Russia Reinforces Ties with Brazil Amid Western Sanctions

Russia Reinforces Ties with Brazil Amid Western Sanctions

Executive Summary:

• Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has increasingly prioritized Brazil as its key partner in Latin America, using fertilizer exports and agricultural trade to preserve global supply-chain relevance and mitigate the economic impact of Western sanctions. 
• Brazil’s policy of “friendly neutrality” toward Russia’s war against Ukraine—condemning the invasion in principle but refusing to join Western sanctions—provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy and reinforces the Kremlin’s narrative that non-Western countries do not support Russia’s international isolation. 
• Cooperation within BRICS has become an institutional pillar of Russia–Brazil relations, allowing Russia to promote alternative financial mechanisms, expand settlements in national currencies, and maintain engagement with major emerging economies outside of Western-dominated institutions. 
• Although Brazil is unlikely to become a full geopolitical ally of Russia, expanding cooperation in nuclear energy, space technologies, and select defense sectors offers Moscow opportunities to deepen long-term technological ties and gradually diversify its exports beyond raw materials.

Introduction

On February 5, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin visited Brazil in one of the most significant Russian foreign policy developments in recent months. During the visit, the Russian delegation conducted negotiations with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Brazilian Vice President Geraldo Alckmin. Both sides openly reaffirmed that bilateral relations are “developing in the direction of a strategic partnership” and should continue expanding despite heightened international tensions (RIA Novosti, February 5). The talks focused on expanding bilateral trade, launching new joint projects, and strengthening scientific and technological cooperation (Roscongress, February 9). During the event, the Russian delegation openly described Brazil as its key partner in Latin America for the first time (RIA Novosti, February 9). 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when Russia began facing growing international isolation, Brazil has emerged as one of Moscow’s most important partners in Latin America. Maintaining close ties with Brazil has provided Moscow with several strategic benefits. First, exports to Brazil allowed Russia to preserve a critical position in the global fertilizer supply chain (Povorot Rossii v Aziyu, August 11, 2024; Izvestiya, May 9, 2025). Second, Brazil’s continued engagement with Moscow has helped Russia maintain diplomatic legitimacy across parts of the Global South. Third, bilateral cooperation within the BRICS framework—where Brazil is one of the foundational pillars—has supported Russia’s efforts to develop alternative financial and institutional mechanisms outside Western-dominated systems. [1] Finally, Russia and Brazil have maintained selective collaboration in defense-related and energy sectors, allowing Moscow to preserve limited but symbolically important technological and military links with a major Latin American power and one of the world`s largest economies. 

Russia’s Fertilizer Exports to Brazil 

Agricultural trade, particularly fertilizers, has remained one of the most critical pillars of Russian–Brazilian economic relations since February 2022. Brazil, the world’s largest importer of fertilizers and an agricultural superpower, relies heavily on external fertilizer suppliers to sustain its globally competitive agricultural sector (Government of Brazil, January 26). In 2025, Brazil imported 45.5 million tons of fertilizers. This demand makes Russia, one of the world`s largest producers of fertilizers, a central partner for Brazil (International Fertilizer Show, June 19, 2025). According to Russian sources, Russia became Brazil’s largest fertilizer supplier—a quarter of the total—in 2025, leaving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Canada behind (Praym, January 14). Russian fertilizer producers have increasingly prioritized exports to Brazil because Western markets have become less accessible following the introduction and progressive expansion of economic and political sanctions after February 2022.  

Brazilian agriculture’s dependence on Russian fertilizers to produce products such as soybeans, corn, and sugar provides major Russian companies—primarily Uralkali and PhosAgro—with a powerful international lobbyist. Since 2022, Brazilian officials have consistently and openly warned that disruptions to Russian fertilizer payments and logistics could damage agricultural production in Brazil, leading to food instability in the region (Government of Brazil, June 23, 2023). 

Maintaining fertilizer exports to Brazil has produced several strategic benefits for Russia. First, the trade provides stable hard-currency revenues. In 2025, Russia’s exports to Brazil stood at $4 billion, helping offset losses from restricted access to Western markets (Myseldon, January 13; TASS, February 5). Second, perhaps even more importantly, exports to Brazil assisted the Kremlin in keeping key ports in the European parts of Russia—such as  Saint Petersburg, Ust-Luga, Murmansk, Taman, and Rostov-on-Don—alive, mitigating the impact of Western economic sanctions (Evraziyskaya Assotsiatsiya Biznesa, January 29, 2024). Third, continued exports to Brazil allowed Russia to remain tightly integrated into global agricultural supply chains and, arguably, to enhance its position within them (PMEF’26, accessed March 6). Fourth, fertilizer trade strengthens Moscow’s economic ties with major emerging economies, reinforcing Russia’s diplomatic outreach to developing nations. Russia’s growing fertilizer exports to Brazil have also become an enabling factor for expanding shipments of this strategic commodity to other Latin American markets, including Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and, despite geopolitical differences, Argentina (Izvestiya, February 10). 

Brazil Provides Russia a Diplomatic Shield 

Brazil’s posture toward Russia after February 2022 has provided Moscow with a diplomatic shield. While Brazil officially supported several United Nations (UN) resolutions condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it refused to join Western sanctions and continued political and economic dialogue with Moscow. This approach, visible in the final phase of former President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro’s time in office, has become more pronounced during Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s tenure, which began in January 2023. Lula’s foreign policy emphasizes mediation, strategic autonomy, and resistance to bloc politics, which has produced “friendly neutrality” toward Russia. In his speeches, the Brazilian president, while describing Russia’s war against Ukraine as a “mistake,” simultaneously criticized Western governments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for contributing to the escalation of the “crisis” and failing to prioritize diplomacy (Meduza, April 19, 2023). This position is beneficial to the Kremlin and largely falls in line with its key talking points. Moreover, Brazil’s political leadership has adopted a stance on Western economic sanctions that is broadly favorable to Russia, repeatedly arguing that such measures do not contribute to conflict resolution. Instead, Brasilia argues that they harm civilian populations, complicate mediation efforts, and prolong the conflict (RG.RU, September 19, 2023). 

Equally noteworthy is Brazil’s proposed approach to resolving the armed conflict. Officially, Brasília has advanced diplomatic initiatives centered on the creation of an international platform composed of “neutral countries” that would facilitate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Among the states identified by Brazilian officials as potential key participants in such mediation efforts is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (TASS, October 9, 2024).

Brazil’s stance after February 2022 has brought Russia important symbolic and political benefits. Continued engagement with a major democracy and a leading developing economy helps Moscow demonstrate that Western sanctions do not command universal support. At the same time, Brazil’s refusal to isolate Russia diplomatically reinforces Moscow’s broader narrative that the international system is becoming increasingly multipolar, with emerging powers pursuing more independent foreign policies rather than automatically aligning with Western geopolitical agendas.

BRICS Facilitates Russia–Brazil Relationship 

Since 2022, cooperation within BRICS has become an increasingly important institutional channel through which Russia maintains multilateral engagement outside Western-dominated structures. Following Russia’s exclusion from major Western financial-economic and political organizations and platforms, Moscow has increasingly emphasized BRICS as a platform for economic coordination, the development of alternative financial mechanisms, and diplomatic dialogue among major emerging economies. In the official Kremlin narrative after February 2022, BRICS has increasingly been presented as a central pillar of a more multipolar international order and a key venue for coordination among non-Western powers (Vedomosti, February 9). One of the key themes most actively promoted by Russia about BRICS is the expansion of economic cooperation through the use of national currencies as a means of reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar in international trade. Russian officials have repeatedly emphasized this objective. According to Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, BRICS countries are actively discussing mechanisms for increasing settlements in national currencies and creating new financial instruments to support trade and investment cooperation within the bloc (Russian Ministry of Finance, July 8, 2025). 

Within the BRICS framework, Brazil occupies a particularly important place in Moscow’s expectations. As one of the world’s largest economies, Brazil is viewed by Russian policymakers as a key partner in efforts to strengthen BRICS cooperation and expand the role of emerging economies in global governance. These expectations are reinforced by Lula’s consistent rhetorical support for deepening BRICS cooperation (CNN Brazil, July 7, 2025). For example, Brazilian officials have repeatedly emphasized that BRICS should contribute to reforming the international financial architecture and strengthening economic coordination among developing nations. Lula has also openly supported discussions on expanding the use of national currencies in trade among BRICS members and reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar (TV BRICS, May 30, 2023). 

Another important institutional pillar of BRICS cooperation is the New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014. The NDB Board of Governors elected former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff as NDB president in March 2023. Rousseff’s appointment attracted attention, given her past involvement in corruption-related controversies (TASS, March 24, 2023). Although Rousseff upheld the decision to halt new financing projects in Russia—usually citing financial rather than political reasons—her position reflects Brazil’s broader approach of avoiding Russia’s political isolation while preserving BRICS institutional mechanisms, a stance welcomed by Moscow (TASS, March 25, 2025). 

For Russia, Brazil’s continued commitment to BRICS under Lula and his critical rhetoric toward the West has important implications. By sustaining the organization’s institutional activity and backing initiatives to reform global financial governance, Brazil helps preserve BRICS as both a platform for economic cooperation and a symbolic counterweight to Western political and financial pressure.

Energy, Nuclear, and Selective Defense Cooperation 

Russian–Brazilian ties exist along several less visible lines of collaboration. Although defense cooperation is not the central pillar of Russia–Brazil relations and faces major limits, it remains symbolically important for Moscow. Over the past two decades, Russia has sought to establish a foothold in Brazil’s defense market through selective arms transfers and negotiations on advanced systems. The most tangible example was Brazil’s purchase of 12 Mi-35M attack helicopters under a 2008 contract worth roughly $150–250 million, marking the first major acquisition of Russian military equipment by the Brazilian armed forces (Sdelanounas.ru, September 3, 2012). Russian commentators note that Brazilian pilots have generally assessed the aircraft positively, emphasizing their reliability in demanding Amazonian conditions (Novosti VPK, April 16, 2021). Moscow also attempted to expand cooperation through negotiations on the Pantsir-S1 air-defense system. Discussions began in 2013 and periodically continued in subsequent years, although the deal was never finalized. Brazilian officials, however, note that Brazil’s status as a major non-NATO ally of the United States constrains its military acquisitions from Russia (TASS, February 8, 2022). Despite the near collapse of military-technical cooperation since 2022, Brazil has avoided formally joining Western restrictions on defense contacts with Russia. For Moscow, even limited military engagement with Latin America’s largest power carries symbolic value, signaling that Russian defense diplomacy retains partners beyond its traditional security sphere.

Energy cooperation, particularly in the nuclear sector, is also a significant dimension of Russia–Brazil relations. The roots of the Russian–Brazilian collaboration in nuclear energy go back to 2017, when Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding with Eletrobras and Eletronuclear aimed at expanding cooperation in nuclear power generation and related technologies (Rosatom, November 27, 2017). While for now this cooperation has been quite limited in scope, Rosatom managed, through its subsidiaries, to sign contracts with Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) to provide uranium conversion and enrichment services. Russian companies have also supplied enriched uranium and specialized materials used at Brazil’s Angra nuclear power plant (Rosatom, January 2026). Russian industry sources also emphasize the fact that Rosatom currently supplies enriched uranium and medical isotopes to Brazil’s nuclear sector, deepening technological integration between the two countries (Atom Media, May 26, 2025). Brazilian officials continue to signal interest in expanding multidimensional cooperation with Russia in such sectors as nuclear energy generation, fuel-cycle technologies, and medical isotope production (Government of Brazil, February 10). For Russia, the expansion of nuclear partnership with Brazil would be of strategic value—nuclear fuel supply and technology agreements typically span over decades and go well beyond technological cooperation itself.

Finally, the Russia–Brazil partnership in space and communication focuses on developing satellite navigation infrastructure and enhancing launch capabilities. The first step in this direction was made over a decade ago, when Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation systems were installed in Brazil (TASS, September 15, 2015). According to Russian sources, several such stations have been installed at Brazilian research institutions—including facilities in Brasília, Recife, and Santa Maria—forming part of Moscow’s broader effort to expand the global coverage and accuracy of the system (RG.RU, April 27, 2025). Beyond navigation infrastructure, bilateral discussions have moved to the domain of satellite launch vehicles and launch services, which have been gladly embraced by Russian analysts. Russian commentators note the Kremlin’s excitement to jointly develop launch vehicles for satellites to be operated in Brazil and to potentially consider technology transfer, an issue that has historically complicated high-technology cooperation between the two countries (Russian Council, June 3, 2025). Akin to nuclear energy, cooperation in space-related technologies could constitute another long-term opportunity for Russia to retain influence in Latin America. 

Conclusion

Brazil is unlikely to become a full geopolitical ally of Russia. Despite the expansion of bilateral contacts since 2022, Brasília’s foreign policy tradition emphasizes strategic autonomy, diversified partnerships, and avoidance of rigid bloc alignment. Brazil maintains close economic and political relations with the United States and Europe while simultaneously expanding ties with emerging powers. This balancing approach limits the prospects for a formal political alignment with Moscow even as cooperation continues in selected areas. Nevertheless, Brazil performs several important functions in Russia’s post-2022 foreign policy strategy. First, the partnership contributes to Russia’s economic resilience. Continued fertilizer exports to Brazil—one of the world’s largest agricultural producers—help sustain Russian revenue streams and preserve the country’s role in global agricultural supply chains. Second, Brazil’s engagement with Russia provides the Kremlin with diplomatic legitimacy. By maintaining political dialogue and refusing to participate in Western sanctions, Brasília allows Moscow to demonstrate that it is not completely isolated internationally. Third, Brazil offers Russia institutional leverage through its participation in BRICS, where it remains one of the organization’s foundational members and an influential voice among emerging economies. Cooperation within BRICS creates opportunities for Russia to promote alternative financial mechanisms and expand technological collaboration in sectors such as nuclear energy and space. These areas are particularly important for Moscow because they could diversify Russia’s export structure beyond raw materials while creating long-term strategic ties with one of the world’s largest economies.

[1] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa, but now comprising 11 member states (BRICS Info, accessed March 11).