Russia and Afghanistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement

Russia and Afghanistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement

Executive Summary:

• Russia and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a military cooperation agreement on May 27 in Moscow, one year after the Kremlin removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organizations and became the first and only country to recognize the Taliban government.
• The undisclosed pact—framed by Moscow as covering the repair of Russian-made equipment—signals a broader strategy to integrate Afghanistan into Russia’s sphere of influence as a transit hub linking Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.
• Deepening Russian–Taliban ties risk unsettling Pakistan, which is engaged in open conflict with the Taliban regime, alarming Central Asian states such as Tajikistan, and undermining the position of the People’s Republic of China, Afghanistan’s largest foreign investor.

Russia and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a military cooperation agreement on May 27 at the International Security Forum in Moscow oblast. The agreement marked an expansion of ties between the Kremlin and the Taliban one year after Moscow removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organizations (see EDM, July 23, 2025; Interfax, May 27; TOLO News, May 28). Afghan Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqub said, “Interaction with Russia is important for us. Afghanistan and Russia have long-standing and historic relations, and we want to move forward in this direction.” Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, after a meeting with Yaqub, stated, “We are convinced that Western countries must unfreeze frozen Afghan assets, fully acknowledge their full responsibility for their 20-year presence in Afghanistan, and assume the entire burden of post-conflict reconstruction of the country” (Interfax, May 27; TOLO News, May 28). On May 14, at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Security Council Secretaries in Bishkek, Shoigu stated that Russia was establishing a full-fledged partnership with the Taliban, “from political and security contacts to trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. We are convinced that cooperation with Kabul meets the objectives of the region’s security and economic development” (Interfax, May 27).

Russia is the first and only country to have recognized the Taliban government (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 28). Its signing of a defense cooperation agreement with the Taliban marks a strategic shift reflecting Moscow’s broader strategy of expanding its influence in Central and South Asia. The relationship rests on an economic foundation as well, with bilateral trade exceeding $530 million in 2025 and Russian officials citing a further 2.6-fold increase in the first two months of 2026 (SpecialEurasia, June 1).

Moscow justified its recognition of the Taliban regime by citing its cooperation in combating terrorism and drug trafficking (TOLO News, July 5, 2025). In 2003, Russia designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization. In August 2021, Russia changed its stance toward the Taliban. It kept its embassy open in Kabul even after the Taliban’s return to power to maintain ties with the group (see EDM, November 13, 2024). In 2024, Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov said, “The Taliban is ready to fight the most dangerous wing of the Islamic State, [the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP)] which is still getting material support from the West, which uses the terrorist group’s capacity to carry out subversive false-flag operations on our soil” (TASS, October 4, 2024). ISKP claimed responsibility for an attack at a concert hall near Moscow in 2024 that killed 145 people (see EDM, March 26, 27, 2024; see Terrorism Monitor, May 6, 2024; Novaya Gazeta Europe, March 7, 2025). In 2025, Moscow cited security as the primary reason for recognizing the Taliban government, which the Kremlin had already declared an ally in counterterrorism efforts, particularly against ISKP (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2025).

The Russia–Afghanistan defense pact—the details of which have not been made public—comes at a time when Pakistan is engaged in an open war against the Taliban regime for harboring anti-Pakistan terrorist groups in Afghanistan (Dawn, February 27). The agreement could raise eyebrows not only in Islamabad but also in Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, which, similar to Pakistan, has been a victim of cross-border terrorism originating from Afghanistan. Since 2021, Dushanbe has been concerned about the infiltration of armed militants into the country. Tajikistan, which has opposed Taliban rule from the very beginning, has tense relations with the Taliban regime in Kabul. Under the four and a half years of Taliban government, several border clashes have broken out between Taliban fighters and Tajikistani border forces (Dawn, November 27, 2025).

Moscow released some details of the military cooperation pact days after signing it to avoid backlash from Pakistan and Central Asian states. Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, called it a military-technical cooperation agreement primarily aimed at facilitating the repair and restoration of Russian and Soviet-made military equipment in Afghanistan. Kabulov described the document as a framework agreement that could open the door to broader military cooperation in the future (Ariana News, June 2). Experts caution that Russia’s ability to deliver on any broader commitments is constrained by its war against Ukraine and the effects of Western sanctions on its defense industry, leading some to read the pact as a symbolic formalization of ties rather than the start of a deep military partnership. For the internationally isolated Taliban, the agreement’s principal value may itself be symbolic, allowing Kabul to claim external legitimacy from a major power outside the West (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 28).

From a geographical perspective, Afghanistan is a key transit point for Russia that links Central Asia to South Asia, offering greater access to maritime trade through ports in Iran and Pakistan. A Trans-Afghan Railway, also referred to as the Kabul Corridor, which is connected to the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) One Belt One Road initiative, could help Moscow bypass trade routes controlled and sanctioned by Western countries (see EDM, November 25, 2025, April 1, June 11). For Russia, Afghanistan holds value as a transit hub linking Central Asia to the Indian Ocean (SpecialEurasia, June 6, 2025). The railway ambition also tempers the military relationship, as the corridor is designed to run southward through Pakistan, giving Moscow an incentive to avoid alienating Islamabad even as it arms Islamabad’s adversary (SpecialEurasia, June 1).

Russia’s strategy of deepening ties with the Taliban marks the beginning of a new period in power dynamics in Afghanistan. Initially, the Kremlin will strengthen its diplomatic, defense, and trade relations with Afghanistan, laying the groundwork for joint infrastructure and security projects. Moscow’s strategy signals Afghanistan’s deeper integration into Russia’s sphere of influence, an outcome that could upset global and regional players such as the United States and the PRC (The Khaama Press, July 4).

The PRC could have the most to lose, as the largest foreign investor and key foreign player in Afghanistan. Beijing continued to increase its investments in Afghanistan’s mining and energy sectors following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the war-torn country in 2021 (RTA, May 19). Similar to Russia, the PRC has been voicing concerns at the United Nations over illegal and unilateral sanctions imposed by the West on Afghanistan, recently calling for the lifting of sanctions and for facilitated access to Afghanistan’s central bank assets for the benefit of the Afghan people (TOLO News, June 15). The PRC is also active in bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan to the negotiating table. In April, it hosted talks between Taliban and Pakistani officials at Urumqi in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to de-escalate the situation at the Pakistan–Afghanistan border (Dawn, April 8).

Russia’s strategic partnership with the Taliban could undermine the PRC’s leverage and influence in Afghanistan. It could also encourage militant groups globally to pursue power through force, alarming both Islamabad and Beijing. Pakistan is currently targeting terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan, and any Kremlin arming of the Afghan Taliban could raise tensions between Russia and Pakistan (Al Jazeera, June 29, 2026).