Russia Expands Youth Militarization (Part Two)
Russia Expands Youth Militarization (Part Two)
Executive Summary:
- The Kremlin has integrated Russian youth organizations such as Yunarmia, the Movement of the First, and VOIN into a militarization system that channels children from patriotic education to military training and, ultimately, service in Russia’s armed forces and security institutions.
- Yunarmia (Youth Army, Юнармия), founded by the Ministry of Defense in 2016, and the Movement of the First, created by President Vladimir Putin in 2022, provide mass patriotic education and youth engagement, with the latter serving as the umbrella organization coordinating Russia’s broader youth policy.
- VOIN (Warrior, Воин), established by Putin in December 2022, serves as the youth system’s specialized military training arm, providing firearms, drone, engineering, tactical medicine, and other combat-oriented instruction while rapidly expanding across Russia and occupied Ukraine.
- Russia’s youth militarization ecosystem is likely to pose long-term security risks for Ukraine and the West by shaping future generations via military training, wartime ideology, and fostering hostility towards Ukraine and the West.
On May 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated the Yunarmia (Youth Army, Юнармия) organization on its 10th anniversary. The Russian Ministry of Defense founded the organization—the “All-Russia Young Army National Military Patriotic Social Movement Association” in full—in 2016. Putin called Yunarmia one of the most authoritative organizations in the country, a “school of life” for millions of Russian children ages 8 to 18, and emphasized the critical role it has played in Russia’s patriotic education system (TASS, May 28). Putin reiterated the Kremlin’s unwavering support for the organization’s role in legitimizing and expanding youth militarization in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
Vladislav Golovin, the head of Yunarmia and a former Russian marine who participated in the assault on Mariupol in 2022, recently said that the organization’s membership has surpassed two million. According to him, Yunarmia operates approximately 450 “Yunarmia Houses,” training centers across Russia and occupied Ukraine where children receive military training, including in first aid and “journalism” (TASS, May 28).
Many Yunarmia graduates have already entered military service, military universities, and law enforcement agencies. In September 2025, Golovin said that 140,000 Yunarmia members had joined the Russian army and other law enforcement agencies, and that about 11,000 members or alumni had already served in Russia’s war against Ukraine (TASS, September 30, 2025). This claim demonstrates that Yunarmia is not merely a patriotic movement but also a key component of a broader youth ecosystem that combines children’s education, nationalistic indoctrination, and pathways leading them to military service.
Youth organizations such as the Movement of the First, VOIN (Warrior, Воин), and Yunarmia have played an increasingly important role in Russian education since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as have militarized youth activities like Avangard Camp and Zarnitsa. These groups are under the close control of Putin and the Kremlin. Putin created the Movement of the First in 2022. Putin also created VOIN, the “Center for Military-Sports Training and Patriotic Education of Youth” in full, in December 2022.
The Movement of the First, Yunarmia, and VOIN are interlocking components of the youth military ecosystem. The Movement of the First increasingly serves as an umbrella organization within Russia’s youth policy architecture, while Yunarmia and VOIN provide more specialized military training functions. Together, these organizations create a structured pathway through which children progress from patriotic education to military-patriotic activities, military training, and ultimately military service in the Russian army and other security institutions.
These organizations regularly organize joint competitions and gatherings. Yunarmia’s Zarnitsa 2.0 event, a high-tech military-patriotic competition supported by the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh, Росмолодёжь) and the Russian Ministry of Education, is one example. Children and young people train as commanders, drone operators, medics, signal operators, engineers, and assault troops during the event (Yunarmia, July 4).
The governance structure of the Movement of the First demonstrates the high-level state coordination behind Russia’s youth policy (Movement of the First, July 6). Putin chairs its Supervisory Board, and its governing bodies include senior officials from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Defense, Rosmolodezh, the Internet Development Institute, and major state-linked corporations such as Roscosmos, Aeroflot, and Gazprombank. Golovin also serves on the Board of Trustees of the Movement of the First.
Yunarmia’s leadership also demonstrates the institutional overlap among Russia’s more explicitly militarized youth structures. On July 3, a meeting of the newly elected Yunarmia leadership was held at the Russian Ministry of Defense’s National Defense Management Center following the 15th All-Russian Annual Yunarmia Rally, where Golovin was confirmed once again as head of the movement, and deputy chiefs were elected for five-year terms (Yunarmia, July 3).
The newly elected Yunarmia leadership includes the chairman of the Movement of the First, the head of the Ministry of Defense’s Center for Military-Patriotic Work, the head of United Russia’s Young Guard, the deputy director for Patriotic Education of VOIN, representatives of Avangard, leadership from the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia, senior military officers, parliamentarians, and regional Yunarmia leaders (Yunarmia, July 3). The composition of Yunarmia’s governing body demonstrates the extensive integration of Russia’s key military-patriotic organizations. It also shows that they function as complementary components of a centrally coordinated state system for youth indoctrination, patriotic education, and military preparation.
The Movement of the First, often described as the successor to the Soviet Pioneers, has around 15 million members aged 6 to 25 across Russia, including 572,000 members in occupied Ukraine (Movement of the First, July 3). It has served as an umbrella structure bringing together educational, patriotic, cultural, volunteer, and military-patriotic activities for children and young people in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Movement of the First has aimed to integrate children into Russian state institutions, promote pro-Russian historical narratives, organize patriotic events, facilitate participation in military-patriotic activities, and reinforce loyalty to the Russian state.
The Movement of the First received $130 million in 2026 and has organized an increasing number of patriotic and educational events across Russia and occupied Ukraine (Novaya Gazeta, June 4). Yunarmia claims at least 50,000 members in occupied Ukraine and has recently been playing an increasing role in introducing children to military culture through weapons handling, trench digging, tactical training, and patriotic instruction. Its founding documents explicitly identify raising the prestige of military service and preparing young people for service in the Russian army and law enforcement agencies as core objectives (Yunarmia, March 26, 2025). Between 2015 and 2021, the Kremlin increased Yunarmia’s funding fourfold from around 198 million rubles ($2.6 million) to 819 million rubles ($10.6 million) (Verstka, May 14).
VOIN has emerged as the most militarized component of the Kremlin’s youth ecosystem, providing comprehensive military training in firearms, tactical and engineering preparation, communications, drone piloting, tactical medicine, military-sports games, and sniper skills (VOIN, July 4). According to its charter, VOIN’s objectives include developing Russia’s military-sports preparation system, supporting military-patriotic organizations, training veterans, and creating conditions for Russian children to master military occupations (VOIN, February 25, 2025). VOIN has enrolled children and youth aged 14 to 35, training approximately 108,000 people, including 10,000 in the occupied territories of Ukraine, between 2022 and 2026 (TASS, April 27). By June 2026, more than 150,000 cadets had completed military training via VOIN, including over 35,000 participants in summer military-patriotic programs, while the rest received training through schools, vocational colleges, and universities (TASS, June 25).
There are 21 VOIN centers across Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin plans to open VOIN branches across all 89 Russian regions by 2030, with new branches planned in Karelia, Primorsky krai, and the Amur oblast by the end of this year per Putin’s direct request (VOIN, December 24, 2025; TASS, June 25). Moscow has allocated around 15 billion rubles ($195 million) from the federal budget since September 2022 to expand the network of VOIN centers (Meduza, May 11).
In June, VOIN leadership approved 14 new educational programs for its participants as part of its “Time of Young Heroes” summer military-patriotic camps. The program, which used to be a single 72-hour course, will become a multi-tiered system of 14 programs that students can complete over five summers (TASS, May 18). Currently, participants complete programs in tactical and firearms training, survival and reconnaissance, first aid and tactical medicine, drone piloting, and sniping during the summer (TASS, May 18).
VOIN has been integrating Russian veterans into youth militarization activities, employing approximately 300 of them as instructors (TASS, July 1). In Ukraine’s occupied Luhansk oblast, 98 percent of instructors were combat veterans or current participants in Russia’s war (TASS, April 27).
Russia’s institutionalized youth indoctrination and militarization pipeline may pose a long-term threat to Ukraine and European security. It is not merely serving as a foundation for producing future military recruits for the Russian military, security services, and law enforcement agencies. It is also shaping a generation of children in Russia and occupied Ukraine to view the United States, Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the West as hostile enemies who want Russia’s demise. The indoctrination of a generation could create long-term security risks that would outlast a potential ceasefire. For Ukraine and its western partners, this situation means that reintegration, de-indoctrination, and civic education programs will be critical in any liberated territories and, potentially, in democratic Russia. Western policymakers should consider that Russia’s youth militarization is likely to present security challenges for Europe for decades to follow.
