Russia’s Favorite Syrian General: Tiger Forces Commander Suheil al-Hassan
Russia’s Favorite Syrian General: Tiger Forces Commander Suheil al-Hassan
The man who has the strongest Russian support in Syria might not be President Bashar al-Assad but rather one his most trusted commanders. During his visit to the Khmeimim Air Base in Syria last December, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with senior Russian officers to discuss the field developments in Syria. Al-Assad sat next to Putin at the meeting, and only one other Syrian official had a seat at the table—and it was not the minister of defense or army chief of staff. It was Brigadier General Suheil al-Hassan, the commander of the elite Tiger Forces. He sat across the table surrounded by Russian officers. “Your Russian friends and colleagues have told me… that you and your men fight decisively, bravely and effectively. The most important thing is that the result has always been positive. I hope this cooperation will help us to achieve more success in the future,” Putin said when he started his opening remarks praising al-Hassan. Assad praised him too (RT [Arabic], December 12; YouTube, December 11, 2017).
Putin’s visit was to celebrate the progress made in the Russian war efforts in Syria. Putin was assessing the situation in preparation to draw down the Russian troops in Syria two years after Russia intervened militarily in the conflict—a major factor in the survival of the Assad regime. Before and after the meeting, General al-Hassan has played a role on the battlefield that is unmatched by any other Syrian commander. He is well known for his brutality against the rebels even when they are in civilian areas.
Background
Brigadier General Suheil al-Hassan is the commander of the elite Tiger Forces of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) of President Bashar al-Assad. The Tiger Forces were named after its commander, who is called “the Tiger” by the regime’s supporters in reference to his bravery. [1] He comes from the same Alawite community as al-Assad. [2] Al-Hassan himself built his unit during the Syria civil war and, to ensure their loyalty, he recruits all of his soldiers from the Alawite areas. The Alawite minority is the group in Syria most loyal to the regime, as Alawites dominate many of the senior power positions in the state, its security apparatus and the military officer corps. The Tiger Forces grew significantly in numbers in recent years: in the early years of the war, it was a force of only a few hundred men, but now it is believed to have grown into an eight thousand-man force (7al.net al-Hal, September 24, 2016).
General al-Hassan has built his reputation throughout the years of the civil war by employing vicious tactics on the battlefield. His policies were demonstrated recently in the operation the regime launched to retake rebel-held areas in Ghouta near the capital Damascus. With the overwhelming aerial and field support from the Russians, he retook all of the rebel-held areas around Damascus. This came at a heavy price, however, as hundreds of people, including civilians, have been killed. But al-Hassan’s brutality has been witnessed elsewhere in Syria (al-Jazeera, February 26).
He is the mastermind, advocate and enforcer of the scorched earth strategy used in fighting the rebel groups in Syria. The Syrian opposition accused him of being behind the barrel bombs tactics, which led to the devastation of many civilian areas (Annahar, June 9, 2014). The U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned al-Hassan on January 12, 2017, for his role commanding his fighters to use barrel bombing in various areas, in one case involving toxic gas (See U.S. Treasury statement, January 12, 2017).
General al-Hassan’s role in the violence in Syria can be traced back to the first weeks of the Syrian uprising. The protests were mainly peaceful when they started in Daraa province in southern Syria in 2011. Then-Colonel al-Hassan was the head of the special operation in Syrian Air Force Intelligence (SAFI). As the most powerful intelligence service in the country, SAFI was the first to respond to the uprising. While reports suggested that al-Hassan received orders not to rush to using violence too early in dealing with the situation, he and his men plotted somethings else. Al-Hassan’s chief of staff, who defected and fled the country in 2012, revealed that al-Hassan had orchestrated one of the early operations that aimed to demonize the protesters. According to Afaq Mohammed Ahmed, who is also al-Hassan’s brother-in-law, an attack on army barracks near Daraa was staged by SAFI in order to portray the uprising as a radical Islamist revolt against the army and a Sunni Islamist sectarian rebellion against the Alawites and other minorities. The barracks also included the residences of the families of the primary Alawite officers. The staged attack was used, according to Ahmed’s account, to justify repression. The peaceful protesters were rounded up, and dozens of them, including children, were killed, injured or arrested. (France 24 [via YouTube], January 6, 2013; al-Jazeera, March 18, 2012).
General Suheil al-Hassan was born in 1970 in a village called Beit Ana, which is near the town of Jableh on the Mediterranean cost, the Alawite heartland. He was one of the top students in his class at the air defense academy in Homs. He graduated as a lieutenant in 1991 to pursue a career in the military, where ascension is open for Alawites who dominate the officer corps and senior positions in the armed forces command. But al-Hassan was also a very dedicated soldier. He moved to the elite SAFI and, as head of SAFI special operations, was involved in operations against al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups (Syria Press, August 10, 2016). [3]
Russian aerial and intelligence support has been vital in defeating rebel groups in many areas across Syria. Still, the Russians needed a reliable partner on the ground. The Syrian army, which has been riddled with corruption and inefficiency, was not up to that role. At the same time, the elite units of the Republican Guard were depleted or kept in and near Damascus to defend the capital. Al-Hassan’s Tiger Forces emerged as a valuable asset for the Russians. Al-Hassan has taken part in every major operation that was fought with Russian backing. [4]
Russia’s Replacement for al-Assad?
Another crucial point that further increased al-Hassan’s importance to the Russians is that they did not want to be seen as coordinating with militias and non-state actors. That has been so important in Russia’s claim that it coordinates with recognized legitimate government forces, while the United States, for example, works with groups like the Kurdish-dominated Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). Russia has even accused the United States of supporting terrorist groups in Syria. (TASS, November 21, 2017). To give al-Hassan an even more official appearance, he was decorated by General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces. (RT [Arabic] August 19, 2017). When Putin was reelected president in March of this year, al-Hassan wrote to the Russian leader to congratulate him, and Putin responded directly to al-Hassan (World and Syria News March 20).
Speculation has grown as to whether the Russians might be preparing al-Hassan to succeed or replace al-Assad if that becomes necessary at any point. That has put al-Hassan in a difficult position. With the possibility of al-Assad thinking of eliminating him, the Russians have made al-Hassan’s personal safety their responsibility. Wherever he goes, he is seen guarded closely by masked Russian soldiers, something than no other Syria commander has (arab21.com, March 6; al-Arabiya, February 9).
Al-Hassan, for his part, has never showed any signs of political ambition and never missed an opportunity to show his allegiance and loyalty to al-Assad. Yet as much as the Alawites are envied for their hold on power, they have their own turbulent history of rivalries. [5]
General al-Hassan’s popularity within the Alawites has also grown significantly. While Bashar al-Assad comes across as someone who inherited power from his father and might take the loyalty of his community for granted, al-Hassan is seen as a genuine “heart and soul” Alawite. Religious leaders openly pray for him and call their followers to join his forces. The Alawites, a relatively small minority, were appalled by the scale of casualties in their community during the early stages of the conflict, as thousands of conscripts from the Sunni majority deserted the army. Part of that was attributed to poor planning and management by al-Assad and his senior officers. Meanwhile, al-Hassan is perceived to have been leading with both more professional tactics and higher spiritual appeal. An increasing number of young Alawites want to fight in his unit exclusively (watanderb.com, July 7).
Although al-Hassan’s relations with the Iranians were very good, for many he is seen as the one who has the power to curtail their influence in Syria. That might become a very crucial for the Russians, especially if Russia is to reach a future agreement with the United States. The latter now aims to stop Iran’s regional influence. Al-Hassan and his forces have become even more significant as the Syrian military is taking over areas in the south near the Israeli border. Israel has reportedly rejected any presence of Iranian-backed militias in southwest Syria, but did not mind Syrian army deployments (Enab Baladi, May 25). For their part, Alawite officers were also not very comfortable with the Iranian involvement in military operations, even though it was necessary support. [6]
Outlook
General al-Hassan has given his Alawite community something they have been looking for—a hero. The lives of the Alawites in Syria were transformed after Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970, shifting them from a marginalized sect into the dominant power. Yet, relations within the community are complicated. Internal rivalries sometimes became very violent, and those who moved closer to the rulers became corrupt and sometimes even bullied their own people. [7] On the other hand, al-Hassan has built his image as a disciplined soldier who despises corruption. He was once famously filmed calling the governor of Homs by phone after he found out the governor had not reported to work, and threatening to arrest him if he did not show up in 15 minutes. He told his men that corruption is more dangerous than his war enemies (al-Arabiyah, May 2, 2016).
Bashar al-Assad inherited power and the overwhelming support of his Alawite community before and during the war. However, not everyone approved of the way he handled the war. Further, the view of some that he moved from his father’s position of being Iran’s ally to being its dependent has not helped al-Assad retain support. In the early years of his rule, when the regime’s grip on power was stronger, some Alawites felt that Bashar Al-Assad was taking their support for granted. He was even once accused of converting to Sunni Islam )paldf.net, January 6, 2006). Al-Hassan, by comparison, is broadly supported by the Alawites and other regime supporters (watan.com. December 6, 2014). He is a warrior who has delayed personal promotion in order to retain a more hands-on position, leading his unit on the battlefield. Al-Hassan has vowed not to see his wife and only son until he achieves victory, and he is a pious Alawite who is determined to reconstruct Alawite shrines in areas retaken from the rebels (al-Alam, February 22; almodon.com, July 14).
The regime’s supporters see al-Hassan’s brutal acts as justified combat activities. They stress his perceived integrity in a country which, like its military, has long been tainted by corruption. Such integrity is a quality that Alawite and other regime supporters appreciate highly. With the degree of Russian support General al-Hassan enjoys and his direct contact with Putin, even if he does not become Syria’s next ruler, he is well positioned for a more senior role. For this to happen, however, he will need to survive possible attempts from al-Assad to block him.
NOTES
[1] Al-Hassan claims that it was the former Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, the father of current president Bashar al-Assad, who gave him that name. According to al-Hassan he met Hafez al-Assad when he was a young member of the Ba’ath party youth organization (Tala’e al-Ba’ath), and al-Assad gave him that name to encourage him (enabbaladi.net, August 17, 2017). The story also implied that his bravery was next to nobody’s except Hafez al-Assad’s (note that Assad means lion in Arabic).
[2] Alawites are members of an unorthodox sect of Shia Islam. They are believed to form between 10-12 percent of the Syrian people (Syria’s population is approximately 18 million). There are other religious minorities like Christians with about 10 percent, Druze about 3 percent , and Ismaeli Shia and Twelver Shia. The overwhelming majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims (about 75 percent).
[3] After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of neighboring Iraq, Syria became the gateway for foreign jihadists who crossed the borders and joined the insurgency in Iraq. The Syrian regime was so worried that it would be the next to be targeted by the United States after it toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. That assessment changed a few years later, and Syria became more cooperative. The Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad changed its strategy and showed more cooperation by cracking down on jihadists and controlling the Iraq-Syria border.
[4] For example, the operation to retake Aleppo from the rebels in late 2016, which was a major turning point in the war, especially in northern Syria, and operations against Islamic State (IS) in eastern Syria — in Ghouta earlier this year and Daraa in recent weeks. (midan.aljazeera.net, March 18).
[5] Since the inception of the modern state of Syria in the 1940s, minorities (particularly Alawite, but also Druze and Ismaelis) dominated the officers corps, as Sunnis looked down on army jobs. After a military coup in 1966, the Alawite Colonel Salah Jadid and Alawite military officers dominated the regime of the secular Ba’ath party. In 1970, Minister of Defense General Hafez al-Assad removed Jadid and put him in prison along with other Alwites. Assad became the first Alawite president of Syria in 1971. In the 1980s, Hafez al-Assad removed his brother and right-hand man Rifaat, who plotted to take power. Rifaat and his family were removed from positions and sent into exile. Hafez al-Assad died in 2000 and was succeeded by his son Bashar; but before that, General Ali Doba, head of military intelligence, and General Ali Haider, commander of Syria Special Forces, both Alawites, were forced to retire in order to guarantee a smooth succession. More recently, Bashar al-Assad was accused of plotting the bombing that led to the killing of his powerful brother-in-law and possible competitor, General Asif Shawkat in 2012.
[6] The Al-Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Shia militias it leads in Syria—and, of course, Iran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah—have all been essential to the Syrian regime’s survival. But the military customs and traditions of the Iranians, Shia militias and Hezbollah are completely different from those of the Syrian army. The latter is a more classical military, in which—as in other modern armies—officers look and act like they are in prestigious positions and are treated with utmost respect, as opposed to the more casual manner of the Iranian IRCG officers who work with the militias. Many Syrian officers have reportedly voiced their concern and anger about the casual way the Iranians deal with them, and are said to have become worried about the future of their prestige as leaders of the Syrian armed forces as the war seems to be headed towards its final chapters. (Author’s interview with a Syrian opposition activist who preferred to remain anonymous)
[7] Hafez al-Assad’s eldest son and his heir apparent, Bassel al-Assad, had famously frequently cracked down publicly on Alawites who misbehaved, including members of his own clan, to show that all people are equal, or at least that all Alawites are equal. But since Bassel’s death in a car crash in 1994, his brother Bashar has been presented in a more restrained way and with a less charismatic image.
