Putin’s Eastern Voyage Highlights Russia’s Setbacks

Putin’s Eastern Voyage Highlights Russia’s Setbacks

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tour of Russia’s Siberian and Far Eastern regions between late July and early September exposed the disconnect between Kremlin messaging and Russia’s economic realities. His rhetoric emphasized development and prosperity while food and fuel prices rose, fish production declined, and the gasoline crisis continued.
• The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and Eastern Economic Forum did not bring significant gains in Russian economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Power of Siberia-2 pipeline deal remained unsigned and a large fire at the Amur Gas Chemical Complex underscored the risk of investment in Russian projects for PRC companies. 
• Economic deterioration and Ukrainian strikes are weakening Moscow’s negotiating position, and Putin is increasingly isolated from domestic economic realities and international pressure to end his war against Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited at least seven cities in Russia’s Siberian and Far Eastern regions since late July during a tour that began in Irkutsk and Omsk and culminated with the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on September 3. Kremlin coverage featured the usual gloss and fanfare, but Putin’s travels illustrated his denial of the accumulating hardships in Russia because of his war against Ukraine. For example, Putin visited a fish plant in Iturup, the largest of the South Kuril Islands, to taste salmon caviar, and did not note the steadily rising price of the popular product (Kommersant, August 13). Soon after, Russian media reported on a sharp decline in the volume of fish catch in the region and further spikes in the price of the delicacy, in part because of rising marine diesel fuel prices (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 17). Japan, which maintains that the Soviet Union illegally seized the four islands during World War II, was outraged by Putin’s first-ever visit to the South Kurils, marking a new low in bilateral relations (Forbes.ru, August 13).

On August 12, Putin observed the final stage of Pacific Fleet exercises off the coast of Sakhalin Island. He threatened a “mirror response” in response to recent detentions of “shadow fleet” tankers by European states, which Putin described as “piracy” (Izvestiya, August 13; Radio Svoboda, August 14). On board the Varyag, the fleet’s flagship named for a cruiser involved in the first day of the Russo–Japanese War in 1904, Putin invoked the ship’s heavily mythologized namesake. Putin attempted to recycle the old myth, which claims that Russian sailors sank their ship so that it would not be taken by the Japanese. In reality, the ship suffered minor damage in a brief clash with the Japanese, who easily refloated it and incorporated it into the Japanese navy under the name Soya (Radio Svoboda, February 9, 2025; Vedomosti, August 16). Putin’s references to the Russo–Japanese War that ended 121 years ago with the U.S.-mediated Treaty of Portsmouth and Russia’s defeat seem counterintuitive in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ukraine reinforced the historical parallel by striking the frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen in Novorossiysk harbor on the day of Putin’s visit to the Varyag, leaving the Black Sea Fleet without a single operative major surface combatant (The Moscow Times, August 19). 

The most high-profile event in Putin’s tour was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Kyrgyzstan, which was extra-long on ceremony and remarkably low on substance (Gazeta.ru, September 1; TopWar.ru, September 3). Putin’s priority was his meeting with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping. Russian media reported that the leaders were expected to discuss finalizing the deal for constructing the Power of Siberia 2 (Sila Sibiri 2, Сила Сибири 2) gas pipeline, which would carry Russian natural gas from the Arctic Yamal fields through Mongolia to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 31). Putin and Xi exchanged many habitual reassurances about the strength of the Russia–PRC strategic partnership, but the pipeline contract still remains in the stage of “advanced preparations” following the SCO (The Moscow Times, September 3). Putin had several other bilateral meetings and expressed solidarity with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (MK.ru, September 1). Putin’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was supposed to prepare the ground for Putin’s visit to India later this month, but Modi’s call to end his war against Ukraine pushed Putin into a tight diplomatic corner (Nastoyashee Vremya, September 2).

The Vladivostok economic forum was meant to give Putin a platform to address Asian investors and advertise ventures such as the Amur Gas Chemical Complex, a joint project between Russia’s Sibur and the PRC’s Sinopec corporations (Kommersant, August 31). On August 25, a massive fire at the Amur plant claimed at least 15 lives and precluded a planned ceremonial launch of the project at the Eastern Economic Forum, showing that while the Far East is generally out of the reach of Ukrainian drones, the poorly functioning Russian economy still creates serious risks for foreign investors (Biznes Online, August 26; Forbes.ru, August 27). Putin’s reassurances that refineries damaged by Ukrainian strikes will be swiftly rehabilitated are disproved by the arrival of the second wave of the fuel crisis, which shows no signs of abating (Vazhnye Istorii, August 21). The more Putin relies on top-down orders to restart economic growth and to launch a new investment cycle, the more the worries among government officials, business elites, and common consumers could translate into politically subversive actions (The Moscow Times, September 4).

Russia’s economic decline weakens its position in peace negotiations. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe reportedly tried to convey this to Russian intelligence leaders during his visit to Moscow on August 25 (Carnegie Politika, September 3). Putin apparently refused to meet Ratcliffe, but met U.S. special envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff on September 5 (Meduza; Kommersant, September 6). On September 6, Kushner and Witkoff traveled to Kyiv for the first time, where expectations that Putin would consent to a reasonable compromise were low but interest in engaging with U.S. negotiators was high (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 6). Moscow commentators closely followed the frank conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which high-level representatives of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also joined (Izvestiya, September 7). The problem for mediators is primarily that Putin’s expressed perceptions of the course of his war depart increasingly from reality (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 7). Russians see no way out of this deadlock—while a majority say they want the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine to end, most believe it will continue for more than a year (Re: Russia, September 4). 

Europeans are rightly concerned about the escalation of Russian provocations, sabotage, and election interference. For the United States, Putin’s intention to pivot toward the PRC and wider Asia-Pacific is of serious importance. Setbacks in executing this course are indicative of a larger problem—the center of gravity in Russian policy is Putin’s war against Ukraine. Moscow is concentrating maximum possible attention on not losing this misbegotten confrontation, and so Siberia and the Far East are drained of investments, resources, and people. Direct messages from India, Türkiye, and even Kazakhstan on the senselessness and dangers of continuing the war are amplifying signals from Washington that each new version of a peace deal may require deeper compromises from the Kremlin.