Russia Uses Past to Justify Indoctrination of Ukrainian Children

Russia Uses Past to Justify Indoctrination of Ukrainian Children

Executive Summary:

• Russia sees history not as a dynamic field of study open to debate but as a bedrock of its ideology and a political tool. Its interpretation of Russian history is carefully policed and used to justify aggressive actions against Ukraine.
• Russian authorities pay special attention to teaching the Russian version of history to children in Ukraine’s occupied territories through new textbooks, retraining teachers, and other sustained measures.
• Russian actions in Ukraine violate numerous bilateral and international treaties, and likely constitute war crimes and other offenses—none of which can be justified by events of the 11th century or the actions of long-dead historical figures, as the Kremlin tries to do.

One of Russia’s demands in the ongoing negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow, facilitated by the United States, is the Kremlin’s claim to the territories of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine (RBC-Ukraine, October 26, 2025). This would require the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the heavily fortified areas of Donbas, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy consistently rejected (TSN, February 7). 

The Kremlin justifies its demands by portraying these Ukrainian territories as historically belonging to Russia (President of Russia, July 12, 2021; TASS, December 9, 2025). Since 2014, after Russian forces occupied Ukrainian territories, the new administrations have introduced revised school curricula to instill this interpretation among local children and young adults. In 2014, when Russian forces occupied Donetsk, Oleksii (name changed to protect his identity) was 14 years old. He told The Reckoning Project (TRP), a global team of journalists and lawyers documenting and investigating war crimes, that some teachers with pro-Ukrainian views left the school. Ukrainian language studies were gradually phased out, and some teachers began banning even speaking Ukrainian during breaks.

During the first year of occupation, the school used old Ukrainian textbooks but asked children to tape over parts of the covers with Ukrainian symbols to “avoid temptations.” Later, the school, he recalls, began receiving textbooks published in Russia and in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) on local Donbas history. Oleksii described the latter as slim booklets full of general statements, Soviet narratives, and Moscow’s interpretation of history. He remembers reading that Donbas had always been pro-Russian. The school program was supplemented with concerts and other activities glorifying the DPR and its unity with Russia. 

After finishing school, Oleksii enrolled at Donetsk State University. A day before the full-scale invasion, he was sick at home—a circumstance he credits with avoiding mobilization into the Russian Armed Forces. He said, “On February 23, I got a call from the dean’s office: ‘Oleksii, please come to the nearest military registration and enlistment office tomorrow.’ I was sick with COVID at the time, lying at home. And honestly, it saved me.”

While still living in Donetsk, he began learning online about Ukrainian history that was not taught in school. This included Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s repressions against Ukrainian peasants and cultural elites, the tragic fate of Ukrainian poet Vasyl Stus, and more. He later left for Lithuania, where he remains. He agreed to speak with Yuliia Khymerik, a TRP researcher, in the hope that, unlike in the past, perpetrators of today’s crimes against the Ukrainian nation will be brought to justice (The Reckoning Project interview, June 2024).

Russia approaches history differently from most other countries. In most countries, history is one subject among many. Similar to other disciplines, it is a work in progress. New interpretations or newly discovered documents can dramatically change the understanding of historical events or figures. Under normal circumstances, Ukrainian and Russian historians would debate differing interpretations at conferences or in academic publications. In Russia today, however, a narrow, carefully policed interpretation of its own and its neighbors’ past serves as a foundation for self-identification and as a political and ideological instrument.

This version of history denies Ukraine full sovereignty and a distinct national identity. The most famous articulation of this view is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s article On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, published in July 2021 (President of Russia, July 12, 2021). In it, he argues that “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia” and that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” Ukrainian historians have argued that Putin misunderstands and misinterprets historical events (see CEPA, February 18, 2022, written by this author). In June 2023, the Russian State Archive published a collection of 242 documents under an identical title—sources from the 11th century to 1991—supporting Putin’s arguments (Archives.Gov.Ru, June 23, 2023). U.K. Defense Intelligence assessed that these materials are used “to justify current Kremlin policy and to support the claim that foreign subversion turned Ukraine into ‘anti-Russia” (X/@DefenseHQ, November 11, 2023)

Historical debate and alternative interpretations are constrained by Russian law. The official Strategy of Russia’s National Policy to 2036, signed by Putin in November 2025, lists among its goals the promotion of “reliable and scientifically sound knowledge about significant events in Russian history, including the history of the state-forming Russian people and other peoples of Russia, and to prevent and combat the falsification of history” (Pravo.Gov.Ru, November 11, 2025). According to the Presidential Decree of December 12, 2023 (No. 1124) “On the approval of the Strategy for Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation,” “falsification of the history of Russia” is defined as one of the causes of extremist threats (Pravo.Gov.Ru, December 28, 2024).

The document “Comprehensive Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2024–2028 in the Donetsk People’s Republic for 2024” includes reviewing library materials every six months to identify and remove literature that “contains information of a terroristic, destructive nature, including the one, which falsifies the history of Russia at all stages of its formation and development and discredits its policies” (Garant.ru, February 7, 2024).[MP2] 

Ukrainian non-governmental organization (NGO) Almenda, in its report How Russia Is Erasing Ukrainian Identity Under the Guise of Fighting Extremism, concludes that Russian extremism legislation defines extremism “not only as a real threat of violence or terrorism but also as opposition to the ideological policy of the Russian Federation” (Almenda, September 24, 2025). According to the analysis, three categories effectively make independent historical research impossible. The first is “Neo-Nazism,” partially defined as an ideology based “on the selective use of historical fragments, symbols, and myths.” The second is “Russophobia,” defined in part as “a hostile, biased, and antagonistic attitude toward citizens of the Russian Federation, the Russian language and culture, and the traditions and history of the Russian Federation.” The research suggests that “Falsification of history”—defined as “large-scale distortion of historical facts aimed at diminishing the role of the [United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)] in World War II”—rewriting events to undermine Russia’s positive image, or using history “as a tool of hybrid attacks against the state”—can also be classified as a phenomenon within the scope of extremism. Russia’s counterterrorism strategy defines Ukraine as “one of the states where falsified historical narratives are being introduced.”

The European Parliament condemned Russia’s instrumentalization of history in its January 23, 2025, resolution. The adopted text rejects historical claims used to undermine Ukraine’s identity and justify the illegal war. It condemns Russia’s failure to establish accountability for Soviet crimes and its suppression of historical research and public debate (Eur-Lex.Europa.Eu, April 23, 2025).

The Russian interpretation of history is a central tool of indoctrination in the occupied territories—as Oleksii experienced. In the 2023 school year, occupation authorities introduced new history textbooks for grades 10–11, and in 2025 for grades 5–7, reflecting a unified official Russian narrative (Almenda, March 11, 2025). The Russian Ministry of Education retrained history teachers in occupied territories (Archive/Zaporozhskoe Agenstvo Novostej, August 27, 2025). In 2025, a new textbook, Military History of Russia, prepared by the Russian Military Historical Society under Vladimir Medinsky, was introduced. It consists of three volumes for grades 6–11 and is recommended “to absolutely all schools in the country, not only military ones” (Almenda, October 10, 2024). Medinsky is also a co-author of standard history textbooks (see EDM, June 5, 2025).

On June 22, 2025, Putin personally met with textbook authors and praised the updated editions. He again denied the natural development of the Ukrainian and other nations on the territory of the Russian Empire, instead blaming the policy of supporting national culture (korenizatsiia; indigenization) at the beginning of the Soviet Union for their creation (RIA Novosti, June 22, 2025).

Review of the new textbooks indicates that they reflect Soviet historiography and introduce new narratives (Texty.Org.Ua, June 24, 2025). Among them is the claim that modern Russia originated from Rus centered in Kyiv—a concept that denies Ukraine its distinct historical trajectory. The Holodomor is minimized, and the Great Britain and France are blamed for the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact—an agreement signed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939, that established Soviet and German spheres of influence, giving the Soviets control over Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia and a part of Poland, which is now Western Ukraine (Holocaust Encyclopedia, last edited September 7, 2023). Instead, one textbook states:

“The unexpected conclusion of the Soviet–German treaty for London and Paris meant the failure of their strategy, which had been based on the idea of setting the USSR and Germany against each other. Even the USSR’s open enemies recognized it not only as logical and justified, but also as being in the interests of the Soviet Union.”

The textbooks also question the legality of the December 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence, claiming without evidence that it occurred “in violation of the Constitution of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.”

They repeat Putin’s statement that “[t]he collapse of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,” and justify the invasion of Ukraine as preventing civilizational collapse. Additionally, they say, “If Ukraine, having joined [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)], provoked a military conflict in Crimea or in Donbas … This would probably be the end of civilization. This could not be allowed.”

Amnesty International called one of the history textbooks “a blatant attempt to unlawfully indoctrinate school children in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories” (Amnesty International, September 1, 2023) Programs such as “Conversations about Important Things,” mandatory weekly classes introduced in 2022, promote Russia’s achievements, duty to the fatherland, and justification of the so-called “Special Military Operation” (Ombudsman.Gov.Ua, July 16, 2024; see EDM, September 9, 2024).

Russian authorities introduced a new sub-subject “History of our region” for 5–7 grades, increased the number of learning hours allocated to the Russian version of history, and introduced a new subject, “Spiritual and moral culture of Russia” (Almenda, November 11, 2025). 

According to Almenda, nearly 40,000 children from occupied territories were brought to Russian cities between 2022 and 2025 for lectures aimed at imposing Russian identity and justifying the war as “liberation” and “denazification” (Almenda, November 11, 2025)

TRP’s submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights concludes that Russia has systematically violated Articles 10 and 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights by denying education in Ukrainian and imposing a single Russified narrative (The Reckoning Project, September 9, 2025). “Education is only available to the extent that it conforms to a Russified worldview,” TRP notes. Parents face pressure, coercion, and fines if they refuse to send their children to occupation-run schools.

Moscow does not treat history as open to interpretation. It promotes a narrow, state-controlled vision of the past, heavily policed inside Russia and in occupied Ukrainian territories. Russian war crimes, aggression, and other violations cannot be debated through competing historical narratives but should be addressed within the framework of international law. Additionally, the efforts of Russian authorities to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in the occupied territories, including through teaching their version of history and promoting militarization, are a threat to Ukraine and its partners, as well as a long-term challenge for Ukraine in the event of liberation.