Hlib Parfonov
Hlib Parfonov is a graduate of the National Aviation University (Kyiv) and a flight engineer. Since 2020, he has headed security policy at the Doctrine Center for Political Studies, in Kyiv. He is broadly engaged in open-source intelligence (OSINT) projects as well as research into the role of intelligence agencies in politics and hybrid threats.
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Articles by Hlib Parfonov
Russia and China Develop New Grain Corridor
During the most recent Belt and Road summit in Beijing, Russia agreed to supply China with 70 million tons of grain, legumes, and oilseeds worth 2.5 trillion rubles (about $25.7
Moscow Re-Organizes Russian Armed Forces (Part Two)
The series of unsuccessful offensives in the Kupyansk and Avdiivka directions have caused major problems for Russian forces in Ukraine (Ukrinform, October 27; Kyiv Independent, October 29). The Russian army
Moscow Re-Organizes Russian Armed Forces (Part One)
On October 17, Russian forces launched a new offensive in the Avdiivka direction (Ukrinform, October 17). Since then, intense fighting has commenced along various sections of the frontlines. On October
Ukraine’s Slow-Moving Counteroffensive: Gaps in Russian Defense (Part Five)
*Read Part Four. Four months in, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been slowly, but steadily advancing along the Bakhmut, Melitopol, and Berdyansk salients. Ukrainian forces have effectively retaken the initiative at
Ukraine’s Slow-Moving Counteroffensive: Russian Defense Continues to Adapt (Part Four)
*Read Part One. *Read Part Two. *Read Part Three. On September 23, the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced a breakthrough in Russian defenses around Verbove in the Zaporizhzhia region (Ukrainska Pravda,
Ukraine’s Slow-Moving Counteroffensive: Russia’s Evolving Defensive Tactics (Part Three)
*Read Part One. *Read Part Two. As the Ukrainian counteroffensive presses ahead, reports have increasingly characterized the effort as a campaign with steady gains, but heavy losses (Kyiv Post, June
Ukraine’s Slow-Moving Counteroffensive: The Russian Response (Part Two)
*Read Part One. As Ukraine was readying for its counteroffensive, the Russian side was making what the top brass deemed as necessary preparations. These efforts were laid out in documentation
Ukraine’s Slow-Moving Counteroffensive: Problems and Solutions (Part One)
At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces had managed to reach the so-called “Surovikin Line” in a number of places. Ukrainian units finally managed to break through the Russian echeloned
Ukraine’s Manpower Requirements Reaching a Critical Threshold
Following Ukraine’s successful Kherson counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, the war in Ukraine has moved into the Materialschlacht, or war of attrition phase, which is rapidly depleting critical resources.
Allies Set to Consider Ukrainian Membership in Vilnius
According to recent survey data, over 80 percent of Ukrainians living in Ukraine and throughout Europe support their country joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Ukrainska Pravda, July 10).
Moscow Scrambling to Solve Manpower Shortages—Without Another Mobilization
While the precise consequences of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s so-called “march for justice” remain to be seen, the events starting on the night of June 23 and abruptly ending with a deal
As Raids Continue, Fractures Are Growing in Russian Border Defenses
The raids in the Belgorod region of Russia on May 22 and June 1 have built on the success of earlier border incursions (see EDM, May 31). Whereas the raid
The Nuclear Angle in Belarus
On April 26, the so-called “Chernobyl Way,” an annual march of Belarusians to mark the anniversary of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant disaster, took place around the world. This year,
Belarus’s ‘Neutral’ Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War (Part Two)
*Read Part One. As Belarus seeks to maintain its “neutral” position in Russia’s war against Ukraine, it is clear that Minsk is keen to mobilize recruits for military training and
Belarus’s ‘Neutral’ Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War (Part One)
Belarus, despite all of Russia’s attempts to somehow lure it into the war against Ukraine, remains at least nominally neutral in the conflict. However, Moscow’s pressure is still strong on
Kyiv Quells Russian Orthodox Church’s Influence Within Ukraine (Part Two)
*Read Part One. As the intense fighting continues between Ukrainian and Russian forces around Bakhmut and Vuhledar, Kyiv continues to take steps to limit elements of Moscow’s influence within Ukraine,
New Russian Offensive Underway in Ukraine
If at the end of 2022 it was assumed that Ukraine would be the first to attack to gain the initiative on the battlefield, more recent calculations have posited that
Kyiv Quells Russian Orthodox Church’s Influence Within Ukraine (Part One)
While some analysis has covered Ukrainian church life, a Western layman might think that religious persecutions are actively taking place in Ukraine. Moreover, such rhetoric can be heard from Western
Russia Struggles to Maintain Munition Stocks (Part Two)
*Click here for Part One. While the Kremlin stubbornly contends that the Russian defense industry will have no issues in replenishing those munitions that have been heavily depleted in Ukraine,
Russia Struggles to Maintain Munition Stocks (Part One)
In the ninth month of Russia’s war against Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the Russian army is being gradually overtaken by “shell hunger.” This should be expected based
Grouping of Russian Units in Belarus Continues to Swell
From the outset of the “partial mobilization” campaign in Russia, processes began taking place in Belarus that created a greater potential for armed escalation in this direction, in particular in
Recent Kremlin Policies Bog Down Russian War Effort (Part Two)
When it comes to industrial mobilization in Russia, it is necessary to underline a critical component: the degree of integration between military and civilian production. During World War I, 80
Recent Kremlin Policies Bog Down Russian War Effort (Part One)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, having announced the holding of referendums in the occupied territories of Ukraine, automatically launched the mobilization mechanism in Russia. But what will this mobilization entail? First,
Vostok 2022: Has Russia Learned From Setbacks in Ukraine?
On September 1, the Vostok-2022 military exercises began in Russia’s Far East. Beyond Russian units, the exercises also included military forces from China, India, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, among others.
Ukrainian Strikes Cause Moscow to Re-Think Munitions Supply and Logistics (Part Two)
*To read Part One, please click here. As reports come in of massive explosions at an ammunition depot in Crimea, the prospects for effectively increasing ammunition production in Russia are
Ukrainian Strikes Cause Moscow to Re-Think Munitions Supply and Logistics (Part One)
Since 2014–2015, Russia has built dozens of ammunition depots hidden in civilian buildings near railway stations in the occupied parts of Ukraine. Russian logistics warehouses are almost always located near
Colossus With Feet of Clay
After the start of the 2022 war, in which the Russian Federation initially deployed about 180,000 soldiers and approximately 120 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) against Ukraine, the Russian military quickly
Drones Over Ukraine: How Are UAVs Affecting Battlefield Operations on Both Sides?
The war in Ukraine has showcased the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by both sides, a capability that has enabled much more extensive combined-arms operations by their respective militaries.