The Phenomenon of Gulmurod Khalimov: Is Islamic State’s War Minister Really Dead?
The Phenomenon of Gulmurod Khalimov: Is Islamic State’s War Minister Really Dead?
Introduction
On August 3, Tajikistan’s Minister of Internal Affairs Rahimzoda Ramazon announced that Gulmurod Khalimov was killed in an airstrike in Syria. This was later confirmed by Tajikistani nationals returning from Syria (Sputniknews.ru, August 3). Later, however, Rakhimzoda stated that he would not believe the news until he had seen the body (Sputniknews.ru, February 14). Indeed, given Khalimov numerous “deaths”—he was reported to have been killed three times, once in 2015 and twice in 2017—the story of the “rebellious colonel” could indeed remain unfinished.
The Hero
Khalimov was born in 1975 in Tajikistan’s Varzob district. During the country’s 1992-1997 civil war, he served in the rank-and-file of the local Special Purpose Mobile Unit (Otryad Mobil’nyy Osobogo Naznacheniya—OMON), and later enlisted in and successfully graduated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy. A professional sniper, he took part in a series of anti-terrorism operations in the Rash Walley in 2009 and in Khorugh in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in 2012. For that, he was decorated with numerous state medals and subsequently promoted to the rank of colonel (Sputniknews.ru, September 8, 2017).
Being a military hero and a successful operative, Khalimov took part in various anti-terrorist training camps/programs organized by the United States and Russia between 2003 and 2014. According to Khalimov, he was taught in U.S. training programs how to prevent terrorist attacks (Stanradar.com, August 12). According to local sources, Tajikistan’s military-political elites developed an early interest in Khalimov. Specifically, Major General Rustam Rahmon (the son of the Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon) considered the creation of a new government organization, to which he reportedly planned to assign Khalimov a special position (Stanradar.com, May 29, 2015). However, as his career was taking off, Khalimov suddenly ‘disappeared’ in April 2015. His re-appearance shocked Tajikistan and its political leadership.
The Defector
On May 28, 2015, Islamic State (IS) posted a video on YouTube in which Khalimov stated that he had joined the organization and called on Tajiks working in Russia to “stop being slaves” and “join jihad” against Russia, the United States, and Tajikistan’s government. The video went viral (Reuters.com, May 28, 2015). Interestingly, prior to his escape, Khalimov had been detained by Tajikistani authorities on suspicion of contacts with radical Islamists. Yet, he escaped further prosecution and retained his position in the military, which seemed inexplicable at the time given the harsh measures applied by local authorities to those suspected of holding radical Islamist sympathies. Furthermore, it remains unclear how he (and his family) managed to freely leave the country undetected. Undoubtedly, this suggests the existence of multiple influential accomplices.
At this point it is still unclear what motivated Khalimov to take such a radical step. Local sources have come up with four potential explanations. First, he may have joined IS as a protest against perceived injustices and maltreatment of Muslims, a sentiment that is allegedly widely endorsed by local authorities. Second, Khalimov’s gradual religious transformation—he acknowledged that he began practicing Islam in 2001—and his transition toward radical Islamism might have led him to joining the terrorist group. However, according to Khalimov`s co-workers and acquaintances, the colonel had never been thought of as an especially religious man. Third, he may have joined IS for financial gain. This is the least credible explanation given the benefits Khalimov and his second wife—who also worked in the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs)—were receiving in Tajikistan at the time of their departure and the young colonel’s various career prospects. The fourth explanation is that Khalimov had some form of post-traumatic stress disorder—that his participation in multiple armed conflicts and military operations could have had a deep and profoundly disturbing psychological effect (Sputniknews.ru, September 8, 2017).
The Radical
Upon joining IS, Khalimov (al-Tajiki) experienced rapid career growth: in 2016, he became the organization’s war minister, a position previously occupied by Tarkhan Batirashvili (a.k.a. Omar al-Shishani), who was killed near al-Shirqat, in Iraq. This made Khalimov the de facto second-in-command to IS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Some sources have argued that this rapid rise within IS was not only a result of Khalimov’s skills and expertise, but also because of his ethnic background and ties to Tajikistan, where IS had hoped to recruit more jihadists (Sputniknews.ru, September 8, 2017). In effect, this thesis finds corroboration in Khalimov’s future activities. Namely, Tajikistani sources claimed that local servicemen started receiving text messages from the renegade colonel, with promises to “congratulate Tajikistan on the 25th anniversary of independence [on September 9]” (Centralasia.media, September 7, 2016).
Sources within Tajikistan’s security services later claimed that Khalimov had been spotted in the Afghan region of Badakhshan (approximately 80 kilometers from Tajikistan) in 2017. Khalimov, accompanied by some militants and fifteen members of the Tajik “Alfa” special forces who also allegedly defected, reportedly attempted to enter Tajikistan in order to stir the situation in Tajikistani Badakhshan, where anti-Rahmon feelings had been on the rise for some time, and potentially recruit new militants (Fergana.media, January 11, 2019).
In effect, rumors about Khalimov were running rampant when he was, once again, pronounced dead. However, this declaration might be premature, given the lack of factual evidence. According to Afghan intelligence services, Khalimov may still be alive and hiding in Central Asia or northern Afghanistan (Dw.com, August 6).
Conclusion: The Legacy of the Rebellious Colonel
The actual fate of Khalimov—whether he was killed or went into hiding—is a secondary concern. Far more important is the impact the ‘Khalimov affair’ might have on Tajikistan and the regional and global extremist movement. In this regard, four points should be highlighted.
First, Tajikistan seems to have failed to resolve its most burning religious questions. The policy chosen by Rahmon after 1997 puts Islam in an ambiguous position. This policy, which infuriates many religious Tajikistanis, has reached its limits and is in need of reform (Berlek-nkp.com, June 1, 2015). It is doubtful that the current political leadership is capable of creating a new approach.
Second, Tajikistan may be looking into the “diversification of radicalism” phenomenon. Radical Islamist ideas are gaining popularity among labor migrants, marginalized members of Tajikistani society and military members like Khalimov. As Central Asian experts have noted, this could open up a Pandora’s Box, with radicalism finding a safe haven among local military/police in the region (Hronikatm.com, June 6, 2015). One such expert, Andrey Serenko, noted: “[T]his is a signal for radical youth and even members of security services in Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics…to accept [Islamic State] and [be] given an opportunity to build a career” (Centre1.com, September 22, 2016).
Third, ethnic Tajiks—and Central Asians in general—might actually be forming the vanguard of regional radical fundamentalism. In effect, Khalimov may be viewed not simply as a unique case, but as an integral part of a larger trend. In effect, recent years have demonstrated the role of ethnic Tajiks in regional/global terrorist movements. It is worth remembering that Khalimov was not the only high-ranking Tajik in IS: in August 2014, another Tajik was promoted to the position of leading the strategic Raqqa province.
Finally, growing radicalization in northern Afghanistan and adjacent parts of Tajikistan might result in spreading destabilization to other parts of Central Asia through, among other measures, the revival of the “Great Khurasan” and other similar projects (Cezarium.com, July 27, 2016).
