Russian Casualties in Ukraine Continue to Rise

Executive Summary:

• An estimated 120,000 Russians have died in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. The rate of losses is increasing over time, boding discontent among Russians as they continue to be used as cannon fodder.
• Ethnically non-Russian regions have borne the brunt of the losses compared to city centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg, likely due to the higher risk of protest in major cities from ethnic Russians and the Russian elite.
• Despite the significant material bonuses to persuade Russians to join the military, especially in the poorer regions, the Russian army seems to be experiencing a lack of new recruits to replace its many casualties.

As Russian casualties in Moscow’s war against Ukraine reach staggering heights, the Kremlin and wider Russian society are increasingly feeling the pain of war (see EDM, July 10). The Ukrainian government estimates Russian losses, including the wounded, at nearly 550,000 individuals since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 (Minfin, July 5). As the number of casualties mount and the Kremlin continues to recruit more Russians to throw into the “meat grinder” in Ukraine, the Russian population may become fed up with the Kremlin’s war and begin to fight back, exacerbating what is already a tense domestic environment (see EDM, November 27, December 7, 11, 2023, January 23, February 8, April 16, 18).

Independent Russian news outlets Mediazona and Meduza, in collaboration with the Russian service of BBC News, recently investigated Russian losses in greater detail using various methodologies (Mediazona, July 5). Researchers examined the difference between the normal and excessive number of new cases in the publicly available National Register of Inheritance to estimate Russian losses. According to the authors, as of the beginning of this summer, approximately 120,000 people in the Russian military have died since the start of the war. Moreover, the rate of losses appears to be rising and currently amounts to a daily average of about 200–250. In examining social media posts, media publications, and government announcements, the researchers established the names of nearly 57,000 individuals who have died in Ukraine. The type of troops, recruitment method, age, date of demise, and regional affiliations are also available (Meduza, July 5). This data is incomplete but still provides valuable insights. (For analysis on Russian combat losses in Ukraine, deduced from Rosstat’s ‘Unassigned Deaths’ category, see EDM, October 19, 2023.)

Exploring the excessive mortality rates, another team of investigators for Russian independent news outlet Vazhnye Istorii (Important Stories) put the number of deaths in the Russian military at 26,000 in 2022 and 45,000 in 2023. The authors primarily focused on ages from 20 to 49 among Russian men who comprise most Russian forces. Their estimates are based on Moscow’s official yearly census data. The investigators examined the difference between the normally expected and actual mortality rates among men of certain ages to arrive at their conclusions. Demographers say that these estimates are a minimum number. For example, deaths can be officially registered not only at the place where the person resided but also at the place where the person died (i.e., in the occupied territories of Ukraine). Russian state statistics service Rosstat does not publish mortality data in the Russia-occupied regions of Ukraine, meaning this data may be missing from the analysis. Additionally, the missing migrants, inmates, and Ukrainian citizens recruited into the Russian army may not be accounted for in this data (Vazhnye Istorii, June 27).

Experts previously pointed out that the Russian military tends to recruit manpower from predominantly non-Russian and peripheral Russian regions for the war in Ukraine (see EDM, March 1, July 13, October 4, 2022, April 9, 16, 30). By not drawing and losing recruits from Moscow and other large cities in central Russia, the Kremlin is trying to avoid widespread backlash from the Russian elite that might force it to curb its imperialist plans. This indicates that the Russian society’s tolerance for combat losses is anything but infinite.

The regional makeup of the losses indicates that the city of Moscow and the city of St. Petersburg lost 571 and 551 people, respectively, in the war. These numbers are comparable to the losses in North Ossetia at 518. Considering the differences in population size between regions, North Ossetia has experienced one death per 1,300 people. This means the region has lost a significantly larger share of its population (almost 8 times more) than the city of St. Petersburg, which suffered one death per 10,000 people and more than 17 times than the city of Moscow, which experienced one death per 23,000 people. s. An even more divergent picture emerges for other peripheral regions of Russia. For example, the Republic of Tuva has reported 591 deaths (one death per 570), and, in the nearby Buryatia, the death toll is 1,429 (one death per 680) (Mediazona, June 21).

In the North Caucasus, Dagestan has sustained the largest number of casualties at 1,007 (one death per 3,200). This is comparable to the nearby predominantly Russian-speaking Stavropol region, located on the boarder of the North Caucasus, with 1,126 reported deaths (one death per 2,600). Curiously, despite extensive publicity in the media, Chechnya has reported only 258 deaths (one death per 6,000). Chechen ruler Ramzan Kadyrov may have been able to suppress the information about the full extent of Chechen casualties in Ukraine. Alternatively, due to his political weight in Russia, Kadyrov may have been able to spare his men from the war by withdrawing them from the most dangerous areas, as some reports have suggested (RBK; T.me/belpepel, June 15, 2023; Gazeta.ru, July 7).

Relative losses may have also been affected by how much trust Moscow puts in one ethnic group over another. For example, Ingushetia has suffered 76 casualties (one death per 7,000), and Kabardino-Balkaria has suffered 169 (one death per 5,400) (Mediazona, July 5). The Russian military may have drawn from these regions to a lesser extent than from others due to the potential security risks, as both have been known for active insurgencies (see EDM, March 7; Kavkaz.Realii, July 9). Additionally, these groups may have been less likely to volunteer.

Experts still wonder when and if significant losses and public discontent will push Moscow to curb its invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, November 7, 2023). The estimated 15,000 Soviet losses in the Afghan War of the 1970s and 1980s became a key factor in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. Russian losses (estimated between 6,000 and 14,000 dead) in the first Russo-Chechen War in 1994–96 also played an essential role in stopping it.

Unlike in the previous wars, the Russian government has been providing unprecedented financial bonuses for volunteers (see EDM, April 9, 16, 30). Some new recruits could receive a whooping 1.65 million rubles ($18,750) as a signing bonus (RBK, May 28). This is an especially attractive option for the people in the poorest regions of Russia, where this amount of money makes up several annual salaries. The base monthly wage of 210,000 rubles ($2,400) for recruits is about five times higher than the average salary in North Ossetia (Audit, accessed July 16). Reliance on paid volunteers lowers the societal pressure on the government for war losses. This does not solve all the issues the Kremlin faces, however. The Russian government has had to regularly increase signing bonuses, indicating fewer people want to volunteer to fight in Ukraine, even for relatively substantial compensation.

The reluctance to fight for an unclear cause and with great danger to self will likely affect the non-Russian republics particularly hard. For example, Dagestanis heavily protested the “partial” mobilization in the fall of 2022 (Mediazona, September 25, 2022; see EDM, September 29, 2022). Even Kadyrov stated that Chechnya “completed the mobilization plan by 1,500 percent,” indicating that Moscow should not expect more recruits from the republic (Vedomosti, December 13, 2023). These pressures are adding to the Kremlin’s calculus in its military campaign in Ukraine and likely preventing it from announcing another wave of mobilization, further compromising its ability to prosecute the “long war.”