Russia’s Arctic Strategy to be Imminently Revised

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(Source: Izvestiya)

Executive Summary:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to unveil Russia’s revised Arctic strategy, which reflects the country’s evolving security, economic, and development priorities, as well as the inadequacy of the current 2020 policy.
  • Russian officials have been using the buzzword “development” or “exploration” at an accelerating rate in recent years to invoke Russian mastery of the Arctic, as well as a more tactical term for “development” to describe precise implementation policies aimed at achieving status and dominance.
  • Russia continues to face numerous challenges in both Arctic exploration and development, including navigating Western sanctions and procurement issues, as well as preventing its vessels from becoming stuck in the sea ice for prolonged periods. 

Recent reports suggest that the Russian State Council is preparing a new long-term plan for Russia’s Arctic zone, which will set the country on a path of securitization and economic and resource consolidation over the next 25 years, while reflecting Russia’s view of its special status in the region (Murman, September 7). A draft decree by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the new strategy for Arctic zone development and national security for the period until 2050 was reportedly prepared earlier in September, according to Alexey Chekunkov, director of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic (RIA Novosti; Sever-Press, September 2). Later in September, Andrei Chibis, chair of the State Council Commission on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Arctic and governor of the Murmansk Oblast, confirmed during a September 25 meeting in Moscow that the State Council Commission on the NSR and the Arctic was finalizing the content and implementation mechanisms of the new Arctic development strategy (Government of the Murmansk Oblast; SeverPost, September 25). 

New discussions and proposals regarding Arctic policy have been circulating for months. Chibis said in July that the Commission was already reviewing a draft of Russia’s new Arctic development strategy to 2050 (RIA Novosti, July 9, 31). Earlier in December 2024, Nikolai Patrushev, aide to Putin and head of Russia’s Maritime Board, said that the country needed to establish a new project on the development of the Arctic zone and the NSR due to the “evolving military and political situation” (TASS, December 18, 2024; see EDM, June 18). In February, Russia’s State Council Commission on the NSR and the Arctic proposed a national development project that takes into account foreign and domestic political and economic challenges (President of Russia, February 28). At the International Arctic Forum in March, Patrushev stated that the Arctic is strategically significant in strengthening Russia’s international position and domestic development, as well as preserving Russian sovereignty (Government of the Murmansk Oblast, March 26). Following Patrushev’s claim, Igor Levitin, an advisor to Putin, said that Russia needs a unified project “as quickly as possible” under Putin’s authority for the period to at least 2050, with relevant funding and investment (Government of the Murmansk Oblast, March 26).  

The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic was meant to submit some of these changes to the Russian State Duma after the Eastern Economic Forum on September 3–6 to introduce a corresponding bill to be adopted in 2025/2026 (SenateInform, July 11; see EDM, September 8). The bill is intended to consolidate tax regimes in Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District and Arctic zone, and provide preferential treatment to businesses operating in these areas (SenateInform; RBC, September 3; TASS, September 6).

Russia’s current Arctic policy is rooted in the 40-page Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period to 2035, which was adopted in October 2020 (President of Russia, October 26, 2020). Accompanying this is the 17-page Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period to 2035, adopted earlier in March 2020 (President of Russia, March 5, 2020). 

Compared to the current strategy, the new one is likely to reflect Russia’s antagonism toward the West, particularly given the repercussions of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as opportunism in respect to global supply chains and natural resources. It is also likely to reflect imperialist narratives toward the Arctic as an area of Russian exceptionalism and mastery. In this vein, Russian officials have been using the buzzword “development” (освоение, osvoenie) at an accelerating rate in recent years when discussing and making policy related to the Arctic (President of Russia, September 23, 2024, November 6, 22, 2024, March 10, 26; Government of Russia, accessed September 30). The noun osvoenie typically refers to development in terms of exploration, pioneering, discovery, experience, and mastery (President of Russia, November 4, 2019, March 10; Rosatom, September 5). The term differs from the verb razrabotat’ (разработать), which typically conveys a more tactical connotation of development, such as creating, designing, or formulating. At the International Arctic Forum in March, Putin stated that the mastery (osvoenie) of the Russian north was an endeavor pursued for generations of Russian ancestry and that the development (razrabotat’) is now a “sovereign, historical decision” (President of Russia, March 10, 27 [1], [2]). The two terms go hand in hand, while Western observers typically focus only on the tactical aspect, rather than the parallel ambition of mastering a treacherous frontier in a way that no other state has done.

Putin prides Russia on its status as the largest Arctic power and claims that the country’s future “lies in the Arctic” and in Arctic development (see EDM, March 21; President of Russia, March 27; Izvestiya, June 28). Russia does hold a number of advantages in the Arctic, not least given its control of about 53 percent of the world’s Arctic coastline (about 15,000 miles). Russia also operates the world’s largest icebreaker fleet, which, due to nuclear power, can facilitate year-round shipping capabilities via the NSR, which Russian official policy claims is a “historically established national transport corridor of the Russian Federation” (President of Russia, amended July 28, 2012; see EDM, November 25, 2024; Bellona, 2025). The 2020 policy positions Russia as the sole authority of transportation through the NSR. It frames this authority as valuable, given the guarantee that the rate of international use of the NSR is expected to increase with the melting of sea ice (President of Russia, October 26, 2020).

Still, Russia faces several challenges in the Arctic. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has been largely isolated from its former Arctic partners and cooperation forums. The Arctic Council members boycotted Russia’s chairmanship in 2022 and 2023, the Council of the Baltic Sea States suspended both Russia and Belarus in 2022, and in 2023, Russia withdrew from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (U.S. Department of State, March 3, 2022; European Union External Action, May 3, 2022; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, September 18, 2023). This has contributed to Russia’s reliance on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as its primary Arctic partner, which declares itself as a “near Arctic” state despite not being in the Arctic (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, January 2018). The PRC, however, with its own ambitious Arctic programs, presents a potential threat to Russia’s dominance in the region (see EDM, February 18).

At the tactical level, Russian capabilities are not always up to scratch in Arctic conditions. It lacks adequate emergency Arctic rescue capabilities and the necessary infrastructure to respond quickly and effectively to incidents (Sever-Press, August 27; Bellona, 2025). Russian shadow fleet oil tankers and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, which are ill-equipped to operate in extreme Arctic conditions, have recently become stranded in sea ice en route to and from Russia and its international export partners, primarily the PRC (Shipsupply.ru, September 15; The Barents Observer, September 23). The latest incident occurred when the Oman-flagged Lynx got stuck in sea ice in early September for several days while transporting oil from Murmansk to the PRC (Shipsupply.ru, September 15). Additionally, Russia’s Northern Fleet regularly experiences delays in construction and commissioning new submarines due to changes in construction terms, supply-chain and financing problems, and Western sanctions (see EDM, May 30).

Russia’s militarization of the Arctic has been on an incremental yet steady rise despite these challenges. Russia has reportedly installed two air surveillance systems and supportive infrastructure on the remote Wrangle Island, which it claims is part of its Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (The National Interest, September 3). Russia’s nuclear-powered submarines, which are part of the Northern Fleet, have recently been used to provoke the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies operating in the High North. One hypersonic-capable Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarine reportedly came within firing range of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the United States’ newest and largest aircraft carrier, while on recent NATO exercises off the coast of Norway (The Barents Observer, August 27; The National Interest, September 30).

Beyond militarization, Russia has increased its socio-economic influence in the Arctic. In the energy sector, Russia exported the first shipments of LNG from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 terminal to the PRC in August (Kommersant, August 28, September 12). On Spitzbergen, the largest island of the Norwegian archipelago, Svalbard, Russia has been more active than usual, recently announcing new research cooperation with the PRC, promoting “anti-fascist” propaganda, and toeing Norway’s criminal code that bans the use of marks of a foreign public authority (see EDM, September 16). Last year, Russia expanded the administrative boundaries of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation to include Beloyarsky and Belozersky districts of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug–Yugra (see EDM, June 18). The two districts are set to receive approximately $97.9 million in government investment to improve their socioeconomic development (NEFT, May 6). 

Russia’s 2020 Arctic policy has not aged well, and it is little wonder that the Kremlin is signaling that an update is coming soon. The Arctic remains a proving ground not only for Russia’s resource extraction and shipping ambitions but also for its broader narrative of exceptionalism and sovereignty. Russia’s imminent revision of its Arctic strategy is due to reflect this osvoenie, but its effectiveness will hinge on its ability to razrabotat’ its logistical and technical challenges and international constraints.