouTube/@TheWhiteHouse, June 22; Congressional Research Service, June 23). During the meeting, Putin told Araghchi that the “absolutely unprovoked aggression against Iran has no basis and no justification” (President of Russia, June 23). Hours after Putin and Araghchi’s meeting, Iran launched a missile attack on the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (Doha News, June 23).
Moscow has been quick to condemn U.S. military action against Iran as a violation of international law and global nuclear norms. When the UN Security Council convened an emergency session on Sunday, June 22, the Russian mission passionately defended Iran’s sovereignty and condemned the United States’s strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites as “utter contempt for the norms of international law” (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN; United Nations, June 22). Statements such as these ring hollow when juxtaposed with Moscow’s own conduct in Ukraine.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities an “irresponsible decision” on the “territory of a sovereign state” that “grossly violates international law, the UN Charter, and UN Security Council resolutions” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 22). The same statement highlighted the “damage caused by the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities to the global non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 22).
The Russian mission to the UN denounced Washington as applying its own double standards compared to Israel’s 1981 attack on a nuclear research reactor in Iraq (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, June 22). The UN Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) condemned Israel’s attack at that time as a violation of the NPT (United Nations, June 19, 1981). A then-U.S. State Department spokesperson denounced the attack as “a very serious development and a source of utmost concern” (The New York Times, June 9, 1981).
Moscow also references the UN Security Councils’ endorsement of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which was intended to limit the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief and lifting a UN embargo of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles to or from Iran (United Nations Security Council, July 16, 20, 2015). Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with Russian media that the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities “undermined” efforts to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program (Izvestiya, June 24). The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in order to apply “maximum pressure” on Iran, as the arms embargo was due to expire soon (The White House, May 8, 2018; Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2020).
Moscow’s condemnation of missile strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities carries little weight given Russia’s numerous violations of international law in Ukraine (see EDM, April 13, 2022, May 14, July 18, 2024). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently denounced Moscow’s double standards. In a post on Telegram, Zelenskyy said, “The Russian leadership demonstratively condemned the ‘missile and bomb’ actions. Today, Moscow is silent—after its own army launched a cynical attack using Russian-Iranian ‘Shaheds’ and missiles on civilian infrastructure in Kyiv and other cities” (Telegram/@Zelenskiy / Official; The Kyiv Independent, June 23).
Russia has occupied two of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (NPPs): Chornobyl (February 24–March 31, 2022) and Zaporizhzhia (March 4, 2022–present). At the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) on-site team regularly reports military activities in the vicinity, explosions carried out by drones, and small arms and artillery fire (Nuclear Energy Agency, accessed June 25). There are regular reports of close-proximity explosions and drones and missiles flying near the Khmelnytskyi NPP, as well as drones flying near the Rivne NPP and South Ukraine NPP (Nuclear Energy Agency, accessed June 25). In April 2024, drone attacks struck one of the reactor containment buildings at Zaporizhzhia NPP (IAEA, April 7, 2024). On February 14, an Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drone strike pierced a 15 square meter (approximately 160 square feet) hole in the roof of the Chornobyl confinement structure (Defense Intelligence Agency, August 7, 2023; Chornobyl NPP, February 14, 19; World Nuclear News, March 7). Russia has denied responsibility. Putin instead positions Russia as a resolver of conflict rather than the aggressor, claiming, “We believe that we did not begin military actions in Ukraine, but we are trying to end them” (President of Russia, June 19).
Moscow’s leveraging of legal discourse for the purposes of statecraft has long been evident and espoused by international legal scholars.[1] The Kremlin’s most recent rhetoric toward U.S. strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities demonstrates an undeniable double standard when compared to the same officials’ justifications for aggression and illegal military activities around Ukraine’s own nuclear sites. These two divergent arguments render the Kremlin incoherent on the international stage.
On the sidelines of the recent International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Putin addressed the distinction between U.S. strikes against Iran and Russia’s “ongoing aggression in Ukraine,” as posed by the reporter (President of Russia, June 19; see EDM, June 23). The reporter said to Putin, “Yesterday, 28 civilians were killed in Kyiv. Our journalists saw a Russian missile destroy an entire city block. How can these two positions [referencing the Russian Foreign Ministry’s condemnation of Israel’s strikes on Iran] be reconciled?” (President of Russia, June 19).
Putin replied to the reporter that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are “fully consistent with the UN Charter,” claiming that the strikes were not on residential areas but on Ukrainian defense facilities and military equipment (which has been verified as false) (The Kyiv Independent, June 17; President of Russia, June 19). The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations later confirmed that the first American civilian to die in Russia’s war against Ukraine was killed in these latest Russian strikes against Kyiv (United States Mission to the United Nations, June 20).
During the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a reporter asked Putin, “[U.S. President] Donald Trump is seeking what he calls the unconditional surrender of Iran in terms of its nuclear program. Are you, as the President of Russia, seeking unconditional surrender from Volodymyr Zelenskyy? It is the same situation” (President of Russia, June 20). Putin replied that “the situation is not the same, but fundamentally different … We are not seeking Ukraine’s surrender. We insist that Ukraine recognize the established territorial realities” (President of Russia, June 20). Earlier, Putin told reporters that he “consider[s] the Russian and Ukrainian people to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours” (President of Russia, June 20).
When asked how he might respond if Ukraine used a “dirty bomb” against Russia, Putin said “Perhaps it would be their last mistake … [O]ur nuclear doctrine, both in common sense and in practice, entails that we always respond to threats posed to us in kind. We always respond and always in kind” (President of Russia, June 20).
Moscow avoids incoherencies in its international legal discourse by falsely blaming the Ukrainian Armed Forces for its own violations, including for committing “terrorist acts” on its own nuclear sites (TASS, April 8, 2024). Putin himself has claimed that Russian forces are not responsible for attacks on the Zaporizhzhia NPP but that it is Ukrainians attacking it. In July 2024, Putin told reporters that “The enemy is striking now directly at the station [Zaporizhzhia NPP]. This, of course, requires special attention from our side and, unfortunately, does not attract the attention of the people and forces who support the Kyiv regime today” (Izvestiya, July 12, 2024).
Moscow may perceive alignment with Tehran as a potential opportunity to mediate peace negotiations and gain concessions from the United States in its own position toward Ukraine, despite Iran and Russia’s competing interests (see EDM, November 26, 2024, March 13, 19, May 5). In April, Russia and Iran ratified the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty as the United States announced a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal (President of Russia, January 17; see EDM, March 13; Russian State Duma, April 8; Middle East Eye, June 13). The Treaty covers a multitude of spheres of cooperation, but stops short of including a mutual defense clause. Military cooperation between the two states continues as Iran supplies Russia with Shahed drones in its war against Ukraine, while Putin recently described the delivery of Russian missile defense systems to Iran as “regular military-technical cooperation within the framework of international norms” (see EDM, June 4; President of Russia, June 19).
Moscow has never claimed responsibility for attacking Ukraine’s nuclear sites, whereas the United States has done so toward Iran (YouTube/@TheWhiteHouse, June 22). Moscow instead has claimed that its annexation of Ukrainian territories essentially renders any nuclear facilities on those territories as part of the Russian Federation and blames Ukrainian forces for any military activity near Zaporizhzhia NPP or other NPPs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 25).
While the Kremlin is all too willing to defend Iran’s sovereignty over its nuclear sites, Moscow and its officials conveniently neglect to accept that Zaporizhzhia NPP is Ukrainian. One day after the Russian Mission to the UN declared U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites “utter contempt for the norms of international law,” the Russian nuclear regulator, Rostekhnadzor, was busy inspecting reactors at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP for licensing to supply electricity to the grid (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, June 22; Zaporizhzhia NPP, June 23). A significant number of technical and engineering tasks must first be completed, such as replacing the electrical grid and restoring the plant’s water supply after Russia destroyed Ukraine’s Kakhovka dam (see EDM, June 28, 2023; Interfax, May 21; Zaporizhzhia NPP, June 10). The director of the NPP maintains that the primary obstacle obstructing this effort is the threat posed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces rather than Russia’s illegal occupation and operation of a nuclear facility on the territory of a sovereign state (RIA Novosti, June 23).
Moscow’s double standards reveal a fundamental reality in Kremlin thinking that the rules-based international order is a tool to be leveraged for its own interests rather than a shared standard of behavior to which it must adhere. Security and sovereignty are irrelevant restraints to the Kremlin, subject to multiple interpretations at any given time, in any given place. Awareness of this thinking is essential in order to secure lasting and meaningful results in any peace talks, negotiations, or deals where Moscow is at the table.
Instances of Russian Double Standards: Iran and Ukraine
| Kremlin Discourse | On Iran | In Ukraine |
| Justification of Force | “The absolute unprovoked aggression against Iran is unfounded and unjustified” (President of Russia, June 23). | Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine, a sovereign UN member, without provocation. |
| Sovereignty and Responsibility | “Russia condemns in the strongest possible terms the irresponsible, dangerous, and provocative actions taken by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a sovereign member state of the United Nations” (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, June 22). | Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory and nuclear sites, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. |
| On Nuclear Security | “IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warned that strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure facilities could have completely unpredictable consequences and pose a huge threat to nuclear and physical nuclear security not only in the Islamic Republic, but also in the region and the world as a whole (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, June 22).
“The President of Russia emphasized the importance of resuming negotiations and resolving any issues pertaining to Iran’s nuclear program exclusively via political and diplomatic means” (President of Russia, June 13). “[I]t is obvious that the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, including those carried out by one of the NPT signatories (namely, the United States), deal a colossal blow to the global non-proliferation regime. They do not simply undermine the authority of the IAEA and the entire system of inspections and control by the Agency, but they also destroy the foundations of international cooperation in this area, which risks casting us back to an era of uncontrolled nuclear risks” (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, June 22). |
Russian drone and missile attacks have damaged Zaporizhzhia NPP and Chornobyl NPP |
| On UN Charter and Global Nuclear Order [2] | “U.S. leadership not only publicly acknowledged its responsibility for these actions, but also flaunted them, demonstrating complete disregard for the norms of international law and the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 487 (1981) and 2231 (2015), as well as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)” (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, June 22).
“Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia condemns Israel’s actions, which violate the UN Charter and International Law” (President of Russia, June 13).
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Russia undermines the NPT by militarizing nuclear sites and conducting strikes near reactors. |
| On De-escalation
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The Russian side “has proposed concrete initiatives aimed at reaching mutually acceptable agreements. Russia will continue to promote a de-escalation between Iran and Israel” (President of Russia, June 13). | |
| Russia as peace promoter and potential mediator | “The Russian side has been fully supporting the efforts to resolve the situation around Iran’s nuclear program peacefully” (President of Russia, June 13). “The Russian leader expressed willingness to provide mediation so as to prevent further escalation” (President of Russia, June 13). |
Russia consistently sabotages and delays peace talks with Ukraine |
Notes:
[1] For research and analysis on Russian legal discourse and statecraft, see: Romanova, T. 2018. “Russia’s Neorevisionist Challenge to the Liberal International Order.” The International Spectator 53 (1): 77–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1406761; Allison, R. 2020. “Russian Revisionism, Legal Discourse and the ‘Rules- Based’ International Order.” Europe-Asia Studies 72 (6): 976–995. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1773406; Green, J. A., C. Henderson, and T. Ruys. 2022. “Russia’s Attack on Ukraine and the jus ad bellum.” Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 9 (1): 4–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2022.2056803; von Gall, C. 2022. “Russian Approaches to International Humanitarian Law.” Völkerrechtsblog, April 13. https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/russias-approaches-to-international-humanitarian-law; Allison, R. (2023). Russia’s Case for War against Ukraine: Legal Claims, Political Rhetoric, and Instrumentality in a Fracturing International Order. Problems of Post-Communism, 71(3), 271–282. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2023.2254915.
[2] Defined as the “system of national and international practices, policies, institutions, rules, and common understandings that govern the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons…” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 9, 2022).
