Russia Exploits Latvian Vulnerabilities to Undermine Baltic Defenses (Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s evolving military strategy in the Baltic region is shifting from predictable linear offensives to deceptive and flanking maneuvers, with a possible thrust through southeastern Latvia that could strategically fracture the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Baltic defense.
• Municipal governance vulnerabilities in Latvia, particularly in eastern cities such as Daugavpils and Rēzekne, create opportunities for Russian hybrid warfare, where Moscow could exploit institutional weaknesses to incite unrest or justify intervention.
• Sociopolitical alienation and Russian influence in the Latvian city of Latgale are deepening, with narratives of victimhood, resistance to state policies, and identity erosion creating conditions that are ripe for covert destabilization, disguised as local advocacy or crisis management.

Over the past ten years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategic planning for the Baltic region has focused on the Suwałki Corridor between the Kaliningrad region and Belarus, and the Narva axis through Estonia—two key directions of potential Russian offensive. These were considered the least protected and most likely breakthrough points. Such thinking, however, has become excessively schematic. In recent years, Russian military planning has increasingly demonstrated a departure from linear logic and a transition to deceptive, flanking, and hard-to-predict maneuvers, especially when united Europe has stated that it would “struggle to muster” a 25,000-strong military contingent (see EDM, February 29, 2024; The Times, April 29; Meduza, April 30).

One such potential vector that Russia may consider to expand its offensive beyond Ukraine would be a strike from southeastern Belarus through Daugavpils, Rēzekne, and Jelgava toward the coastal city of Tukums in western Latvia. This route has historical analogues, logistical justification, and, critically. Notably, only recently have multinational battlegroups begun to “scale up [their] NATO forward presence” in this area (Facebook/MNBLVA, September 19, 2024; NATO, March 6). If Russia implements an offensive along this route, this direction could become not just a tactical surprise but a strategic shock threatening to split the entire Baltic defense line and isolate Riga (Army University Press, November–December 2022).

Russia often exploits weaknesses at the local governance level, in both hybrid and full-scale warfare (see Jamestown Perspectives, May 2, 27; see EDM, May 8). In 2014, Russia’s main success in Donbas was brought about by the effective absence of local authority, which allowed it to implant its agents under the guise of separatists (Kuzio, “Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win,” July 8, 2024). In 2022, the Kherson region was the only regional center captured by Russia during its offensive. It was surrendered directly by Volodymyr Saldo, the Russia-appointed local collaborator and governor of the region. Regardless of the condition of the Russian army, the Kremlin always seeks to complement its military machine with hybrid methods of warfare. Latvia has precisely such a potential frontline sector (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 8, 2023; The International Affairs Review, August 16, 2024; EBU Investigative Journalism Network, March 12).

A key element of the Baltic region’s current transformation is the gradual erosion of Latvian sovereignty at the municipal level. In the eastern districts, especially in Daugavpils and Rēzekne, the central government is increasingly encountering sabotage of its decisions. Local authorities have refused to carry out orders related to dismantling Soviet symbols, avoided publicly supporting national and allied initiatives, and have sometimes directly confronted Riga. This forms essentially autonomous zones of political irritation in Latvia (Latvian Public Media, April 3, 2024). In 2022, the Latvian government approved a law titled “On the Prohibition of Exhibiting Objects Glorifying the Soviet and Nazi Regimes and Their Dismantling on the Territory of the Republic of Latvia,” which approved the mass removal of Soviet military monuments (Belsat, April 9). The Daugavpils City Council, however, contested this decision to remove the monuments by a certain date, using funds from its own budget, as unconstitutional. It was the only local government in Latvia that considered this law to impose a “disproportionate” financial burden on it, and the Latvian Constitutional Court declared the obligation complied with the Constitution (Latvian Public Media, December 7, 2023; Constitutional Court of Latvia, December 14, 2023).

Recently, there have been reports of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) spreading false information about Riga preparing to conduct widespread demolition of monuments honoring Soviet soldiers from World War II. The SVR claims that this is an effort to disrupt the celebrations for Victory Day’s 80th anniversary (Belsat, April 9). This was “solely for the purpose of destabilizing and provoking Latvian society, wanting to stir up once again an ethnic conflict between Latvians and the Russian-speaking population,” according to Latvian political scientist Filips Raevskis. Daugavpils is one of the few regions left in Latvia to still have “recognizable” monuments (Belsat, April 9).

In parallel, Latvia is experiencing demographic and identity erosion. The outflow of the Latvian population and declining economic activity are leading to the gradual formation of ethnically and politically insulated communities in the major cities of the Latgale region, which no longer view Riga or Brussels as authoritative centers (Centre for Eastern Studies, March 15, 2023). Push back against compulsory conscription to serve in the Latvian army, schools resisting the transition to the Latvian language, and the orientation of local media toward Russian narratives all reinforce this effect (International Centre for Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity Studies, April 9, 2024). Against this backdrop, the proliferation of illegal structures purporting to express the “local will” and the emergence of Kremlin-loyal media and information clusters have become possible. (To read more analysis on this issue, see Jermolajeva, Rivža, Aleksejeva, Šipilova, Ostrovska, “Smart Growth as a Tool for Regional Convergence: Evidence from Latgale Region of Latvia,” October 2017; Struberga, Ozoliņa, “Crisis Communication and Resilience: Are Russian and Latvian Speakers in the Same Boat?,” May 13, 2022; China-CEE Institute, June 2022; Centre for Eastern Studies, July 16, 2024; Rönngren, “Making Sense of Russian Strategic Narratives. Affect and Reception Among Young Russian Speakers in Latvia,” March 21).

These processes create a high potential for legitimizing external intervention from Russia under the guise of internal instability. A destructive scenario may not begin with tanks, but with the appearance of “public representatives,” protests against central decisions, a split within local administrations, and—once a crisis is declared—military cover could be introduced, allegedly to “restore order.” This is how the line between internal and external conflict can become blurred. It is a boundary that gives the adversary room for maneuver while leaving the defending side only with dilemmas on how to respond (Hybrid CoE, May 2024; Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2024; European Digital Media Observatory, October 14, 2024).

Localized victimhood narratives, aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the Latvian state among the Russian-speaking population, are growing in Latvia. Through anonymous Telegram channels, street-level agitation, and quasi-journalistic platforms, messages are broadcast about systemic oppression, school closures, rising utility prices, and economic decline in Latgale (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2024; Telegram/alekseystefanov, accessed May 28). These messages are not necessarily coordinated directly by Russian intelligence services—many are the result of self-organized loyalty, fueled by years of unaddressed grievances. This type of agitation, however, is the most resilient. It is localized, embedded in daily life, and intuitively perceived as “our own,” unlike overt “Moscow-style” propaganda (4liberty.eu, January 8, 2024).

The deliberate distancing of Latgalian discourse from Latvia’s political center is noteworthy. In local press and media, rhetorical constructs such as “Riga is not us,” “they do not help us here,” and “we’ve been abandoned” are increasingly common (Meduza, May 5).  Such alienation is convenient for an external actor. If the crisis escalates, it allows any external intervention to be presented as technical assistance rather than aggression (Hoyle, Wagnsson, Powell, van den Berg, Doosje, “Life through grey-tinted glasses: how do audiences in Latvia psychologically respond to Sputnik Latvia’s destruction narratives of a failed Latvia?,” November 6, 2023). In conditions of weak institutional resilience, this creates a threat of spontaneous institutional fragmentation, where civil administrations in certain regions could simply “cease to recognize” Riga as the decision-making center.

As a result, a situation emerges in which external intervention may be portrayed not as an invasion, but as a response to internal disintegration. This is an extremely dangerous mechanism. It does not require immediate territorial seizure but merely exploits the existing erosion of vertical authority and identity. Thus, by the time open conflict begins, the adversary may already control the information domain, administrative structures, and the public narrative—and therefore will act not as an aggressor, but as a “restorer of order.”