Only One Percent of Pupils in Russia Study in Non-Russian Languages

Executive Summary:

• Only one percent of pupils in the Russian Federation are studying in a non-Russian language school, half as many as nine years ago, and far less than the share of Russian citizens whose primary language is not Russian.
• The decrease in schools teaching in non-Russian languages threatens the survival of minority languages and the cultural heritage of their nations. Russian President Vladimir Putin is pushing homogenization, but has sought to obscure it through the “folklore-ization” of these peoples.
• These policies may backfire if they change the meaning of being an ethnic Russian, angering Russian nationalists, or if they lead to the rise of Russian-speaking non-Russians better able to compete in the job market, who still face ethnic discrimination.

Only one percent of pupils in the Russian Federation are studying in minority language schools. This number is significantly less than the share of Russians whose primary language is not Russian. Additionally, just 11 percent of students are studying a non-Russian native language as a separate subject (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, November 6). As of 2010, approximately 14.3 percent of Russians considered a minority language their “native” language, and 20 percent of Russians identified as ethnically non-Russian (Minority Rights Group, accessed November 11). The share of school-age children who are non-Russian may be even greater, given that fertility rates among non-Russians remain higher than those among ethnic Russians (see EDM, October 31, 2024). In the case of more than three dozen nations, instruction in all kinds of subjects in their native languages has ended, with more likely to be eliminated from school programs in the future (Vedomosti, September 15; Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, November 6). Half as many students are studying in a language other than Russian compared to nine years ago. This decline is even more pronounced as a proportion since the total number of pupils in Russian schools has decreased in the past decade (The Moscow Times, September 1).

These trends have been the direct result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies over the last decade, which have banned republics from requiring that all pupils on their territories study their titular languages and nominally gave parents the right to choose to have their children study in Russian rather than those languages. In reality, however, the policies put pressure on students to learn Russian rather than the titular language of their republics by requiring any school graduate who wants to attend university to pass tests in Russian. Additionally, many schools that had offered instruction in non-Russian languages closed, and there is no longer an incentive for replacing teachers who can teach in non-Russian languages when those who do retire (Takie Dela, September 9).

These changes have not been popular among large swaths of non-Russians, who view them as a threat to their language and culture (see EDM, November 5, December 3, 2012; see Commentaries, January 23, 2014). The number of non-Russian parents calling for their children to be given the chance to study their native languages, at least in separate classes for a few hours a week, has risen. Given that Moscow continues to reduce the number of hours allocated for minority language classes and largely confines them to the earliest grades, many non-Russian parents are unsatisfied. One or two hours of language instruction per week cannot compensate for the loss of instruction in all subjects in that language (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, November 6).

The Kremlin is pursuing a policy that some Russian commentators have called the “folklore-ization” of ethnic minorities, using surface-level reforms to assuage continuing non-Russian resistance to its policies. Moscow has created national holidays and other activities that appear to boost the status of non-Russians but, in reality, further reduce them from self-standing nations to marginalized ethnic groups inside a culturally, linguistically, and politically Russian state (The Moscow Times, November 5). Folklore-ization has placated some non-Russians, but has outraged others who see it as part of a drive to eliminate non-Russian nations from playing a key role in the administration of the state, quite possibly leading to the elimination of non-Russian republics as a political entity (MariUver, April 24).

The Kremlin’s reduction in non-Russian language instruction and the political power of non-ethnically Russian republics is not without risks for Moscow. The inclusion of an increasing number of non-Russians within the ethnic Russian nation angers some Russian nationalists who fear that this may lead to more intermarriage between Russians and non-Russians, a multiplication of Russian dialects, and even the assimilation of ethnic Russians by non-Russians, all phenomena that are anathema to these Russians’ identities (Window on Eurasia, June 15, October 7). More worrisome for the Kremlin, Putin’s policy of Russianizing education is sparking increased non-Russian protests. Some such protests have been successful, as in the recent case when Moscow was publicly forced to back down on its plans to stop classifying non-Russian tongues as “native languages” (Window on Eurasia, June 15, August 25). Putin’s Russianization and Russification policies may lead to the elimination of some nations and republics, as he hopes, but these policies could also spur the rise of more Russian speakers among ethnic minorities who will be able to compete with ethnic Russians for jobs and benefits. These non-Russians may become radicalized in their nationalism if and when they are blocked from fairly competing with ethnic-Russians for jobs. A non-Russian who is denied a position because they do not speak Russian fluently is one thing, but a non-Russian who speaks perfect Russian and then is denied it is something else entirely (MariUver, November 8; Idel Realii, November 6).  As students of nationalism have long noted, the Irish did not become nationalists until they stopped speaking Gaelic, and British control of India was not threatened so much by Hindi-speaking peasants as by English-trained lawyers, such as Gandhi.

Putin shows no sign of letting up on his Russianization drive, increasingly insisting that Russian culture dominates. This relentless preference has alienated non-Russians while empowering some Russian nationalists (Window on Eurasia, November 8). The continuing war against Ukraine has radicalized Russian nationalists and some non-Russians who have been disproportionately affected by the war, setting the stage for more conflicts between Russian nationalists and the non-Russian nations (Window on Eurasia, May 22, 2023). Most non-Russians had their children in Russian-language schools long before Putin began his current push. This means that those who did not are the most radically committed to the survival of their national languages and thus the most likely to react in opposition to Moscow (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, November 6). Putin’s language reforms in the schools are likely to have a larger and more fateful set of consequences than he intends, as similar impositions of the language of empire have had throughout history.