Russia Uses Cossacks to Sustain Ideological Support for War

Russia Uses Cossacks to Sustain Ideological Support for War

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s war against Ukraine surpassed the duration of the Great Patriotic War on January 11, leading the Kremlin to seek new historical motivations—including the elevation of the Cossacks as imperial-era symbols—to sustain ideological and societal support.
• The Kremlin is nationalizing and institutionalizing Cossack movements across Russia, integrating them into military symbolism, regional governance, and recruitment efforts, including participation in the 2026 Victory Day parade and expansion into new regions.
• Cossacks are embedded into Russia’s wartime ideology through hero worship, youth education, and memorialization of fallen fighters, reinforcing militarization and a historical narrative linking imperial traditions to Russia’s future.

On January 11, Russia’s war against Ukraine officially surpassed the length of the Great Patriotic War, the name Russians use for their fight against the Nazi invaders from 1941–1945 during World War II (Meduza, January 11). Forced comparisons to the epoch-making fight against Adolf Hitler have hitherto been the Kremlin’s ideological legitimation for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin may require a new historical parallel after surpassing this milestone. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has invoked Peter the Great’s Great Northern War against Sweden before and during the conflict, one might expect the resurrection of movements and social forces from the Imperial era to accompany such claims (Kommersant, January 6, 2022). The Cossacks pose a viable option. Aside from their “centuries-long” service to Russia, praise from Putin’s presidential aid and liaison to the Cossacks, Dmitry Mironov, and inclusion in the strategy for the development of the Russian Cossacks as an “historically serving society,” recent developments suggest this outcome (Kazachestvo, February 25, 2025; Council under the President of the Russian Federation for Cossack Affairs, accessed January 21). The Kremlin has used the Cossacks to promote its war mythology throughout the war against Ukraine. It appears to continue looking to them to maintain support for the war effort within Russian society.

The Volga Cossacks are finalizing agreements to participate in the 2026 Victory Day parade on Red Square. The first prorector of the Samara state technical university, Evgeny Frank, said, “For us, it is a great honor and responsibility to march alongside the heroes of the Special Military Operation in the form of a training unit” (VsKO, January 19). This remark stands out for several reasons. On the one hand, the Volga region is not commonly associated with the historical and romantic image of the Cossacks, which further supports inferences about the nationalization of the movement across Russia (see EDM, May 29, October 30, 2025). The comment coming from an official of the Cossack further supports open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations—including one recently published in Bellingcat—which have found that cloaked Cossack movements in the region have been playing an important role in luring recruits to give their lives to Russia’s war effort (Bellingcat, December 5, 2025). On the other hand, the inclusion of yet more Cossacks on Russia’s most sanctified stage of the Victory Day Parade testifies to their importance to the regime and the creation of its military might.

Cossack organizations expanding into new parts of the country are also anchored by how the relatively numerous Vologda Cossacks from the Central Cossack Voiska are being incorporated into the recently established North-Western Cossack Voiska (VsKO, January 16). The move, signed into law by Vologda Governor Georgy Filimonov, provides the new host with greater substance and muscle in a sparsely populated region. Likewise, the inclusion of a bust of Cossack General Konstantin Nedoburova on the “alley of Russian heroes” in Moscow, following a vote at the Smena Children’s Center, demonstrates how the Cossacks continue to be positioned in Russian culture and in the worship of heroic figures in Russian history (Kazachestvo, January 19). The decision came after Nedoburova won a competition in which children chose between 16 candidates, of whom he was the only Cossack. While it is important not to overstate the significance or representativeness of such a small competition, some of the other choices included several World War II fighters. Admittedly, Nedobruva fought in World War I, the Russian Civil War, and the Great Patriotic War, but he will soon be included among statues of legendary Russian figures, such as Peter the Great, Dmitry Donskoy, and Alexander Nevsky, emphasizing his pre-Soviet contributions.

Nedoburova is not the only Cossack to have been anointed the title of “hero of Russia” in recent times. Putin named Luhansk Cossack Yuri Petrov a hero of Russia in January during a ceremony at the Kremlin, making him the thirteenth Cossack to win the prestigious medal (VsKO, January 19). Vitaly Kuznetsov, the chief Ataman of the national movement, mentioned Petrov’s role in “liberating” the Ukrainian city of Siversk, saying “the deeds of the Cossacks continue the many centuries tradition of serving the Motherland and serve as an example for the rising generation.” Such an example has already been institutionalized in nearby Krasnodar, where one of the streets has been named in memory of the Cossack Dmitry Darchenko, who fell while fighting in Zaporizhzhia. According to the vice governor of the region, Stanislav Kazanzhi, “From childhood he was raised in the traditions of the Cossacks and patriotism … His feats during the Special Military Operation are an example of manliness and devotion to truth for the rising generation.” He added, “I want to emphasize that in the Krimsk district, there is a system of work for guarding the memory of heroes in the patriotic upbringing of youth” (Kazachestvo, January 16). Cossacks who have participated in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine are already being integrated into the Russian ideology of war, emphasizing the role of militarization in youth upbringing.

The Cossacks are also being drawn ever closer to official structures in Novosibirsk. On January 18, the working group on Cossack affairs held a meeting, chaired by its head, Roman Burdin, who is the deputy chairman of the regional government and minister of regional policy. The meeting discussed strengthening ties between the Cossacks and the regional government, including the Cossacks’ role in maintaining public order, patriotic education of youth, and “new initiatives” to deepen connections between the Cossacks and the regional government (VK/@cossacks_noko, January 18; Kazachestvo, January 19). In the Sakhalin oblast, a discussion of the results to revive the Cossacks was held, which highlighted the presence of 18 Cossack classes in secondary schools, 36 Cossack groups in daycares, the creation of a “union of Cossack youth” movement, and a plan to create a youth association at Sakhalin State University (Kazachestvo, December 30, 2025).

As the war grinds on and Russia seeks to leverage any remaining ideological remnants of its romanticization of the Great Patriotic War to infuse its soldiers with meaning and motivation, comparisons to World War II will increasingly need to be set alongside other periods of history. The national spread of the Cossack movement, especially into youth culture, the Kremlin’s attempts to institutionalize Cossack hosts throughout the territory, and the integration of the dead into the narrative all suggest the Cossacks continue to have an important role as ideological figures of Russia’s future.