Russia Overextends on Arctic Nuclear Icebreaker Goals

Russia Overextends on Arctic Nuclear Icebreaker Goals

Executive Summary:

• Atomflot, a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, is suing the Baltic Shipyard for 46.1 million rubles (about $507,100) over a 34-day delay in delivering the nuclear-powered icebreaker, Yakutia, due to international sanctions and industrial bottlenecks.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin frames nuclear-powered icebreakers as instruments of sovereignty and Arctic dominance, yet the Kremlin’s Arctic goals are disconnected from logistical realities.
• The slow and uneven pace of Russian construction, compared with Kremlin ambitions, has important implications for Russia’s forthcoming strategy for Arctic zone development and national security for the period until 2050.

On December 3, Russian media reported that the Moscow Court of Arbitration had issued a ruling ordering the Baltic Shipyard to pay penalties to Atomflot for the construction delays of Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreaker, Yakutia. Atomflot, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, maintains the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet. It is suing the Baltic Shipyard 46.1 million rubles (about $507,100) for a 34-day delay in delivery of Yakutia, which is part of the nuclear-powered icebreakers Project 22220 (Vedomosti, December 3; Atomic Energy 2.0, December 5).

The Baltic Shipyard has blamed the Yakutia’s delay on difficulties in finding new equipment suppliers due to international sanctions and the need to import substitute equipment (Vedomosti, December 3). The court ruled that the Baltic Shipyard should have anticipated these issues and agreed with Atomflot on a different deadline in advance (Vedomosti, December 3). This is the second time Atomflot has attempted to file a lawsuit against the Baltic Shipyard over Yakutia’s delays (Vedomosti, December 3). This latest ruling order is awaiting a final decision.

Scaling of nuclear-powered icebreakers remains uneven and slow due to industrial bottlenecks, financial constraints, and sanctions. Russia is the only country with a nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet (eight in total), in addition to its 34 diesel-powered icebreakers. Three Project 22220 vessels are under construction, each requiring about five to six years from order to delivery. Rosatom predicts that it will require 15 to 17 new icebreakers (up from earlier projections of 10 to 11) in order to enable Northern Sea Route (NSR) cargo transport of 100–150 million tons despite sanctions pressure (Rosatom, March 28). The Kremlin has prioritized nuclear-powered icebreakers over nuclear-powered cargo ships, of which it has one ageing vessel awaiting decommission (Rosatom, accessed December 11). This prioritization is a cheaper and more efficient option than constructing multiple nuclear-powered cargo ships, as a single nuclear-powered icebreaker can escort multiple cargo ships, regardless of their propulsion source.

Russia’s newest vessel under Project 22220 is the Stalingrad. On November 18, Rosatom staged a high-profile keel-laying ceremony at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg, which Russian President Vladimir Putin attended virtually (Rosatom, November 20). Keel-laying marks the start of construction, not operational readiness. The vessel is not expected to enter service until December 2030. State media, however, framed the event as a major milestone in Arctic development. In his speech at the event, Putin said that it is “essential to consistently strengthen Russia’s position in the Arctic” (President of Russia, November 18). Another Project 22220 nuclear-powered icebreaker under construction is the Chukotka, ceremonially launched in November 2024. It is only 70 percent complete, however, and is not due to be delivered to Atomflot until December 2026 (Atomic Energy 2.0, November 19).

Nuclear-powered icebreakers are important to the Kremlin’s narrative that the Arctic is an area of special historical influence, and to applying nuclear technology to its Arctic ambitions (President of Russia, November 18) [see Table 1]. The new strategy for Arctic zone development and national security for the period until 2050, for which Putin reportedly prepared a draft decree in September, will undoubtedly reflect this (see EDM, October 3). Putin said in March that he will “do everything to strengthen Russia’s global leadership in the Arctic” (see EDM, March 21, April 15; President of Russia, March 27). These icebreakers maintain year-round shipping, escort resource shipments, conduct tow and rescue operations, and conduct research operations, thereby ensuring a continuous Russian presence in the High North and along the NSR. The 3-meter icebreaking capabilities also make the Project 22220 vessels important resupply assets for Russia’s military bases along the NSR (High North News, August 12, 2024; Rosatomflot, accessed December 15). A recent investigation found that Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers, despite ostensibly being “civilian” vessels, were used to launch drones into the airspace of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Digital Digging, December 10).

Control of the NSR remains the primary function of Russian icebreakers, nuclear-powered or otherwise. Rosatom has been authorized as the NSR infrastructure operator since 2018 (RBC, June 26, 2018). In October, Rosatom General Director Alexey Likhachev said that the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (TTC)—which is intended to connect St. Petersburg to Vladivostok—will become a key section of the NSR due to growing Arctic mining, international transit, particularly from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and connection with Russia’s domestic railway network (Rosatom, October 25).

The PRC, however, appears to be keeping Russia at arm’s length in its own icebreaker projects. Rosatom is working with PRC company New New Shipping on a joint venture to design and construct five container ships capable of year-round Arctic transit, although it is not yet public whether these ships will be nuclear-powered (Atom Media, June 6, 2024; Interfax, June 18). The first ship is expected to be completed in 2027.

There is little chance that the PRC will exceed Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet numbers anytime soon. Still, it may outpace Atomflot and the Baltic Shipyard in efficiency and supply chain access. The PRC recently inaugurated its first nuclear-powered icebreaker, Xuelong 3 (or Snow Dragon 3), which it calls the world’s first 35,000-ton nuclear-powered icebreaker and research vessel (SMEOcean, September 20). The PRC also recently promoted a new conceptual design by China State Shipbuilding Corp for a nuclear-powered icebreaker that would function as both a ferry and a cargo vessel (China Daily, December 6). There are no indications of Russian involvement in the PRC’s nuclear-powered icebreaker construction, despite hints at this in a 2019 report (South China Morning Post, December 10, 2019).

While the Kremlin projects the narrative of its nuclear-powered icebreakers as symbolic of Arctic dominance and sovereignty, it is ultimately constrained by sanctions and supply chain choke points. International sanctions are making a meaningful dent in the construction pace and casting a spotlight on the disconnect between Kremlin policies and logistical realities. The Kremlin may be overextending its resources and expectations for nuclear-powered icebreakers in the Arctic, and its ability to maintain the narrative of dominance and sovereignty is unsustainable at the current rate.

Table 1: Russian Nuclear Technology in the Arctic