Russia-led Regional Integration Projects Continue to Flounder

Russia-led Regional Integration Projects Continue to Flounder

Executive Summary:

• Countries in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) offer rhetorical support for closer integration despite Russia seeking exemptions from a common market for its armaments industry and cracking down on immigration from EAEU countries.
• Despite Russian lobbying and a much-hyped meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan continue to forgo full membership in the EAEU and remain observer states.
• Post-Soviet states have formed a new organization to ostensibly promote the Russian language. This may be a way of attempting to appease Moscow, given Putin’s long-standing anger at Kyiv’s decision to make Ukrainian the country’s only official state language.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)—comprising Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—continues to promote regional integration despite its decade-long existence yielding a resounding lack of results. A new set of procedures to deepen integration processes, known as the “Lead Protocol No.4” («IV Большой» протокол; “IV Bol’shoi” protokol), was approved by the Supreme Council—the trade bloc’s governing body—this summer and was introduced into Kazakhstan’s parliament. The text was posted on the official government portal to allow citizens to review it (Eurasian Economic Commission, September 25). Kazakhstan’s press noted in October that the protocol contains provisions by Russia to exempt its armaments industry from the proposed integrated EAEU procurement system (Exclusive.kz, October 5). The provisions include language on “alterations regarding the laws of the Russian Federation concerning government defense procurements,” which allows the Kremlin to maintain a special system for its military-industrial complex that is exempt from oversight of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the governing body of the EAEU. This contradicts the EAEU’s drive to grant the body more powers to remove trade barriers and regulate a common market across the five EAEU member states and their trade partners (EAEU, accessed November 17).

Russia has also introduced tougher measures earlier this year to limit guest worker access to its labor market, and the country’s Immigration Service frequently refuses to reregister guest workers if they move jobs (Eurasianet, September 9). These shifts in Russian guest worker policy contradict the central goals of the EAEU on the creation of a common labor market and conflict with the EAEU’s own laws, which allow EAEU citizens to reregister with new labor contracts (Radio Azatutyun, January 18).

The Russian press had expected that the October meeting between Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Russian President Vladimir Putin would lead to a long-expected announcement that the Central Asian republic would seek formal membership in the organization (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 31). No such announcement followed, however (President of Russia, October 9). In addition to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has also yet to join the EAEU. Uzbekistan’s priority remains finalizing World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, while continuing to delay decisions about pursuing full EAEU membership for at least another few years. This delay follows the Oily Majilis’s—the Uzbek legislative body—decision to reject full EAEU membership in late 2024 (see EDM, February 26; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29).

Georgia has also not pursued membership in the EAEU. The European Union remains Georgia’s largest trading partner, with trade volumes reaching 5 billion euros (about $5.8 billion) in 2024. Despite a decline in Georgian–EU relations, the EAEU will struggle to ever match such trade (1tv.ge, October 29). The continued integration of energy markets and emphasis on energy routes underscore how the EAEU is driven by commodities and transit networks, rather than finished manufactured goods, which further limits the attractiveness of the bloc for Georgia (see EDM, February 26).

EAEU discussions now focus on establishing a common stock and commodities exchange by 2030, which will enable securities to be traded across member states (EAEU, October 15). There are, however, reasons to be skeptical about the bloc achieving fiscal integration along EU lines. A decade ago, following the formation of the EAEU, conversations began to take place in Kazakhstan and Russia surrounding a common currency for the union, called the “Altin” (Turkic for “gold”), with Russian newspapers expressing hopes that it would be introduced “no later than 2025” (see EDM, March 27, 2015; Rossisskaya Gazeta, May 12). These plans never came to fruition, and Russia’s increasing isolation from the global economy, along with its oversized role within the EAEU’s economy, will pose a significant obstacle for other EAEU member states seeking a common market. This issue is particularly acute given the 19th EU sanctions package against Russia adopted on October 22, which includes sanctions imposed on banks in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion (European Commission, October 22; Gazeta.uz, October 23).

In parallel with the EAEU, the International Organization for the Russian Language (MOPRYa) continues to move forward. Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed the organization at the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in October 2023 (RBC, October 13, 2023; TASS, November 21, 2024). Press reports noted that Uzbekistan’s parliament rushed to affirm membership, which now includes Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (Azatlik, November 4, 2024). The organization is headed by the director of Kazakhstan’s Diplomatic Academy. One likely reason for the organization’s formation is an attempt by member countries to placate the Kremlin, which has used Kyiv’s decision not to make Russian an official state language in Ukraine as one of the excuses for launching its full-scale invasion in 2022 (TASS, December 23, 2021; Kommersant, August 17)

The importance that the Kremlin places on maintaining the Russian language as a central element in integration across post-Soviet Eurasia is not lost to leaders in Russia’s so-called “near abroad.” It can often serve as a barometer for sentiments among other countries toward Russia (see EDM, October 31, 2024). Armenia has not formally joined the MOPRYa, and the country’s Minister of Education, Zhanna Andresayan, emphasized that Armenia may eventually join, but that Russian would never become an official language in the country (Novosti Armenia, July 10).  

Ironically, Russia seeks to exempt its growing military-industrial complex and labor markets from the Russia-dominated EAEU. Post-Soviet states are also avoiding full EAEU membership, while still demonstrating a desire to avoid conflict with Russia over the Russian language by joining Tokayev’s newly formed organization. After three years of Russia’s war against Ukraine, post-Soviet Eurasia continues to offer little more than rhetorical support for regional integration.