Peace in South Caucasus Closer After the Washington Summit, but Uncertainties Loom

Executive Summary:

• The August 8 summit between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Washington, D.C., with mediation by U.S. President Donald Trump, reached a deal on the Zangezur Corridor, envisioning an “unimpeded” transit route through Armenia to Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave.
• Domestic opposition in Armenia has fiercely criticized the deal, and with upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026, there is uncertainty about Armenia’s future position.
• Challenges from Russia and Iran, both of which oppose external involvement in the corridor, add further complexity, with Russia insisting on maintaining the previous agreements it reached with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On August 28, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that his country will start substantive talks next month with the United States and Azerbaijan on the practical arrangements for opening a transit route to Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave via the territory of Armenia (Armenpress.am, August 28). The agreement on this route (hereafter the Zangezur Corridor) was reached on August 8 during a trilateral meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan, mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump (see EDM, August 12). 

According to the trilateral agreement, the route (renamed as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP) would serve as an “unimpeded” passage and be managed through what Trump called an “exclusive partnership” between Armenia and the United States for 99 years (President of Azerbaijan, August 9). According to Pashinyan, this implies the deployment of an “Armenia-United States company” which “will carry out the business management” (Armenpress.am, August 21). He underscored that the company “will not control that road but manage it,” refuting the domestic criticism about the loss of Armenian sovereignty over the route and the sublease of the territory to the United States. 

A range of local and external factors amid the deal between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States creates uncertainty that could undermine or prevent its smooth implementation. In addition to the challenges posed by Armenian opposition groups and external actors, the terms of the deal itself raise questions. For example, Azerbaijan has previously insisted on a passage through the Zangezur corridor without customs regulations or security checks, something Armenia has not yet accepted (see EDM, January 28, 2022).

A couple of weeks before the Washington summit, Aliyev reiterated this demand, saying, “Azerbaijani cargo and Azerbaijani citizens should not have to face Armenian border security—or anyone else, for that matter” (President of Azerbaijan, July 19). He said he had delivered this message to Pashinyan at the Abu Dhabi summit and underlined that “there should be no physical contact and there must be guaranteed security measures so our people and cargo can travel freely” (see EDM, July 17; President of Azerbaijan, July 19). 

The three countries have likely addressed this uncertainty by agreeing to implement digital services along the corridor, which would allow the passage of people and cargo without “physical contact.” Pashinyan has already discussed this possibility, stating that his government plans to introduce modern border procedures, including the use of biometric passports and digital technologies (Azernews.az, August 21). It remains unclear, however, if customs checks will be applied. On August 27, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan avoided providing a clear answer about whether customs checks will apply to Azerbaijani citizens using the TRIPP route (News.am, August 27). This ambiguity may prove constructive, suggesting that the two countries may have already found, or are in the process of finding, common ground on this issue.

A mutual understanding and willingness for cooperation within the TRIPP deal at the intergovernmental level appear to exist. Challenges from both local and external actors, however, may complicate the process. Armenia’s parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition have harshly criticized the Washington agreements, accusing Pashinyan of “incompetence” and “surrender” (Azatutyun, August 12; Horizonweekly.ca, August 25). Opposition groups in Armenia have labeled the TRIPP agreement a “new existential threat” that “has nothing to do with peace” (Azatutyun, August 12). With Armenia set to hold parliamentary elections next year, the opposition’s threats cannot be entirely dismissed. On August 26, Aliyev warned of “serious complications” for Armenia if any future government were to back out of the Washington agreements (President of Azerbaijan, August 27). “It’s an agreement between two states, not between Pashinyan and me,” Aliyev emphasized, suggesting that Armenia has made commitments in the presence of the U.S. President and is obligated to follow through.

The situation in Armenia may change next year if Russia-supported opposition groups manage to take over the leadership. Although Russia welcomed the peace deal reached in Washington, the Kremlin insists that the Russia-mediated trilateral statements of 2020 and 2022 remain valid, as neither Baku nor Yerevan has officially withdrawn from them (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29). This represents an indirect attack against the TRIPP deal, as the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020, designates Russia as the party responsible for controlling the corridor between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (President of Russia, November 10, 2020). On August 28, Pashinyan stated that the trilateral statement of 2020 has lost its relevance in light of the recent developments and, therefore, “belongs to the past” (Caliber.az, August 28). 

Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mocked Pashinyan’s statement, asserting that it, too, “belongs to the past” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29). Earlier, during his visit to Yerevan, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk also warned against the involvement of extra-regional players in the project. Saying that Russia supports the Armenia-Azerbaijan deal, he added, “the involvement of any external players from outside the region would disrupt the geopolitical balance, which would have negative consequences” (Massispost.com, August 15).

Another regional player, Iran, also opposes the United States’s involvement in the Zangezur Corridor, although, similar to Russia, it welcomed the peace deal between Baku and Yerevan. Iranian officials regarding the TRIPP deal, however, have notably had mixed reactions. For example, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, during his meeting with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan in Tehran, stated that Iran’s concerns about the involvement of “foreign forces” in the corridor had been “largely alleviated” following explanations and reassurances provided by Armenian officials. (Presstv.ir, August 30).  A day before this meeting, however, Iran’s parliament issued a statement about the Zangezur Corridor, saying it “contradicts the interests of the countries of the region and poses a direct threat to collective security” (News.am, August 29). The Iranian parliament called for regional cooperation without the participation of extra-regional players and vowed to take all the necessary actions against threats posed to Iran. 

While the TRIPP agreement marks a significant step toward regional cooperation, its implementation remains uncertain due to internal opposition and external geopolitical challenges. Regional players—particularly Russia and Iran—remain dissatisfied with the deal and will likely seek opportunities to intervene and protect their interests. Russia’s insistence on maintaining the relevance of the 2020 trilateral statement and warnings against extra-regional involvement signal its intent to assert influence over regional developments. Additionally, Iran’s mixed reactions further complicate the situation. The future of the Zangezur Corridor will depend on how these regional dynamics are managed and whether Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States can navigate the pressures and ensure the implementation of the agreements made in Washington.